

Tigran Petrosian ♦ Aleksandar Matanović

THE MATCH OF THE CENTURY USSR vs. WORLD

50th Anniversary Edition



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SYSTEM OF SIGNS

±	white stands slightly better
∓	black stands slightly better
±	white has the upper hand
∓	black has the upper hand
+−	white has a decisive advantage
−+	black has a decisive advantage
=	even
∞	unclear
∞	with compensation for the material
⊙	development advantage
○	greater board room
→	with attack
↑	with initiative
↔	with counter-play
⊖	zugzwang
#	mate
!	a very good move
!!	an excellent move
?	a mistake
??	a blunder
!?	a move deserving attention
?!	a dubious move
△	with the idea
□	only move
⊂	better is
⊕	centre
»	king's side
«	queen's side
×	weak point
⊥	endgame
♖♗	bishops of opposite color
♖♖	bishops of the same color
⊖	double pawns
♙	passed pawn
>	advantage in number of pawns
⊕	time

86/203 Chess Informant

E 12 Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings

♖ 3/b Encyclopaedia of Chess Endings

N a novelty

(ch) championship

(izt) interzonal tournament

(ct) candidates' tournament

(m) match

(ol) olympiad

corr. correspondence game

RR editorial comment

R various moves

L with

– see

Foreword to the 1st Edition

The recent encounter between the leading chess players of the Soviet Union and a select team of grandmasters from other countries was indeed an event that held the attention of chess fans the world over. The “Match of the Century”, as it was called, fully justified the efforts of the sponsors, organizers and all who helped to make this event possible: the occasion was a contribution not only to the developmet of chess itself but to the cause of friendship and understanding among the peoples of the world. Five ex-champions of the world, the present champion and, most probably, several future champions assembled in the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade. With a splendid show of sportsmanship the finest chessplayers of our time, did not disappoint their fans.

The organizers of this match, all chess enthusiasts from Belgrade, wish to express their gratitude to: The World Chess Federation (FIDE), the Chess Federation of USSR, the leaders of the Soviet and World Teams, for their assistance in assuring the success of this event, to various persons prominent in Yugoslav political and cultural life for their contribution, to numerous economic organizations and news agencies for their support, to the grandmasters who participated in the match.

This publication on the “Match of the Century”, which is a lasting tribute to the creative talents of these grandmasters, brings the whole event to its natural conclusion. There are several unique features of the book, e.g. with only a few exceptions all the participants have annotated their own games (in Russian and English). In this way the reader may follow each game from the point of view of both players. The notes of the Soviet players are in Russian, and those of the World team in English.*

** In the 50th Anniversary edition the notes of all the players are in English.*

Aleksandar Matanović

Aleksandar Matanović (b 1930) is a Serbian Grandmaster, and Chess Informant co-founder. He was the Yugoslav national chess Champion on three occasions (1962, 1969 and 1978), and represented Yugoslavia internationally at many team events, most notably Olympiads, winning several medals with the mighty Yugoslav squad. He devoted the later years of his career to Chess Informant publications, especially the famous Encyclopedias of Chess Openings (ECO) and Informant periodicals. Also, Matanović published several instructive chess manuals, and few game collections.

Foreword to the 50th Anniversary Edition

The match between the USSR and the Rest of the World was an epoch-defining event that featured many of the greatest names in the history of chess. Five World Champions, and all of the world's highest-rated players – without exception – took part. Not for nothing was it billed as the "Match of the Century".

The idea for this book was inspired by Chess Informant's work USSR v. Rest of the World¹, which was published in Belgrade not long after the match. It contained brief biographical details of the players, and annotations to the games by the players themselves, in English (by the Rest of the World players) and Russian (by the Soviet participants). That book was the starting point of our effort, as it was extremely satisfying to develop the original work compiled by Tigran Petrosian and Aleksandar Matanović. The present work features expanded player biographies and translations of the Russian-language annotations. It also features translations of contemporary articles from the Soviet chess press, as well as later recollections by some of the players and key characters involved in the match.

The game of chess then was very different to the modern version. Today, the fundamental role played by powerful computer engines has removed much of its mystery. But it is not only the game itself that has changed; its leading actors have also, perhaps, become less colourful. In preparing the biographies of the participants, we were struck by the extent to which many of them had been affected, either directly or indirectly, by some of the most momentous events of the first half of the twentieth century. The Russian Revolution of October 1917, the Great Terror of the late 1930s, the Nazi Invasion of the USSR in 1941 and the subsequent Siege of Leningrad, the Holocaust, the partition of Europe along capitalist and communist lines – these had all left their mark. The lives of many of today's leading grandmasters, most if not all of whom have been professional chessplayers for their entire adult lives (and sometimes even longer than that), may seem slightly one-dimensional in comparison.

It is unlikely that the game of chess will ever regain the status that it once enjoyed in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, as well as in Yugoslavia. Truly, it is difficult to imagine the scene that took place in central Belgrade (and described in the Introduction) occurring in any city of the world today.

On the 50th anniversary of that great event in the Serbian capital, we invite the reader to take a step back to those years and to re-live the match as it was experienced at the time, in the words of its participants and some of the leading journalists of the day...

Douglas Griffin
Igor Žvegljć
February 2020.

INTRODUCTION

Half a Century Ago...

Half a century ago. Early April 1970. Richard Nixon is just over a year into his presidency, and will soon launch the secret invasion of Cambodia by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces that will result in the spread of the ongoing conflict in South-East Asia. In just over a week's time, on 11th April, the ill-fated Apollo 13 spaceflight will take off from the Kennedy Space Centre in Cape Canaveral, Florida. The day before this, Paul McCartney announced his departure from The Beatles. On the 15th of the month, an incredible 136,505 football fans will pack into Glasgow's Hampden Park to watch the Scottish champions, Celtic, defeat their English counterparts, Leeds United, to advance to the final of the European Cup. At the 42nd Academy Awards (Oscars) ceremony, *Midnight Cowboy* will win the prize for the best film. *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid* is still playing in cinemas, while Simon and Garfunkel's *Bridge Over Troubled Water* is riding high in the music charts.

While in Belgrade, capital of the Serbian Republic and of Yugoslavia as a whole, the "Match of the Century" has been taking place...

In this unique event, two ten-player teams – one from the Soviet Union, the other from the "Rest of the World" – faced each other over four rounds in a competition that captured the imagination of the chess world, and continues to fascinate to this day. The games were played in front of two thousand spectators in the Great Hall of the *Dom Sindikata* (the House of Trade Unions), within sight of the Federal Assembly Building, home of the parliament of Yugoslavia. We may picture the scene... on the brightly-lit stage, against the background of a blue curtain, black and orange pieces are displayed on the white and yellow squares of the demonstration boards. Around them are ten operators, dressed in white. In the hall itself, it is dark. Outside, on Marx-Engels Square, the lights in the streets and in the surrounding buildings have been dimmed so that fans who had been unable to get hold of the sought-after tickets can follow the progress of the most interesting games on a giant illuminated demonstration board – a gift from the workers of the Yugoslav Atomic Centre. Commentary on the games by International Master Mario Bertok is relayed to the crowds by loudspeaker...^{2, 3}

The event in Belgrade had been many years in the making. As long ago as 1945, following the famous USSR v. USA radio match – in which the decisive defeat of the Americans by 15½:4½ announced the coming hegemony of the Soviet Union – the idea of a USSR v. "Rest of the World" contest was suggested by Savielly Tartakower. Further conversations regarding the possibility of such a match had taken place in Moscow during the second half of the 1948 World Championship Match-Tournament. However, the idea did not begin to take concrete shape until March of 1969, when M. Molerović of the Serbian Chess Union asked whether it would be possible to organise a match under the aegis of FIDE. Following further discussions during the Petrosian-Spassky match, the preliminary agreement of the USSR Chess Federation was gained. At the FIDE Congress in San Juan (1969), draft regulations were presented, and the ex-World Champion Max Euwe agreed to appear in the role of Captain for the Rest of the World team.⁴

Within the Soviet hierarchy there was qualified support for the event. The USSR Chess Federation was answerable to the Committee on Physical Culture and Sport, which reported to the USSR

Council of Ministers, the main executive and administrative agency of the Soviet Union. The primary concern of the Chairman of the Committee, S. P. Pavlov⁵, was whether or not the Soviet team could be relied on to win. The opinions of leading Soviet grandmasters were sought, and once assurances had been given, the permission of the authorities ultimately followed. However, as a result, the Soviet players were under enormous pressure to deliver. Many years later, ex-World Champion Vasily Smyslov, who played on the 6th board for the USSR team, recalled:

*What is remembered first and foremost: in Belgrade the struggle was conducted much more sharply than in any tournament. In terms of its intensity, it was an incomparable spectacle. Psychologically, we felt very strongly the responsibility that lay on us. Our leadership was convinced that we would win with a crushing score, as we did against the Americans in 1945. Then, we had been invited to the American Embassy, and we saw that the entire embassy was simply shocked by the score of 4½ : 15½. Probably, the Sports Committee expected something similar from us this time.*⁶

Once the decision had been made, every effort was made to ensure success. The players and some of the Soviet Union's best trainers participated in a training camp outside Moscow, which involved physical preparation as well as purely chess-related activity. However, relations among the players seem to have been strained at times, particularly over the question of board-order. Many years later, Boris Spassky said the following with regard to the question of team spirit:

*Yo know, we almost lost this match. We were not a unified team, because the board-order was decided by the USSR Sports Committee.*⁷

On the Rest of the World side, the main practical difficulties were around the question of the top two boards. Max Euwe had taken the sensible decision of selecting the ten players and two reserves on the basis of players' Elo ratings. At that time, Bobby Fischer and Bent Larsen were clearly the best players in the West, but Fischer had played only one game in the previous eighteen months, while Larsen's recent record gave him some justification for claiming that he should lead the Rest of the World select. For some time it was unclear as to whether Fischer would play at all, but no sooner had he agreed to take part, than Larsen stated that he would only play on condition that he were given top board. It seemed that the problem was intractable, but thanks to the remarkable flexibility and perseverance of the organizers, a solution was eventually found.

In all, the event had cost more than \$100,000 – more than \$650,000 in today's money – to organise⁸. Then, at 17:00 on 29th March, the event was opened by the president of the Yugoslav Government, M. Ribičić.⁹

A flavour of just what had been going on behind the scenes up to this point can be read in the following articles from the contemporary Soviet and later Russian press.

Articles in The Soviet & Russian press

In this chapter we present you the extracts from articles in the contemporary Soviet press – as well as from later memoirs by some of those involved – which should allow you to sense the flavour of the events in the lead-up to the match.

Note: In agreeing to the participation of the Soviet team, the USSR Sports Committee let it be known that on no account should their opponents be known as the “World Team”. Their argument was that the team could not be termed as such, since it necessarily did not include players from the Soviet Union. Thus, in the Soviet literature of the time the rather clumsy term ‘Team of Selected Chess-players of the World’ is used. For this extended and revised edition, we have used the simpler term “Rest of the World” whenever possible.

Article by M. A. Beilin¹⁰, *Po Gvozdike Za Pobedu Nad Sbornoi Mira – Podvodnye Kamni “Match Veka”, “64” (№ 4, 2000).*

Carnations for Victory over the World Team - The Submerged Reefs of the “Match of the Century”

Chairman of the Committee on Physical Culture and Sport under the USSR Council of Ministers from 1968 until 1983, S. P. Pavlov. (Photo source: commons.wikimedia.org)

Thirty years ago the path from the Central Chess Club on Gogolevsky Boulevard to the Sports Committee, which was then to be found on Skatertny Lane, was short and well-trodden. But this time I completed it more rapidly than usual. A call to the Chairman himself was an unusual event for the head of the Chess Department.

The large office, which after its refurbishment and the arrival in it of S. P. Pavlov¹¹ was nicknamed by the staff the “Pavlov Palace”, was brightly lit. My eye was immediately caught by the backs of the heads of four World Champions. “Black, redheaded, grey and blond” flashed in my mind. The champions were seated in front of the chairman’s writing desk. I excused myself for my lateness, reminding Sergei Pavlovich that the department was now located in a different building. He nodded and returned to the theme.

- “What will the result of the match be?”

Botvinnik, the oldest and not for nothing known as the “Patriarch”, replied:

- “We will win”.



Short and clear, in the style of the champion.

Everyone smiled in a friendly way. Spassky, Petrosian and Smyslov confirmed Botvinnik's assessment; the atmosphere warmed. The champions took responsibility and the chairman reached the conclusion that there would be a match.

The grandmasters dispersed. Sergey Pavlovich turned to me and asked, seriously: "How did they know that the match was in question?"

I guessed that it was most likely of all from me, since I had called one of them that morning on the telephone. But just in case, I answered evasively "Sergey Pavlovich, World Champions have access to wide information".

The chairman did not manage to clarify my role...

Already in 1945, when the USSR team won a radio match against the USA team by the sensational and more than convincing score 15½ : 4½, the ingenious grandmaster Tartakower noted that it would be good to hold a match between a USSR team and a World team. Almost a quarter of a century passed, and in 1969 the FIDE Congress instructed the Yugoslav Chess Federation and the Serbian Chess Union to organise such a match. The host country was a natural choice. Yugoslavia had contributed enormously to the world chess movement. The world calendar without the international tournaments in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, Skopje and other Yugoslav cities would have been much poorer.

Soon the official invitation arrived in Moscow. The conditions appeared good; the organisers had foreseen everything, even as far as insurance. The World Champion, the grandmasters and the Chess Federation liked the idea of the match. No-one objected to it.

After simple estimates with pencil in hand, as advised by the wise leaders outlining the make-up of the team, the matter was reported to the chairman of the Sports Committee. He picked up the phone and called a very important comrade. And he gained approval. At all this I was present.

A short time passed, and the bosses said that there had been an objection. Supposedly, the objection was by Comrade Zimyanin¹², the editor of *Pravda*. Although he did not have any immediate concerns with sport and chess, he did have some regarding questions of the wider world, and indeed they were of the most immediate sort.

I of course understood that there was some risk of losing this match, but like all ordinary chess-players I wanted the match to take place. There was no personal interest: Yugoslavia held no particular appeal, as in the plan for the year I had two other trips. All that remained for me were worries and risk.

Once the powers-that-be had turned their attention to the match, I was asked the ritual question: "Whose idea was all this?". I decided it was better not to answer.

In place of a reply, as I have already said, I picked up the phone and called the World Champion, as they say, "cold". In my heart, a conflict between these officials and chess did not arise. Further events unfolded by force, although in the manner of champions various subtleties were observed. For example, on one occasion I was required to send a written request to the Moscow city chief regarding

the reconstruction of the Central Chess Club. The task seems simple enough, but in what order was it to be signed? Memories of ancient localism were alive in the minds of the contemporaries. We had to introduce rationalisation – the signatures were arranged not one under the other, but side-by-side, on one line. In general, when the matter gets as far as defending chess as a whole, agreement is achievable.

Thus, the champions conspired together and the joint visit to the chairman of the Sports Committee took place. A submerged reef had been successfully circumvented. However, the chairman attached a condition – not under any circumstances were the opponents to be referred to as the “World” team. This is how the vague pseudonym “Team of Selected Chess-players of the World” came into being. Later, journalists christened the event “The Match of the Century”, and everything fell into order.

The political problems having been solved, prosaic ones came to the fore: how was the team to be recruited? There was no shortage of willing candidates – ten full team members and two reserves had to be chosen on merit. Behind the cordon, ex-World Champion M. Euwe, captain of the Rest of the World team, solved the problem in simple fashion – by taking

account of individual ratings. The only hitch was that Bent Larsen had declared his right to first board. The uncompromising Fischer, in his turn, astonished everyone – there was to be no dispute, although he seemingly said that he all the same knew himself to be the stronger player. Our team in general was thrown together without difficulty, but who would play on which board immediately became particularly important and, naturally, was kept absolutely secret. So secret that it was not even revealed to the director of the Chess Department. Nor did the Presidium of the USSR Chess Federation ask. I was hardly left out for humane reasons, but this was convenient rather than offensive.

When the board order, which had previously been reserved for the press family, was made public, Botvinnik proved to be on the eighth board. The Patriarch was offended. But he complied. And played at ‘full voltage’. Only at the airport, when the team was seen off to Belgrade and the photo-correspondent wanted to take a snapshot for posterity, Mikhail Moiseevich flatly refused to be pictured with everyone. I tried to speak with him, but he replied shortly and clearly to me, in the style of the champion, that he would not be photographed with “them”. Probably, he suspected someone of disloyalty. Or, perhaps, all of them. Aleksandr Roshal, performing an analogous request on behalf of the photographer, received the conclusive response: “No! I will not be photographed with this... gang.”

The photo-correspondent took Botvinnik’s photo separately. Then, admittedly, a photo-montage was done. The contemporary technique of reconstruction solved everything.

The struggle in the match unfolded gravely. On the first boards we proved to be in deficit. Fischer picked up 3 out of 4 against Petrosian. On the other hand, ‘old’ Keres, who was ‘stuck’ on the tenth board, collected the same number of points. Botvinnik, Smyslov, Geller and Taimanov won their micro-matches. Victory was gained with difficulty and by the minimal score 20½ : 19½. Nonetheless, victory. Our team and federation received congratulations from various countries at the state and public level. But “no-one is a prophet in his own land”. Not having won in this way!

At the airport the grandmasters were met modestly. Each of them was handed a single red

carnation...

Thirty years have passed. There is no Soviet Union; there is no USSR team; many of the participants in the match have passed away. But in chess history the 'Match of the Century' remains a memorable event, eloquent evidence of the high authority of our native school of chess. In 1984 this authority was confirmed in a so-called 'Return-match of the Century'. But it did not have the resonance of the previous one.

And if it were to again be repeated? Perhaps, a truncated USSR, that is, Russia, and this time without mistakes?

Article by A. B. Roshal¹³, *Vperedí – Bolshaya Igra*, “64” (№ 13, 27th March - 2nd April, 1970).

Ahead – A Great Match

This week there begins a match that is everywhere being called “The Match of the Century”. The captain of the team of our opponents – grandmaster and ex-World Champion Max Euwe gave a wholly logical justification for this shrill title: now and in the next few decades, there is no doubt that no single country will manage to achieve such supremacy in the sport of chess as that which is presently enjoyed by the representatives of the USSR – hence, the Match of the Century, the 20th Century!

Around an event that promises much, there are many prognoses. No-one is in any doubt at all about the victory of the Soviet team; the headline of one article, on the contrary, asks “Does the World Team Have Any Chance?”. But first of all, regarding the accuracy of the wording. Can a team for which our outstanding grandmasters do not appear be called a ‘World Team’? Of course not. And therefore the collective of our opponents has gained the name ‘Team of Selected Chess-players of the World’.

Two days before the departure of our grandmasters, a reception was held in the embassy of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia – the organising country of the match. As always, foreign journalists actively assailed the members of the Soviet delegation, interviewing the champions. In exchange they were informed of the latest news: Miguel Najdorf and Friðrik Ólafsson were already in Belgrade, Bent Larsen, despite the recent statement [*Translator’s note*: that he would only play on condition that he was given 1st board], had requested his airline ticket from Copenhagen to Belgrade, Robert Fischer was flying in the first-class cabin of the Indian airline company *Maharajah*...

To the reception of which I have spoken, our grandmasters had come almost directly from the Moscow Region Rest Home, where they had all been preparing together for the match (Boris Spassky considers the possibility of conducting such a training camp to be an important advantage of the Soviet team). I was fortunate enough to spend a few days in this rest home and to witness this preparation. The impressions of one of the directors of the training camp, Master L. Abramov, have been added. Regular skiing excursions (on the last day, on the notice board: “Today – farewell to the skis!”) revealed their leaders. The spectators’ favourite was Lev Polugaevsky. At table tennis, Paul Keres was best, at billiards – Leonid Stein. However, there were also other opinions...

In general, in the training games the grandmasters were inexhaustibly inventive. Keres, for example, with Black, played the King’s Indian Defence in very original fashion, demanding in exchange from Petrosian that on 1. e4 he would necessarily reply 1... e5. But here the opponent of the Estonian matador landed a ‘sucker punch’ by employing Keres’ own system. Already in the next game, retribution awaited this ‘breaking of convention’: Keres played the King’s Gambit, beloved of him in his younger years, and Petrosian, smiling, raised his hands in the air. While the pleasure that the spectators took from the meeting of Mikhail Tal and Semyon Furman defies description...

Why was Furman here? This grandmaster, as well as Igor Bondarevsky, as well as Livo Nei and

Isaac Efremovich Boleslavsky – helped the team members in their theoretical preparation. I have called Boleslavsky by his name and patronymic since here he was christened ‘Academician’. This grandmaster gave lectures to the entire team. Admitted to one of these lectures, I was at first simply moved by the spectacle that had opened up to me.

On the entrance of Boleslavsky, the entire cohort of mischievous grandmasters, as if in a school lesson, jumped up and respectfully froze. Outwardly, no-one expressed their surprise; the ‘Academician’ allowed himself to sit down and set about delivering the lecture. Replies during the exercise he categorically avoided: “I did not give you the floor” (this, to Vasily Smyslov), “You do not understand such positions” (to Efim Geller). Boleslavsky was harsh, but fair, and thanks to this, such lessons soon became mainstream and everyone was fascinated by the work.

Individual lessons included preparation for encounters with the specific opponents. In so doing, account was naturally taken of the previous relationship between each pair. Strictly speaking, I did not interview anyone, but I gradually became interested in the score of the previous encounters, the prognoses for the coming ones, and the possible results of the match as a whole. No-one expressed any doubt about the victory in general. From the modest 21 : 19 (Bronstein) to the convincing: 23 : 17 and 24 : 16 (Korchnoi and Tal, respectively).

I very much wanted to know how the future opponents had previously played against one another. It should be noted that the greater the advantage in score they have over their probable opponents, the more reluctant the great grandmasters are to talk about this topic.

-“My business with Wolfgang Uhlmann in chess has turned out to be perhaps even better than with you in ping-pong”, noted Mark Taimanov, having won another match against me.

I thought that from six, he had won two with four draws, but recently in Dresden I learned from Uhlmann’s wife that he had won three. It turns out that Frau Uhlmann counts better than us...

Gradually I came to know that Spassky had twice defeated Fischer with the same number of draws, and that the ‘peaceable’ Petrosian had to play a whole ten games with Larsen in order to agree on a first draw, and the general score stood at $6\frac{1}{2} : 3\frac{1}{2}$ in favour of the ex-World Champion. Viktor Korchnoi had also made only one draw with Lajos Portisch, but, having won two games from the Hungarian, had lost as many. Polugaevsky and Vlastimil Hort had met only twice, and both games had finished peacefully. I did not elicit a response from Geller regarding the score in his numerous encounters with his Yugoslav friend Svetozar Gligorić, but his comrades told me that the advantage in the results of the games was on the side of the Soviet grandmaster – 3 : 1. Smyslov and Samuel Reshevsky had something similar. True, the Muscovite had seemingly won an additional game. Mikhail Botvinnik had twice defeated Milan Matulović, Tal had won the same number of times (here one should add, with two draws) against Najdorf. The “oldest of the veterans”, as he jokingly called himself – the young-looking Keres – flatly refused any counting of scores, but all the same confidentially advised that he retained the most pleasant memories of his meetings with Ivkov. The veteran’s colleagues confirmed: “Paul Petrovich very often beats Borya!”.

All of the meetings excited me, but, drawing some general conclusions, I was convinced that particular attention would be fixed on the duels on the first three boards. Interesting games were also be expected on the 8th and 9th boards: Botvinnik v. Matulović (if Mikhail Moiseevich did not grip

the Yugoslav in a strategic vice, noted one) and Tal v. Najdorf (if Misha showed excessive activity, noted another).

Summarising all that has been said, I would question the suggested results in the individual matches that were sent to the editorship of '64' by the reader P. F. Shatalov from Piatigorsk. Of course, now is not the time to present readers' prognoses, but we thank comrade Shatalov for the information and calculations. Certainly, not the most pleasant of them is the contrast in the average age of the two teams: the USSR team, roughly 42½ years; the Rest of the World, 4 years younger. Interestingly, the youngest participant in the event is Hort, who was born in 1944. While Fischer is already 27... Four days before the start of the match, Smyslov turn 49. On the day of the first round Uhlmann will mark his 35 years; on the day of the last, Portisch will turn 33.

To judge the sporting form of our grandmasters is seemingly straightforward: the results of many competitions, active rest on the eve of the match, serious preparation – these are all evidence of good form. Tal (it is now accepted that one must talk of his health) felt himself to be normal, for the time being... correspondents don't ask him about this! At that same reception at the Yugoslav embassy I heard how a journalist, long known to him, cried "Oh, you are looking very fine! You are probably in good form?" – Tal replied: "I still suspect that my form is all the same worse than my health".

The information from the latest foreign tournaments is evidence of the full battle-readiness of the Rest of the World team. Larsen won a double-round tournament of eight grandmasters in the Swiss town of Lugano, with 9½ points. Second there, a point behind, was the first reserve in the team of our opponents, Ólafsson. Matulović appeared in the homeland of Ólafsson, in the Icelandic capital, Reykjavík. In a not very strong tournament the Yugoslav did not take anything like a high place, but this means nothing; it is generally known that the young grandmaster is someone with a very interesting style, but who – as it often turns out – also plays very unevenly. The last names in the list of participants in the forthcoming Interzonal are those of Portisch and Ivkov, having taken 1st-2nd place in a small (four-player) playoff event after the zonal tournament. This tournament finished the other day in Prague, and now, finally, all of the participants in the Interzonal are known. The right to continue the struggle for the world crown is held by all of the main Rest of the World team... except for the its leader. All!

The senior trainer of our team, I. Z. Bondarevsky, does not exclude the possibility of defeat on one or two boards. "But" – he all the same adds – "overall victory for us is worth ten times as much, and in the coming struggle we should achieve it, with such an outstanding team!".

The Match of the Century – Day by Day Pre-history of the Match

Like all major events, the ‘Match of the Century’ has its pre-history. A quarter of a century ago, when the chess-players of the USSR delivered a major defeat to the strong USA team in a radio match, grandmaster S. Tartakower said “The result of $15\frac{1}{2} : 4\frac{1}{2}$ appears fantastical, but it is quite real. I think that Soviet chess-players could have fought on level terms with a team made up of the strongest grandmasters of the rest of the world. It is clear to me that the great era of Soviet chess is beginning.”.

I could not believe that someone would take over the organisation of such a match. The representative of the USSR Chess Federation, D. Postnikov, recalled that a conversation regarding such a match took place in 1948 in Moscow, during the match-tournament for the World Championship. M. Vidmar, who was chief arbiter of that event, said that his greatest desire would be to be the arbiter of such a match.

Much water subsequently flowed under the bridge. Sometimes, during major events, the idea of such a match resurfaced, but then it was once again forgotten about, because an organiser capable of bringing the idea to reality could not be found. In our day too Soviet chess-players dominate in individual and team events. The very successes of Soviet chess have made an enormous impression in the development of chess art over the whole world.

In recent years, in various countries there have appeared a series of chess-players of extra-class – B. Larsen, R. Fischer, V. Hort, L. Portisch. To them should be added S. Gligorić, W. Uhlmann, M. Najdorf, S. Reshevsky, who already had the reputation of being leading grandmasters.

In the Serbian Chess Union, the match ‘USSR – Rest of the World’ was spoken about for the first time in March 1969. The member of the Presidium of the Union, M. Molerović, known among us as a good organiser, asked me whether it would be possible to organise such a match under the aegis of FIDE. I replied that first of all it would be necessary to obtain the agreement in principle of the Soviet Federation, and only then to ask FIDE to take the match under its patronage.

During the Petrosian - Spassky match, a conversation took place regarding the possibility of a USSR – World match. And the preliminary agreement of the USSR Chess Federation was gained.

At the FIDE Congress in San Juan (1969) we presented draft regulations for the match, while the ex-World Champion M. Euwe agreed to appear in the role of captain of the Rest of the World Team. According to the regulations, the organiser was obliged to take upon themselves all of the expenses associated with the match. It must be said that at that time we did not have the means, and believed that such a grandiose event could not take place without the support of tourist organisations, entrepreneurs, newspapers and magazines.

The main difficulties lay elsewhere. Would we manage to create a team of the strongest chess-players of various countries? After all, these grandmasters were involved in a major programme of appearances in various tournaments. At the congress in San Juan, the Soviet representative B. Rodionov correctly noted that the absence of some leading grandmasters, such as B. Larsen and R.

Fischer, would significantly lessen the interest in the match.

In October there began the ‘hunt’ for the strongest, first of all for those who probably ought to be included in the team of the World select. Particularly unclear was the question of Fischer, who had not appeared in tournaments since September 1968.

I had wanted to exploit my stay in the USA and to meet with Fischer, but to find the American grandmaster proved not to be simple due to his frequent travelling. After some unsuccessful attempts, I all the same managed to get on the telephone with the elusive American. Fischer said that the idea of the match was very interesting, but that four games was too few, and that any sort of chance events were possible. I reminded him that team events could not last 20 rounds. We agreed that he would be sent an official invitation and also the regulations. All this was sent to Fischer, after which a lengthy period of waiting began.

Meanwhile, on the 8th December a protocol regarding the match was signed, and at the beginning of January M. Euwe announced the line-up of the Rest of the World team. In a letter of 19th January, B. Larsen wrote to me: “I agree to participate in the match. I am not pushing for any special conditions. But I would be very disappointed, were I not to be playing on 1st board...”.

However, the choice of players and the board order was a matter for the captain, not the organiser.

Conversations with Fischer

On 10th February the US Chess Federation advised of the fact that S. Reshevsky, and also P. Benko and L. Evans, who were included in the ‘long-list’ of the Rest of the World team, had agreed to participate in the match. Regarding R. Fischer, they advised in the telegram that “for the time being, nothing is known of his decision”.

A few days after the telegram, there arrived a letter from Fischer himself. “The idea of the match” – wrote the American grandmaster – “appears very interesting to me. I wish the organisers every success. This match will undoubtedly be the event of its era.” Fischer wrote further that he would have happily participated in this grandiose event, but wanted to have the possibility of playing a “great match” with one of the Soviet grandmasters that would last until six victories, with draws not counting.

In conclusion Fischer expressed the hope that the organisers would meet his conditions, with which they were probably familiar, since he usually pressed for them. He went on to list them: during play any sort of analytical help for the participants should be prohibited; the players should first make their moves and only then write them down; still and film photography should be prohibited in the tournament hall; spectators should be no less than 25 feet from the participants; there should be artificial daylight in the tournament hall; the chess pieces should be suitable, otherwise he would reserve the right to play with his own ones.

An agreement accepting all of Fischer’s conditions should be signed by the tournament committee. Regarding participation in the match, R. Fischer limited himself to the reminder that “play in such a short event does not lack risk for my name...”.

14th February

A telegram was sent to Fischer with the reply: “The match in Belgrade is an excellent opportunity for you to fight against Spassky, who as World Champion is risking significantly more. Your agreement to participate would represent a friendly gesture...”.

15th February

Telegram from Fischer: “After your telegram I have reconsidered my position. I still need your clarification of a series of points, after which a final decision will be taken. You should give me your opinion of my special conditions. Send me also a picture of the lighting in the tournament hall, a list of the prizes, the authority of team captain Euwe etc.”

16th February

The organising committee, after detailed analysis of Fischer’s conditions, came to the conclusion that they were not so terrible. The most questionable was the requirement that moves should be written down only after they have been played. But we took a “Solomon-like” decision: the interpretation of the rules would be the prerogative of the arbiter. A telegram was sent to Fischer: “Your conditions have, in the main, been accepted. You are invited to come to Belgrade no later than 22nd February, and once here, to decide whether to participate in the match or not. The expenses associated with the trip are on our account.”

The organising committee decided to take this course since on 25th February there was supposed to take place the exchange of team line-ups by board, after which no re-ordering would have been possible, other than changes of the two reserve players. Simultaneously, we asked the USSR Chess Federation for a postponement in the exchange of team lists until 1st March. Our proposal was accepted.

18th February

Fischer telegraphed: “I agree to come for a week, so that I can decide whether to play or not. Send ticket and money for the trip”.

19th February

A ticket was sent to Fischer; on the same day there arrived another telegram from him: “We can arrange everything by telephone.” The same day, Fischer spoke by telephone with the vice-chairman of our federation, A. Matanović.

20th February

Telegram from Los Angeles: “I agree to participate in the match USSR – Rest of the World. Fischer.”

It seemed that the matter with the American grandmaster had been resolved. Now we could occupy ourselves with Larsen.

26th February

The chairman of the organising committee, S. Majstorović and the match director D. Perović headed to the Netherlands. There at the time was B. Larsen, who was giving a series of simultaneous displays. They failed to catch him in Amsterdam, but managed to speak to him by telephone. Larsen

was unhappy at being given 2nd board, but he intended to play in the match.

28th February

No sooner had the representatives of the organising committee returned from the Netherlands, than in the newspapers there appeared a statement by B. Larsen, given by him in Lugano. The Danish grandmaster had reconsidered, and would not play in the match if he was left on 2nd board.

In a letter sent to the president of FIDE, the organising committee and the team captains, he explained the reason for his refusal: in the last years he had achieved many more tournament successes than Fischer had in his entire life.

2nd March

Fischer sent a new 9-page letter. Until now he had not once raised the question of an extra-honorarium for participation. But this time the letter was dedicated in the main to financial questions. It turned out that Fischer had only agreed to participate in the match so that the team captain could shortly afterwards present the list of participants. He would make his final decision only once a decision had been made on a number of important questions, in particular regarding the extra-honorarium (\$5000), the prize for 1st board, special prizes, play on Fridays and Saturdays, lighting, expenditure on telegrams, etc.

He concluded by writing: if the tournament organisers are not able to meet the conditions regarding the tournament hall, then he was ready to play in a different room... Replies on all points were sent to Fischer.

18th March

Judging by his telegram, Fischer was not happy: "The financial conditions", he wrote, "are unsatisfactory. If the particular playing conditions in the hall cannot be guaranteed, I agree to play in a different hall with special lighting. At the same time Fischer advised that he intended to come to Belgrade a few days before the start of the match.

19th March

We let the American grandmaster know that none of the participants would receive an extra-honorarium. The tournament hall had been prepared with lighting as per his wishes. The refitting of the lighting had incurred additional expenditure. The airline company advised that Fischer had reserved tickets, but that he had not collected them.

24th March

In Belgrade there arrived the oldest participant in the match, the Argentinian grandmaster M. Najdorf, who on the 15th April would turn 60 years old. A few days earlier, the Icelandic grandmaster F. Ólafsson had arrived.

In terms of temperament, M. Najdorf was undoubtedly the youngest participant in the match. It would be difficult to find another such cheerful chess-players. Without even having had time to settle in to the hotel, he immediately headed to the international women's tournament that was taking place in the city. There he found himself a blitz partner, and he played until the middle of the night.

Najdorf spoke of the fact that it was his great fortune to play in the ‘Match of the Century’. He spoke about his opponent as a genius of attack. “Alekhine had everything” – he said – “but no-one in the history of chess was such a master of attack as Tal.”

25th March

Two unpleasant pieces of news and one good one. The airline company advised that Fischer’s tickets had been taken, and that he would be guaranteed “special service” during the flight, such as it was offered by the Indian *Maharajah company*. We saw this news as a good omen.

However, in the evening the latest telegram from the American arrived: “I would like to get a reply regarding the possibility of playing in another room with special lighting.” That’s how it was! On the one hand, the company Air India maintained that Fischer would arrive on 26th or 27th of March. On the other – a telegram. Once again, uncertainty. After a short consultation the organising committee sent Fischer the following reply: “The hall has been prepared according to your wishes. \$2000 has been spent on the refitting of the lighting.”

The second surprise was with Najdorf. During dinner he suddenly discovered that he had lost his documents and chequebook. Exactly the same thing had happened to the Argentinian grandmaster the previous October in Mallorca.

They were looked for in every place that Najdorf had been during the day, but without results. We decided to make an announcement in the chess section of the newspaper *Politika*.

26th March

In the morning a young man came to the hotel ‘Metropol’ and gave Najdorf his documents and chequebook. “I found them in the street”, he said. In the evening S. Reshevsky arrived. He also had problems. He had lost a package containing belongings for religious observance. Reshevsky was in desperation. But on the next flight from London his package arrived. The American grandmaster’s mood lifted. Reshevsky considered that the Soviet team was the favourite. While the make-up of the World team was, in his view, poor. On the bottom four boards the Soviet chess-players had a clear advantage.

27th March

The USSR team arrived in full. Old acquaintances and friends. Interviews, conversations, unending photography.

In the afternoon, B. Larsen and K. Darga arrived. Larsen was accompanied from the airport to the hotel by the chairman of the organising committee, Majstorović. Conversation naturally centred on the match, but there was no word on whether the Dane would definitely play. Meanwhile, to the questions of the journalists, Larsen replied that he would not play, and that he had come to Belgrade in his capacity as a journalist. Judging from everything, the Dane was quite unable to accept the fact that he had been put on 2nd board.

We went to meet R. Fischer. But at the airport we learned that his aircraft has landed earlier. On our return to the *Metropol*, Fischer was already there. We spoke with him on the telephone. We excused ourselves for having been late. We hoped that everything was in order with his participation. He

predicted the victory of the Soviet team.

28th March

All of the remaining participants in the match arrived. In the evening, the captain of the Rest of the World team, M. Euwe, also arrived. On the way from the airport we informed him that everything was in doubt, but it was possible that neither Fischer nor Larsen would play. Fischer had still not seen the tournament venue and could demand to play in a different room, to which we would not agree. Larsen did not want to appear on 2nd board.

Everyone was worried. The absence of two such chess-players would greatly reduce the significance of the match.

At the hotel, a sensation awaited us: Fischer had announced that he was ready to play on the 2nd board. In recent years Larsen had indeed achieved greater successes, the American grandmaster recognised. But was it really possible that Fischer had voluntarily rejected the 1st board? Such an idea did not enter our heads. Now it was necessary to clarify just how serious was the declaration.

Half of the work was done. But in the protocol it was written that once the team lists had been exchanged, modifications to the board order were prohibited. M. Euwe appealed to the captain of the Soviet team, D. Postnikov, with a request to consider the possibility of a change. A short time later both captains and the arbiter signed a new protocol, according to which Larsen would play on the 1st board, and Fischer on the 2nd. The display of good will on the part of the Soviet team was welcomed by all.

Meanwhile, Fischer and two members of the organising committee examined the tournament hall. Fischer remained content. Seemingly, everything was in order...

And thus to the drawing of lots. In the 1st round the Soviet team would play with White on the odd-numbered boards.

The Match Begins

29th March

At 10:00 there was a meeting of the captains, their deputies and the arbiters. Some final decisions were taken. The atmosphere was friendly and business-like. Unexpectedly, an hour before the opening ceremony of the match I was called to the telephone by Fischer. I anticipated that something was wrong.

Majstorović and I went to see the American grandmaster.

Fischer asked whether Petrosian had agreed to first make his moves and then write them down, and not the opposite – which in his opinion contradicted FIDE's rules of play. I said that it was not a serious problem, but Fischer insisted. Then I promised Fischer that I would pass his request, via Euwe, to the captain of the Soviet team, and I expressed my certainty that the matter would be resolved positively.

Fischer was clearly upset that he had ceded the 1st board. He complained that he had felt tired the previous day, and this was why he had taken such a “stupid” decision. He grabbed his head in despair.

Well, well! We had believed that the matter with Fischer and Larsen was over, and here again was uncertainty.

We headed for the tournament hall. I was told that Fischer was once again looking for me. On the telephone Fischer asked whether everything was in order on the score of the recording of moves; whether the Soviet side had agreed. At that moment I did not know how Petrosian would react to this demand. Besides, there remained literally a matter of minutes until the opening ceremony, and I replied “Everything is in order!”. Only later did I learn that Petrosian had promised to fulfil the request of the American grandmaster, although previously he had always first written down the move, and only then played it on the board.

17:00. The participants and guests were in the hall of the Dom Sindikata. Everything was ready for a match without equal in the history of chess competitions. The welcome at the opening ceremony was given by the chairman of the organising committee, S. Majstorović, and the mayor of the city of Belgrade, B. Pešić. He noted the interest in the match, and its significance for the further development of chess art.

The floor was handed over to M. Euwe and B. Postnikov. Euwe said that “the Soviet team is very strong. In it are playing the World Champion and three ex-Champions. What can an ex-World Champion do, besides play?”. Then the President of the Yugoslav Government, M. Ribičić made the first move in the game Spassky v. Larsen. The battle was beginning.

For the organisers, the most difficult part was over.

Extract from article by A. B. Roshal, *Na Golubom Fone*, '64' (№ 14, 3rd - 9th April, 1970).

Against a Blue Background

The stage is brightly lit. On the background of a blue curtain are the white and yellow squares of the demonstration boards with black and orange pieces. Around them are ten operators, dressed in white. In the hall itself, it is dark.

In the evening the lights are extinguished on Marx–Engels square in front of the *Dom Sindikata*, as well as in the buildings surrounding it, so that the illuminated demonstration board – on which there are reproduced positions from the most interesting games – may be seen more clearly. From a special machine, a megaphone carries the voice of the International Master and chess columnist from the Zagreb newspaper *Sports News*, Mario Bertok. In a word, for chess lovers, wonderful conditions have been created. But the most special surprise prepared by the hosts was in the form of live radio broadcasts with the participation of grandmasters. Chess-players could ask various questions by telephone, and they were answered on the radio (Smyslov even sang a song for chess lovers, but only after the end of the match). And, of course, they wanted to know in advance how the ten games in progress, being played at such a high level, would end. Among those who took upon themselves the easy task of predicting the overall result, there were no original opinions – everyone agreed with the conclusions of the American computers. But there were also some qualifications. S. Reshevsky (as we know, he was playing for the team of selected grandmasters on the 6th board) predicted approximately equality on the top six boards, and supposed that it was only on the lower boards that the superiority of the Soviet team would manifest itself. Nona Gaprindashvili was even more severe – there would be a serious struggle only for the first two boards. Jumping ahead, we will note that both the Women's World Champion and the American grandmaster proved to be right.

Strangely enough, all this had already ceased to occupy the powerful press corps (the overall number of those accredited exceeded three hundred). The journalists were waiting for a sensation. And they waited. Bent Larsen, of whom we have said that he generally only declared his right to be called the West's best chess-player, displayed downright "Fischer-like" intractability and demonstrated his preparedness to exploit his journalistic responsibilities: either he would be placed on 1st board or he would re-classify himself as a correspondent for a Danish newspaper. No attempts at persuasion helped, and a spoonful of tar was already beginning to sink into the wonderfully-decorated barrel of chess honey.

Unexpectedly, a way out of the impasse was suggested. This occurred when in Moscow it was already the middle of the night and the 29th March – the day of the first round – had begun. It was at precisely this time that the captain of the Selected Chess-players of the World, M. Euwe, turned to the head of the Soviet delegation, B. Postnikov, with the request not to object to the violation of one of the points of the previously signed and approved regulations on the event by his charges, R. Fischer and B. Larsen. Euwe wanted to put Larsen on 1st board and Fischer on the 2nd, and in such a case not resort to the use of the reserves under any circumstances.

In the purely sporting sense, such a re-ordering was unfavourable to the Soviet team. (The reader already knows that, to save the prestige of the 'Match of the Century', our chess-players did not

object to the re-ordering in their opponent's team. I however will permit myself to return to this question only in the purely analytical sense.) Spassky had prepared for the meeting with Fischer for a long time, in so doing making use of the unique card index of M. Botvinnik, who not so long ago was himself 'programmed' for a previously-proposed match with the American grandmaster. Petrosian had studied the games of Larsen. However, the games from the previous two World Championship matches would undoubtedly have served as the main subject for the two leading foreign chess-players in their preparations for playing against the Soviet leaders. Thus, both Larsen and Fischer, even if unintentionally, had studied the oeuvres of both of our best grandmasters...

Board-by-board Player profiles & head-to-head scores

As we have seen, Euwe announced the line-up of the Rest of the World team well in advance, allowing the Soviets to carefully consider the question of their board order. While the composition of the top two boards in the Rest of the World team turned out to be different than expected, on each of the remaining eight boards the respective member of the USSR team had been hand-picked so as to maximise the chances of the team overall.

Brief portraits of the players' lives and careers prior to the match in Belgrade are presented in this chapter. Exhaustive biographies would be beyond the scope of this work; instead we have sought to highlight the different backgrounds of the participants and to give something of a taste of their individual characters, as well as the different paths by which they became interested in the game, and their respective routes to the summit of world chess.

In some depth the previous head-to-head encounters between the combatants on each board have been examined with scrupulousness; the results and character of these duels undoubtedly played the principal role in the question of the board order chosen by the USSR Sports Committee. This thorny issue evidently proved to be a source of considerable discord among the players.

Extract from V. L. Korchnoi, *Chess is My Life* (Batsford, London, 1977), pp. 68-69. (Translation by Ken Neat)

The Match 'USSR v. The Rest of the World', organised in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1970, was a unique event in world chess. The army of Soviet chess players is enormous, and very strong. The USSR could probably compete with a World Team on as many as 50 boards, as is shown by the matches between the Russian Federation and Hungary, Ukraine v. Bulgaria, or Belorussia v. DDR, where little-known masters without any titles win against players of world renown...

In the USSR, preparations were made for the match: a training camp was set up, and the best trainers were enlisted. But there was no harmony between the team members. Rather there was just the opposite – clashes of opinion, disagreement and arguments. The antagonism between the participants became particularly acute when the board order was announced, after being worked out by the Sports Committee following consultations with the experts. The bottom boards in the team were given to the oldest players.

I consider that, in a team with such reserves as Stein and Bronstein, the players could have been arranged in almost any order. Probably all, with the exception of the World Champion, should have been placed strictly in order of age, after announcing this beforehand.

It turned out that the Rest of the World Team was more united and harmonious than the Soviets. What's more, I remember how during play some of the Soviet players walked up and down the stage, rejoicing over the misfortunes of their own team members. The atmosphere within the team was nervy, and did not lend itself to serious play.

Extract from M. M. Botvinnik, *K Dostizheniyu Tseli* (Fizkultura i Sport, Moscow 1978). English edition: *Achieving the Aim* (Pergamon Press, Oxford 1981), pp. 198-199. (Translation by Bernard Cafferty)

Then there was the prospect of the Match of the Century – the USSR team against a team of all other countries. It was an old idea; when I was active in FIDE I rejected this idea as I felt that it could have undesirable consequences from the point of view of FIDE solidarity, but what could one do?

Just before the match there was a repetition of something like what happened in 1952, when I was excluded from the Olympiad side. A number of grandmasters – those who were playing on the top boards – made sure that I was put on Board 8. This was obviously speculating on the fact that I would refuse to play in the team. Most likely this is the decision I would have made, but the danger of a loss by the Soviet side was so great that I agreed to go to Belgrade.

But lack of harmony in a team is always punished, and the punishment this time was just as harsh as in 1952. The top boards failed and the awkward situation was saved by those whom the ‘authorities’ had not been relying on. Yet there were no objective reasons for putting me lower than fourth board! Both abroad and in the USSR the result of the Soviet players on the top boards received the appropriate assessment.

FIDE Elo List, 1970 (board no. in brackets)

World Champion vs. The Great Dane

USSR

Boris Spassky

b. 30th January 1937, Leningrad

Age: 33


Boris Vasilievich Spassky learned to play chess at the age of five, after he had been evacuated from his native city of Leningrad (which was soon to fall under a 900-day blockade) to the region of Kirov, some 1400km to the east. On his return to Leningrad in 1946 he began to occupy himself seriously with the game, and entered the famous chess circle at Palace of Pioneers, under the directorship of Vladimir Zak.

In 1953 he made his international debut at the tournament in Bucharest, in which he sensationally defeated Vasily Smyslov in the opening round. As a result of his performance there, he became an International Master. In 1955 he made his debut in the final of the Soviet Championship (which was simultaneously a FIDE Zonal tournament), and qualified for the Interzonal in Gothenburg. By qualifying for the Candidates' tournament in Amsterdam, he gained the title of International

Grandmaster - at the age of 18, he was the youngest holder of the title in the world. The same year he won the title of World Junior Champion (ahead, incidentally, of Lajos Portisch, board 3 for the 'Rest of the World' team in Belgrade).

However, Spassky's apparently effortless rise to the chess summit soon stalled. He failed to qualify for the Interzonal in the next two World Championship cycles (the first after a shattering loss to Mikhail Tal in a decisive final-round game in the 1958 Soviet championship). In the early 1960s, however, he began to work with grandmaster Igor Bondarevsky, and the effects soon began to show. He won the long and exhausting qualification series for the following World Championship cycle – one which began with the 33rd USSR Championship semi-final in Rostov-on-Don in 1963, continued via the USSR Championship final, a further Zonal tournament in Moscow, the interzonal tournament in Amsterdam, and then a series of Candidates' matches v. Keres, Geller and Tal.

Boris Spassky, pictured in Leningrad in 1948.
(Photo: N. Naumenkov, TASS.)



Boris Spassky, pictured in play at the Amsterdam Candidates' tournament, 1956.
(Photographer: J. D. Noske)

In 1966 he faced Tigran Petrosian for the World Championship in Moscow, but for the first time

since the days of Alekhine, the match was won by the champion.

Undaunted, Spassky was again victorious in the following Candidates' cycle, winning his matches v. Geller, Larsen and Korchnoi.

In 1969 he succeeded in wresting the title from Petrosian, to become the 10th World Chess Champion. In the years prior to the match in Belgrade, he won a number of major international events, such as Belgrade 1965, Santa Monica 1966, Beverwijk 1967 and San Juan 1969.

At his peak, Spassky was renowned as a player of universal style, who could conduct spectacular sacrificial attacks as readily as he could nurture small positional advantages to victory. Thus, for example, in an article in the Soviet press on the Belgrade 1965 tournament, Viktor Korchnoi wrote:

Spassky's style has now changed significantly – the results of his association with Bondarevsky have told. Deep strategic preparation for game, high and many-sided technique, subtle analysis, painstaking preparation for each opponent – this is what distinguishes the play of Spassky today...¹⁵



Rest of the World

Bent Larsen (Denmark)

b. 4th March 1935, Tilsted

Age: 35

Bent Larsen, pictured in play at the Amsterdam IBM tournament, 1964.

Bent Larsen was born in 1935 in the small town of Tilsted in Jutland. He learned to play chess shortly before his seventh birthday, having contracted a number of children's illnesses. He later wrote that "he recovered from chicken-pox and mumps without any effects: with chess it was a little different".¹⁶

After finishing school in the city of Aalborg, Bent Larsen became a chess professional in his late teens and gained the International Master title at the age of 19 as a result of his performance in the 11th Olympiad. In 1955 he won the championship of the Nordic countries, defeating Friðrik Ólafsson in a match for the title in Reykjavík. At the 12th Olympiad in Moscow in 1956, he gained the International Grandmaster title, drawing his individual encounter with the then-World Champion, Mikhail Botvinnik. He performed disappointingly in his first Interzonal tournament at Portorož in 1958, but continued to accumulate valuable tournament experience.

Between autumn 1961 and autumn 1963, Larsen did his military service, which severely curtailed his chess activities (only twice was he granted leave to participate in chess events) and was in general, an

experience about which he had “few good things to say”.

However, the physical fitness that he gained may well have helped him in an era where tournaments were long (often considerably longer than today), and in general, players paid little or no attention to their physical condition.¹⁷



Bent Larsen, pictured in play at the Amsterdam Interzonal, 1964.

During 1954 and 1964 he won the Danish championship six times, and by the mid 1960s he had established himself as one of the strongest grandmasters in the World, sharing first place in the 1964 Interzonal tournament in Amsterdam (thereby qualifying for the Candidates' matches, where he was eliminated at the semi-final stage by Tal) and winning a series of major international tournaments – Le Havre 1966, Havana 1967, Palma de Mallorca 1967, Monte Carlo 1968, Palma de Mallorca 1969 and Büsum 1969.

Given Fischer's absence from the scene for much of that period, by the end of the decade he could with some justification claim to be the strongest player in the West. Immediately before the match in Belgrade he reinforced his claim with a victory in a strong Larsen was a player with a somewhat unorthodox playing style that was strongly influenced by that other great (adopted) Dane, Aron Nimzowitsch. His will to win - irrespective of the opposition - and his overall uncompromising approach were among his strongest characteristics.



Previously, Larsen and Spassky had met each other at the board 19 times. The first occasion was in 1959, at the inaugural international tournament organised by the Moscow Central Chess Club, in the Soviet capital. That game was drawn.


Larsen took first blood in their personal encounters in their next meeting, a highly dramatic game from the penultimate round of the 1964 Interzonal.

Spassky and Larsen at Leiden, 1970

Bent Larsen - Boris Spassky

22nd round, Interzonal Tournament

Amsterdam 1964



This position was reached after Black's 51st move, 51...c3, in the adjourned session. Despite his two extra pawns, Spassky had been fighting to save the game for some time. Here Larsen paradoxically offered an exchange of queens with **52.♙e6!** which must have been an unpleasant surprise for his opponent.

Black has no choice but to take at e6 since 52...♙g7? (52...♙h8?? 53.♙f7! ♖f7 54.♗e6#) is beautifully refuted by 53.♙e5!, when after 53...♙e5 54.f5 White threatens mate after 55.♗e6 and 56.♖g7#, as well as the knight.

After **52...♙e6 53.de6** the threat of mate (54.♗h7#) forces Black to play **53...♔g7**, after which material equality is re-established: **54.♗e4 ♕h6** (54...♔h7 is also possible) and **55.♗c3**

The game had suddenly taken an unexpected turn, while Spassky had relatively little time to reach the time control at move 56. He cracked under the pressure, playing **55...♗e4??** Larsen later called this move "an incredible error of judgement".¹⁸ Indeed, after it Black loses trivially in the rook-and-pawn endgame.

But in fact, the way to draw - 55...♞d8! (to answer 56.♗d5 with 56...♗c8 and 56.♞d1 with 56...♔g7 57.♞d5 ♞c8!) - was far from obvious and Larsen himself only discovered it years later.

The game ended: **56.♗e4 fe4 57.♔h4 ♞a8 58.f5 ♞a2 59.♞g8 ♞f2 60.♞f8** and Black resigned.


However, since then the Dane had only managed to defeat Spassky once, during the latter's decisive victory in the Candidates' Semi-final in 1968. The tone was set for that match was set by the 1st game.

Boris Spassky - Bent Larsen

1st match-game, Candidates' Semi-final

Malmö 1968

chesstouring.com



This position arose after 21 moves of an Exchange Variation in the Slav Defence. The game seems to be headed for a draw, but a combination of clever play by Spassky and Larsen's over-estimation of his own prospects soon led to a decisive outcome: **22. ♖d2!**

Intending both ♖a5 and the manoeuvre ♘f4-d3. **22... ♖a3?!** Better, in the opinion of Bondarevsky¹⁹, was to exchange rooks.


23. ♘f4 ♖c1 24. ♖c1 ♖c8 25. ♖c8 ♘c8 26. ♖c2!

Suddenly, Black is faced with slight difficulties. **26... ♘e7 27. ♖c7 g6(?)**

After this White's advantage become serious. Bondarevsky considered **27... ♘g6(!)** to be the best chance, for example **28. ♘d3 h6** (but not **28... ♖a2** on account of **29. ♘e5**) **29. ♖c8 ♔h7 30. ♖c2**, when "White's position remains better, but nothing real is apparent".


28. ♘d3 ♘f5

On **28... ♖a2** there follows **29. ♘e5**, for example **29... ♖a3 30. ♖d8 ♔g7 31. ♖e8**.



29.g4! ♖h6

29...♗e3 is impossible: 30.♗e5! ♕f8



31.♕c1!, etc.

30.♗e5 ♕b4

Or 30...♕a2 31.♗d7 ♕a3 32.♕b8 ♖g7 33.♕e5 ♖g8 34.♖g2, and Black can do nothing.

31.♗d7! ♕e1

A vain attempt, in time trouble, to seek salvation in perpetual check.

32.♖g2 ♕e2 33.♖g3 ♗f5 34.gf5 ♕e1 35.♖f4 ♕h4 36.♖e5 ♕g3 37.f4 ♕e3 38.♖f6 ♕d4 39.♗e5 and

Larsen resigned.


Overall, the score between the two going into the match in Belgrade was 13½ : 5½ in Spassky's favour (10 wins to Spassky, 2 to Larsen, with only 7 draws).

Within a few weeks, the players would meet again in the 4-player match-tournament at Leiden in the Netherlands. That event was won by Spassky, and in the individual encounters with Larsen the score was 3 : 2 in favour of the Russian (+1, -0, =4). Spassky's place was taken in the final round by the Soviet team's reserve, Leonid Stein.


The remarkable chess talent of Leonid Zakharovich Stein did not begin to blossom until he was well into his twenties, and he was on the verge of quitting chess altogether before he finally succeeded in gaining the title of Soviet Master of Sport title in 1959. Within three years he had forced his way into the Soviet elite. He shared 3rd-4th place in the 28th USSR Championship final (Moscow, 1961), which was simultaneously a FIDE Zonal tournament, and gained the International Grandmaster title as a result of his performance in the subsequent Interzonal event in Stockholm. Over the course of the next five years he three times won the title of Soviet Champion – in 1963, 1965 and in 1966/67.

He took clear 1st place in the great international tournament at Moscow in 1967, and would have twice qualified for the Candidates' events were it not for a FIDE rule limiting the number of participants from any one country (effectively, the USSR). Leonid Stein was an exceptionally dangerous attacking player with a superb feeling for the initiative. A notorious 'slow starter', in longer events, once he got fully into gear he was capable of stringing together long runs of successive victories. He had a particular liking for King's Indian set-ups for both Black and White. Prior to the event in Belgrade Stein and Larsen had met on two occasions. At the Amsterdam Interzonal in 1964, the Soviet grandmaster had won a fine positional game.

Leonid Stein - Bent Larsen
21st round, Interzonal Tournament
Amsterdam 1964



White's position is strategically winning, and Stein realised his advantage in crystal-clear fashion as follows: 29.♙a4! ♜b1 30.♞b1 e5 31.de6 ♞e6 32.♙c6 ♞e7 33.♞b7 ♞d7 34.♞b6! ♞c6 35.♞c6 ♜e8 36.♞d5 ♜f8 37.♞a6 ♞e2 38.♜g1 ♜e7 39.♞a7 ♜d8 40.♞f7 ♜c7



41.♞c6! and Black resigned.

Three years later, however, in the Interzonal in Sousse (Tunisia), the Dane gained his revenge.

Leonid Stein (left) in play v. Lubosh Kavalek at the IBM tournament in Amsterdam, July 1969.

Board 2 – Petrosian v. Fischer
The Iron Tiger vs. The American Genius

USSR

Tigran Petrosian

b. 17th June 1929, Tbilisi

Age: 41

Tigran Vartanovich Petrosian was born into an Armenian family in Tbilisi, capital of the Soviet Republic of Georgia. He lost his parents at an early age. At the age of 15 he had to take over his father's job of caretaker at the Tbilisi House of Officers in order that he and his older sister Vartoosh could make ends meet.²⁰

Petrosian became acquainted with chess in the early 1940s in the Tbilisi Palace of Pioneers, where he developed his ability under the directorship of Archil Ebralidze.²¹ Ebralidze was a player of strongly positional style, from whom Petrosian inherited a liking for the theories of Nimzowitsch and the Caro-Kann Defence.

In 1945 Petrosian won the Georgian championship and achieved his first success at the All-Union level, sharing 1st-3rd place in the USSR Youth Championship in Leningrad. The following year, he took undivided 1st place in the same event, scoring 14 points out of a possible 15. That same year of 1946 he played hors concours in the Armenian championship, where he finished in 1st place, ahead of the famous master and study composer, Genrikh Kasparian. Following this event, Petrosian moved to the Armenian capital, Yerevan.

In 1947 Petrosian gained the Master of Sport title. In 1950 he took the decision to move to Moscow, where his talent continued to develop, although he was already attracting some criticism in the Soviet chess press for what was seen as an excessively cautious approach. The following year he achieved a major breakthrough – by finishing in 2nd-3rd place in the 19th USSR Championship final, which was simultaneously a FIDE Zonal tournament, he qualified for the Interzonal in Saltsjöbaden (Sweden). Characteristically, he went through that long event without losing a single game, and by finishing in 2nd-3rd place he qualified for the 1953 Candidates' tournament in Zürich, thereby gaining the coveted title of International Grandmaster.

Tigran Petrosian in play against Arthur Bisguier in the opening round of the USA v. USSR match in New York City, June 1954.



Tigran Petrosian in play v. Boris Spassky in the 11th game of the 1966 World Championship

This marked the appearance of Petrosian among the world's elite. He qualified for the following three Candidates' tournaments (Amsterdam 1956, Bled/Zagreb/Belgrade 1959 and Curaçao 1962), the last of which he won, going through all 27 games of the eight-player match-tournament without losing a single game to gain the right to face Mikhail Botvinnik for the World Championship. There, famously, he took the title from the 'Patriarch' of Soviet Chess, winning the match by the score of $12\frac{1}{2} : 9\frac{1}{2}$ (+5, -2, =15). He successfully defended his title against Boris Spassky in 1966 – the first time since the days of Alekhine that a World Champion had won a match for the title – but three years later his younger opponent proved to be too strong for him.



'Iron Tigran' was renowned for the solidity of his play, but many of those who knew him well spoke of his exceptional tactical gifts and calculational abilities, which he revealed in training games and in blitz play, but which all too often remained 'behind the scenes' in his tournament and match practice. His playing style was highly original, and his positional exchange sacrifices to gain control over a key square or indeed a whole colour complex became something of a calling card. Due in part to his peaceable nature, he had a high propensity for draws, and as such he was particularly at home in match play. Nevertheless, he gained his share of victories in national and international tournaments – as recently as 1969 he had taken his third Soviet Championship title, sharing 1st-2nd place with Lev Polugaevsky and then winning the subsequent playoff match just a couple of months before the event in Belgrade.

Rest of the World

Bobby Fischer (USA)

b. 9th March 1943, Chicago

Age: 27

Bobby Fischer in play v. Mikhail Tal at the 14th Olympiad, Leipzig 1960. (Photo: U. Kohls)

Bobby Fischer was born in Chicago in 1943 and was brought up by his Swiss-born mother, Regina. The Fischers – Regina, Bobby and Bobby's sister Joan – lived in various locations across the USA before they settled in Brooklyn in 1950.

Bobby had learned to play chess at the age of six, and soon became completely engrossed in the game, to the exclusion of virtually everything else. In June 1954 he was taken by his mentor, Carmine Negro, to see the USA v. USSR match at the Hotel Roosevelt in Midtown Manhattan – where his future opponent in Belgrade, Tigran Petrosian, was among those playing; the 11-year-old Fischer was described as being "wide-eyed with excitement".²²

Many years later, Fischer was quoted as saying “when I was eleven, I just got good.”²³ In 1956 – by now U. S. Junior Champion – he won a game v. Donald Byrne that was immediately dubbed “the Game of the Century”.

The following year he won the US Open Championship on tie-break from Arthur Bisguier, and then, to general astonishment, at the end of 1957 the 14-year-old Fischer became US Champion and qualified for the 1958 Interzonal tournament in Portorož, Yugoslavia. There, incredibly, Fischer succeeded in taking one of the six qualifying places for the 1959 Candidates’ tournament, and in so doing he became an International Grandmaster, the youngest in the history of the game.

Fischer played in the next World Championship cycle, winning the 1962 Interzonal tournament in Stockholm by a crushing margin, scoring 17½ : 22 (+13, -0, =9) and finishing 2½ points ahead of his closest rivals, Geller and Petrosian. However, he performed disappointingly in the subsequent Candidates’ tournament in Curaçao. He did not play at all in the following cycle, and withdrew from the 1967 Interzonal tournament in Sousse, Tunisia, while leading with 8½ : 10.

Between 1957 and 1967 Fischer took part in eight US Championships in total, winning them all (in the 1963/64 event he achieved the unprecedented feat of winning all eleven games). He took first place in numerous international events, and performed well on 1st board for the USA in three Olympiads.


There was never any question about Fischer’s extraordinary chess talent, but he was notoriously temperamental and by the time of the match in Belgrade it was clear that perhaps the main obstacle to Fischer gaining the highest prize in chess was Fischer himself. Indeed, in the eighteen months prior to Belgrade, due to a self-imposed exile he had played only one serious game (v. Anthony Saïdy in the New York Metropolitan League).

Fischer’s chess-playing style was one of classical simplicity. He was particularly dangerous in positions where the opponent lacked counter-play. His exceptionally narrow opening repertoire made it relatively easy for opponents to prepare for him, but on the other hand his theoretical knowledge in his chosen set-ups was second to none.



Prior to their mini-match in Belgrade, Petrosian and Fischer had faced one another 13 times. The first occasion was at Interzonal of 1958. A telling moment was reached after Black’s 33rd move:

Tigran Petrosian - Robert Fischer
13th round, Interzonal Tournament
Portorož 1958




Here Petrosian (White) continued 34. ♖c2!

In his classic *My 60 Memorable Games*²⁴, Fischer later wrote: “Headed for an even stronger post on d4. I was amazed during the game. Each time Petrosian achieved a good position, he managed to manoeuvre into a better one.” Petrosian continued to increase the pressure, but in a rook endgame he chose the wrong continuation and allowed his young opponent to escape with a draw.

Portorož, 1958 the 15-year-old Bobby Fischer (right) faces Tigran Petrosian, as Svetozar Gligorić (far left) looks on.

In the 1959 Candidates' tournament, which was held in the Yugoslav cities of Bled, Zagreb and Belgrade, Fischer and Petrosian faced each other 4 times. Petrosian convincingly won the first two games, with the latter two being drawn. In both games in which Petrosian had the black pieces, he gained the advantage with the Caro-Kann Defence. Both games featured remarkable conclusions. In their 2nd-round encounter, the following position was reached after White's 50th:

Robert Fischer - Tigran Petrosian
2nd round, Candidates' Tournament
Bled 1959



Here Petrosian began to exploit his connected passed pawns, enlisting the help of his king:


50...a4 51.♖c3 ♔b6 52.♗e3 ♘c5 53.♙f3 b4 54.♗h6 ♘e6 55.♗h8 ♖d8 56.♗h7 ♖d7 57.♗h8 b3!

Annotating this game in *Chess in the USSR*, Vasily Panov wrote here: “The manoeuvrability of the white pieces is so limited that the black king can boldly support the advance of the pawns”.²⁵


58.♗b8 ♔a5 59.♗a8 ♔b5

Mistaken would be 59...♔b4 on account of 60.♙c6

60.♗b8 ♔c4 61.♗g8 ♔c3 62.♙h5 ♘d8 63.♙f3 a3 64.♗f8 ♔b2 (!)



A remarkable situation. 65. ♔h8 ♘e6 66. ♔a8 a2 67. ♔a5



67... ♔a4!

“A spectacular concluding blow, forcing victory” (Panov).

68. ♖d2 ♔a3 and Fischer resigned.

Their 16-round encounter was a thrilling draw in an endgame with four queens on the board.

It can also be found in Fischer’s *My 60 Memorable Games*.²⁶


The next meeting between these two players also took place in Yugoslavia, at the great Bled tournament of 1961. There, once again, Fischer was unable to make any headway against Petrosian’s

Caro-Kann Defence. After White's 21st move the following position was reached:

Robert Fischer - Tigran Petrosian

18th round

Bled 1961




Fischer has just played 21.♔g5, but after Petrosian's reply **21...h6!** it transpires that the pawn at g7 cannot be captured 22.♔g7 ♖e7 23.dxc5 ♔c6! 24.♙g6 ♜df8 25.♙f7 ♔e4! followed by 26...♞h7, and Black wins.

After 22.♔c5 ♔c5 23.dxc5 ♖e7 (23...♞c8 was also good) 24.c6 ♜d6 25.♞he1 ♞c6 Black had reached a very comfortable endgame. After 26.♞e5 ♞a8 27.♙e4 the peaceable Petrosian offered a draw, but on Fischer's refusal he immediately went wrong 27...♞d6? (27...♞e4 was correct) 28.♙a8 simple and good.

After 28.♞d6 ♖d6 29.♞e6 fe6 30.♙a8 ♖c5 31.b3 ♞d7 32.♖c2 ♖d4 Black's grip on the dark squares would have been complete.

28...♞d1 29.♖c2 ♞f1 30.♞a5 ♞f2 31.♖b3 ♞h2 32.c5, and it was clear that the c-pawn would prove unstoppable.

The game ended: **32...♖d8**



33.♖b5! ♜h3 34.♖b8 ♕c7 35.♖b7 ♕c6 36.♕c4! and in view of the inevitable mate, Black resigned.

At Curaçao 1962, Petrosian was at the peak of his powers, and he again got the better of Fischer over their four games there, winning one – on the black side of a French Defence – and drawing three.

Both of the games between Fischer and Petrosian at the 2nd Piatigorsky Cup (Santa Monica, 1966) were drawn. Thus, going into the ‘Match of the Century’, the head-to-head score between Fischer and Petrosian was $7\frac{1}{2} : 5\frac{1}{2}$ (+3, -1, =9) in favour of the Soviet grandmaster.

Board 3 – Korchnoi v. Portisch
Viktor the Terrible vs. The Hungarian Botvinnik

USSR

Viktor Korchnoi

b. 23rd March 1931, Leningrad

Age: 39

Viktor Korchnoi in play in the 20th USSR
Championship final (Moscow, 1952).

Viktor Lvovich Korchnoi was born into a family of Polish ancestry in Leningrad in 1931. His parents divorced shortly after his birth, and he was raised first by his mother and then, from 1935, by his father and stepmother, Rosa Abramovna Fridman. His father was to die at the front, and Korchnoi endured the terrible deprivations of the 900-day blockade of his native city, during which his grandmother perished.²⁷

In 1944 he began to study in the chess circle of the Leningrad Palace of Pioneers.

By 1948 he had shared 1st-2nd place in the USSR Youth Championship, but his progress was less meteoric than that of his Leningrad rival, Boris Spassky. He gained the Soviet Master of Sport title at the age of 20, and the following year he qualified for his first USSR Championship final, in which he defeated Vasily Smyslov in the first round.



Korchnoi made his international debut at the international tournament in Bucharest, 1954, in which he took 1st place. The following year he shared 1st-2nd place at Hastings with Iceland's Friðrik Ólafsson, and on the strength of these results and his showings in the 21st and 23rd Soviet championships, he was awarded the International Grandmaster title at the FIDE Congress in 1956.

Over the course of the next decade Korchoi established himself as one of the leading players in the world. In the first half of the 1960s he won three Soviet championship titles (in 1960, 1962 and 1964); he qualified for the Candidates tournament in 1962, and reached the final of the Candidates' matches in 1968 – in which he lost to Spassky.

He won numerous international tournaments, many of them by very large margins – for example, at Gyula 1965, where he scored the remarkable result of 14½ : 15 to finish 5½ points clear of the field, and at Wijk aan Zee 1968, in which he won his first eight games and eventually took 1st place by 3 clear points.

Rest of the World

Lajos Portisch (Hungary)

b. 4th April 1937, Zalaegerszeg

Age: 32

Lajos Portisch in play at Wijk aan Zee, 1968.
(Photo: E. Koch)

Lajos Portisch was born in the western Hungarian town of Zalaegerszeg in 1937. He began to play chess at the relatively late age of 12. (Later, he would state that he had to work hard for years to surmount this handicap.)²⁸


In 1954 he won first prize in a master tournament at Keszthely, and on the strength of this he was selected to represent Hungary in the World Junior Championship at Antwerp, 1955, where he finished in 3rd place.

He gained the Master title by qualifying for the final of the Hungarian championship soon afterwards. By 1958, he was Hungarian champion and a member of the Hungarian national team, gaining the title of International Master. Three years later he was awarded the title of International Grandmaster at the FIDE congress in Varna.

Over the course of the next decade he established himself as the strongest player in Hungary and as one of the strongest players in the world, qualifying for the Candidates' matches in 1965 and 1968 and winning numerous international tournaments.

Portisch's pronounced positional style resulted in him becoming known as the 'Hungarian Botvinnik'. He had a relatively narrow opening repertoire, but had the reputation of being a theoretical expert in the openings that he did play.


Prior to 1970, Korchnoi and Portisch had only played on five previous occasions. All but one of these encounters was decisive. The first of their games, played in Budapest in 1961, was vintage Korchnoi.



Lajos Portisch - Viktor Korchnoi

Maróczy Memorial

Budapest 1961




This position arose after 32 moves of a Nimzo-Indian Defence. Black's has the superior minor piece, but the active rook at c6 has to be neutralised. Korchnoi continued with **32...b4!**

After **33.♖c4!** (33.♞d6?? ba3) **33...♞a6 34.ab4 ♞b4 35.♞b4 ♜b4** Portisch decided to give life to his bishop with **36.d5 ♕f7 37.♞d1**, but after **37...♞a5 38.♙c3 ♞d5 39.♞b1 ♜c6 40.♞b7 ♜e7** Korchnoi retained the extra pawn.

Play went on: **41.♞b8** (41.♙g7!?) **41...♞d1 42.♕h2 ♞c1 43.♙d4 ♞c2 44.♕g1 ♜c6 45.♞b7 ♕e6 46.♙h8** (46.♞h7 ♜d4 47.ed4 ♞c1 48.♕h2 f4, etc.) **46...h5 47.♞g7 ♜e5 48.♞g8 ♞c1 49.♕h2 ♞f1! 50.♕g3 h4! 51.♕h4 ♞f2 52.♙e5 ♕e5 53.♞g6 f4! 54.♞g5 ♕f6 55.♞g4 ♕f5 56.♞g5 ♕e6 57.♞g4 ♕d5 58.♞g5 ♕c4 59.ef4 e3** and it became clear that the e-pawn would cost White the rook. After **60.♞g6 ♞f4 61.♕g5 ♞e4 62.♞d6 e2 63.♞c6 ♕d5**, Portisch resigned.

Viktor Korchnoi - Lajos Portisch

Wijk aan Zee 1968



This position was reached after Black's 12th move. Korchnoi could have retained an advantage after 13. ♖e2, hoping to later exploit the weaknesses caused by Black's somewhat risky advance of the g-pawn.

Instead, however, he blundered with 13. ♘d5??. overlooking the simple tactic 13... ♕d5 14. ed5 g3, winning a piece. He played on for some time, but there was never any doubt about Portisch's victory.

Thus, going into their head-to-head in Belgrade, the score between Korchoi and Portisch was level – two wins each, with one game drawn.

Board 4 – Polugaevsky v. Hort
The Tale of Lion and The Big Czech

USSR

Lev Polugaevsky

b. 20th November 1934, Mogilev

Age: 35


Lev Abramovich Polugaevsky was born in the Belarussian town of Mogilev. After the outbreak of war in June 1941, the Polugaevsky family was evacuated to the city of Kuibyshev (which has since reverted to its pre-revolutionary name of Samara). During the war years many strong chess-players were evacuated to the city on the Volga, and it became something of a chess centre. The young Lyova Polugaevsky became interested in chess after his father presented him with a chess set as a reward for his success at school, and he soon enrolled in the chess section at the Kuibyshev Pioneers' Palace. At the age of 14, his talent was noticed by Kuibyshev chess player A. F. Ivashin, who took the young Polugaevsky under his wing.²⁹ By 1949 young Lyova was in the youth team of the Russian Republic, and by 1950 he had gained the title of Candidate Master.

His first major breakthrough came in 1953, when he took 2nd place in the final of the championship of the RSFSR, fulfilling the norm for the Master of Sport title. After finishing Kuibyshev's School № 6 in 1952 with a gold medal for academic excellence, he entered the Kuibyshev Industrial Institute, specializing in industrial heat and power engineering. After graduating, he worked for over two years as Chief Engineer in a local factory producing tractor parts. However, his chess career took over as the depth of his exceptional talent became clear. He made his international debut at Marianske Lazne in 1959 (where he took 1st place), and the following year he made his debut for the USSR team in a match against West Germany. In 1961 he won the championship of the RSFSR.

Polugaevsky moved to Moscow in 1962, at the age of 27. That same year, after winning the tournament at Mar del Plata in Argentina (two clear points ahead of second-placed Smyslov) he was awarded the title of International Grandmaster by FIDE. By the late 1960s he was clearly one of the strongest players in the World, as evidence by his

results in the final three USSR championships of the decade, in each of which he shared 1st-2nd

Lev Polugaevsky in play at the IBM tournament in Amsterdam, July 1970. (Photo: E. Koch)



place.

Polugaevsky was a player of classical positional style, possessing an exceptional analytical ability. As early as the 1950s he had begun to develop the variation in the Sicilian Defence that was to bear his name, and his opening preparation in general was unusually profound.

Rest of the World

Vlastimil Hort (Czechoslovakia)

b. 12th January 1944, Kladno

Age: 26

Vlastimil Hort was born in Kladno, Czechoslovakia. His paternal grandparents were from the Sudetenland.

He learned the game at the age of five. As was the case with Larsen, it seems that he became familiar with the rules of chess during a period of illness. As a youth, he was attracted by ice hockey as well as by chess. Though he later described himself as being “a very ordinary child”, and “no wunderkind”,³⁰ just a month after his 16th birthday, Hort took 3rd place in the championship of Czechoslovakia and immediately afterwards he made his international debut in Moscow, in a tournament organised by the USSR Central Chess Club, where he scored a creditable 4/11, tying for 8th-10th place with Simagin and Uhlmann. That same year of 1960 he made his debut for the national team in the 14th Olympiad in Leipzig.


Hort gained the International Master title in 1962, and the International Grandmaster title three years later, after sharing 1st-2nd place with Keres in the tournament at Mariánské Lázně. He narrowly failed to qualify for the Candidates’ series in 1968, but by the end of the decade he had established himself as one of the leading players in the world.

In 1968 he graduated from the International Trade faculty of the Prague Commercial Institute.


Hort was a very dangerous practical player, whose playing style was characterised by its resourcefulness. He paid relatively little attention to opening theory, but was particularly strong in the middlegame.

Prior to the ‘Match of the Century’ Polugaevsky and Hort had met each other over-the-board on only four occasions. Polugaevsky had got the better of his young opponent in the tournament in Moscow in 1960 in a double-edged King’s Indian Defence.

Vlastimil Hort in play at the IBM tournament in Amsterdam, July 1970. (Photo: E. Koch)




Lev Polugaevsky - Vlastimil Hort
Moscow Central Chess Club International 1960



This position was reached after White's 29th move. Here, natural and good appears 29...♖b8, with the point that 30.♘c1 can be met by 30...♙b2! 31.♙b2 ♖b2 32.♙b2 ♖c3, when 33.♗e1? is refuted by the tactical blow 33...♘d5! 34.ed5 ♖c2!

After 29...♖b8 White should evidently continue instead 30.♗g2, preparing ♘c1 as well as the doubling of rooks on the g-file.

Instead, Hort continued 29...♙a4? 30.♘c1 ♙c2, when after 31.♙c2 ♙c2



32.♖h2! ♙a4 33.♖hg2. White broke through on the g-file. After 33...♖h8 34.♖g6 ♘e8 35.♙a2

(35.♖a4!? ♜a4 36.♖a2) **35...♙d7 36.♖b3** Black's game went rapidly downhill: **36...♜h2 37.♜6g2 ♜g2 38.♜g2 a4 39.♖d2 ♜c8 40.♙a3 ♜a8 41.♖c4 ♜a6 42.♖b6** and Hort resigned.

The remaining three encounters (at Sarajevo, 1964 and 1965 and at Skopje/Ohrid 1968) had all been fairly uneventful draws. Thus, the head-to-head score stood at $2\frac{1}{2} : 1\frac{1}{2}$ (+ 1, - 0 = 3) in favour of the Soviet grandmaster.

Board 5 – Geller v. Gligorić
The Clash of the King's Indian Legends

USSR

Efim Geller

b. 8th March 1925, Odessa

Age: 45

Efim Petrovich Geller was born in Odessa in 1925 and grew up in an apartment in the city's Pushkin Street.³¹ His father, Pyotr Efimovich, was a chess lover and a former student of Boris Verlinsky – the first recipient of the title of USSR grandmaster. As a child, young Fima Geller was interested in football, but did not make it into the football section of the Odessa Pioneers' Palace. Instead, he entered the chess section and began to participate in youth tournaments.³² During World War II, Geller finished high school and then served as an aircraft mechanic.

After demobilisation, he entered the Faculty of Economics of Odessa University. By 1946 he was competing in the championship of the Ukrainian Republic, finishing in 4th place. The next year, he made his debut in the Semi-final of the 16th USSR Championship in Sverdlovsk, where he finished in 5th-6th place. During this time, Geller was also active in the field of basketball – despite his relatively short stature he was selected for the Odessa city team. Fortunately, however, when the time came to choose between basketball and chess, he opted for the latter. 1949 was a pivotal year for Geller that saw him move from relative obscurity to being counted among the ranks of the country's leading players. By sharing 1st-3rd places in the Semi-final of the 17th USSR Championship in Tbilisi, he gained the Master of Sport title. Then, in the final in Moscow – which featured almost all of the Soviet Union's strongest players apart from Botvinnik – he made a sensational debut; going into the last round he was ahead of the field by a ½-point. He lost that decisive encounter with Ratmir Kholmov, but nevertheless finished in 3rd-4th place with Taimanov, just behind the winners, Bronstein & Smyslov.

Two years later, in the 19th USSR Championship – which was simultaneously a FIDE Zonal tournament – Geller finished in 2nd-3rd place, defeating World Champion Botvinnik in their individual encounter and qualifying for the Interzonal tournament in Saltsjobäden. His 4th-place finish there was good enough to qualify for the Candidates' tournament, and the 27-year-old Geller

Efim Geller in play at the Candidates' tournament in Amsterdam, March 1956. (Photo: G. van der Werf)



was accordingly awarded the title of International Grandmaster by FIDE.

In 1955 he became Soviet champion, sharing 1st-2nd place with Vasily Smyslov in the exceptionally strong 22nd USSR Championship (another Zonal event) and winning the subsequent playoff match. He failed to qualify for the 1958 Interzonal, but performed well in the following World Championship cycle, and came within a ½-point of sharing 1st place at Curaçao.

Had he gained the right to face Botvinnik in 1963, it is perfectly possible that he could have become World Champion, particularly taking into account his favourable score v. Botvinnik in their head-to-head encounters. In the years prior to the event in Belgrade, Geller had taken 1st place at Gothenburg and Kislovodsk (1968) and shared 1st-2nd places with Botvinnik at Wijk aan Zee (1969).

Geller's wife Oksana Georgievna, who was 12 years his junior, was a ballerina in the Odessa Theatre. The couple met at the end of 1957. Six months later they married and a year later their only son, Aleksandr, was born.³³ In his free time, Geller liked to play cards, dominoes and billiards.

In the words of Genna Sosonko, "he was a simple man, not an intellectual and not a philosopher. He liked to eat, without paying attention to calories and cholesterol, and he liked to sit in a group and drink with friends. He was seldom seen without a cigarette in his hand."³⁴ A truly exceptional analyst, Efim Geller was one of the greatest theoreticians of his generation. As his team-mates in Belgrade Boris Spassky and Mark Taimanov were later to say: "He would play one or two games a year that would determine the direction that chess took in this or that opening"... "In general the players of our generation, Averbakh, Geller, I, and to a lesser extent Bronstein and Petrosian, were trained to do constant and deep analytical work. Still, in this respect I think that Geller stood out amongst us."³⁵

As a result of his desire to delve deeply into the secrets of the position, Geller frequently found himself in time trouble, and this reduced his practical strength to some extent. However, as grandmaster Sergei Shipov writes, "...had Geller been a little more practical, he would have been a different chess-player, a different person. A different fate."³⁶ Nevertheless, he had an impressive personal score against many of the greatest names in twentieth-century chess.

Rest of the World

Svetozar Gligorić (Yugoslavia)

b. 2nd Februar 1923, Belgrade

Age: 47

Svetozar Gligorić in play at the FIDE Zonal tournament in The Hague, 1966.

Svetozar Gligorić was born into a poor family in Belgrade. His mother and father, who were natives of Western Serbia, had moved to the capital of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes shortly before his birth.³⁷ The family lived on Knez Mikhail street in the centre of the city. When young Svetozar was only nine years old, tragedy struck – his father Dragoje died from tuberculosis at the age of 32.

Gligoric became familiar with chess by constantly watching games played in a café near the family

chesstouring.com

home. He later recalled that this daily ritual continued for perhaps two or three years, but that by the time he was eleven years old, he was fully familiar with the rules. At the age of 13 he began to concentrate fully on chess, when his football 'career' was interrupted by a broken arm sustained on the banks of the Danube. Before long he was youth champion of Belgrade, and two years later he would gain the title of National Master, following his victory in the Amateurs Championship of Yugoslavia in Zagreb in 1939.

Then, when Gligorić was eighteen, tragedy struck again – his mother Ljubica died from leukaemia at the age of 37. Several families offered to take the young Svetozar into their household, but he chose that of the President of the Belgrade Chess Club, Dr. Niko Miljanić. Gligorić would later say that this decision saved his life. In March 1941, a coup d'état overthrew the Yugoslav government that had signed the Tripartite Pact. In retaliation, Belgrade was heavily bombed by the German luftwaffe. Miljanić, anticipating this, had moved everyone to the town of Vrnjačka Banja. From there he organised an escape to Montenegro. Travelling via Čačak and Sarajevo, they arrived in Nikšić on the day Yugoslavia capitulated. Gligorić was to spend all of the war in Montenegro, seeing active service with a partisan unit, but it seems that a chance encounter with a chess-playing partisan officer led to his removal from combat.

In the first championship of post-war Yugoslavia, a marathon 24-player round-robin event, Gligorić took second place, just a ½-point behind the winner, Trifunović.

In 1947 he gained his first major success in the international arena, sensationally winning the tournament in Warsaw ahead of Smyslov, Boleslavsky and others. In 1949 he defeated the Swedish grandmaster Ståhlberg in a match (+2, -1, =9). His performances in the national championship – 1st-2nd in 1947 and 1948, clear 1st in 1949 and 1950 – had established him as the strongest player in Yugoslavia, and he played for 1st board for the national team in the 9th Olympiad at Dubrovnik, at which Yugoslavia took the gold medal. In recognition of these results, as well as his victory in the tournament at Mar del Plata in Argentina in 1950, he was awarded the title of International Master by FIDE.

Gligorić's steady improvement continued over the following years. As a result of his victories in the Staunton Memorial tournament in England, and the FIDE Zonal tournament at Bad Pyrmont, he was awarded the International Grandmaster title in 1951. The following year at the Saltsjöbaden Interzonal tournament he qualified for the 1953 Candidates's tournament, marking his arrival among the world's elite, where he would remain for many years.

Among his notable victories in international tournaments over the next decade and a half, one may mention Hastings 1956/57 (shared with Larsen), 1959/60 and 1960/61, Dallas 1957, and Copenhagen 1965 (shared with Suetin and Taimanov).



Gligorić himself regarded the gold medal on the 1st board at the Munich Chess Olympiad 1958 (ahead of World Champion Botvinnik) as his finest achievement. He took part in the 1959 Candidates' tournament, and qualified for the 1968 Candidates' matches.

At home he continued to dominate, winning the national championship in 1956, 1957, 1958 (shared with Ivkov), 1959, 1960, 1962 and 1965 and leading the national team in international competitions. In those years, Yugoslavia was among the top chess-playing nations in the world, as evidence by its haul of silver and gold medals at the chess olympiads, and Gligorić was a hugely popular figure – in 1958 he was named the best athlete of Yugoslavia in the a poll of the daily newspaper *Sport*.

Gligorić was notable for the consistency of his chess tastes. He had a fairly narrow opening repertoire, in the main favouring classical systems – so he developed a particular attachment to the King's Indian Defence with Black. In this and other opening systems (for example, the Nimzo-Indian Defence and Classical King's Indian with White, and the Spanish Game with Black) he had the reputation of being one of the leading theoretical experts. An autobiographical work published later in his career was entitled "*I Play Against the Pieces*", reflecting his approach of playing according to the position on the board, without taking the tastes or preferences of the player sitting opposite.


Soon after the war Gligorić became a journalist with the Belgrade newspaper *Borba* ('Struggle'). Throughout his career he combined chess with his duties as a correspondent.

Geller and Gligorić met over the board for the first time in 1952, in the 3rd round of the Interzonal tournament. Geller (White) stood better out of the opening, but allowed his opponent to regroup his pieces harmoniously. Under the illusion that he still stood better, he continued to play for a king-side attack. After 21 moves the following position was reached:

Efim Geller - Svetozar Gligorić

FIDE Interzonal Tournament

Saltsjobäden 1952



White has just played 21.♘f3-d4?! (the simplifying 21.♞bc1 was indicated). After the reply **21...♞c3!**, however, it became clear that White's 3rd rank is very exposed. Nonetheless, rather than 22.♞bc1 Geller continued to play for the initiative with **22.♞bd1?**

After **22...♙a4 23.♞d2 ♞ac8** the initiative passes permanently to Black, and Gligorić's made no mistake: **24.♞f3**

24.♞f2 ♞d3!

24...♘d7 (defending against 25.e5) **25.♞f2 ♞a3 26.♘e2**

26.♙b1 ♞cc3 27.♞e1 ♘b6

26...♙c3!

Black wins the exchange, since after 27.♘c3 ♞cc3 White loses by force: 28.♞e2 ♙b5 29.♞fd1 ♞c7 30.♙d4 ♞d3 31.♞d3 ♞d3 32.♞d3 ♞c4

27.♙b1 ♙d2 28.♙d2 ♙c2 29.f5 ♘f6 30.fg6 hg6 31.♙c1 ♞d3 32.♞h4 ♙b1 33.♙g5 ♞c2! 34.♘f4

34.♞f6 ef6 35.♙f6 ♞f6 36.♞f6 ♞e2


34...♞dd2 35.♞b1 ♞b6 36.♞g1 ♞d4 37.♞e1 ♘h5 38.♞g1 ♞e4 and Geller resigned.

The next meetings between the two players were at the famous Candidates' tournament of 1953. Both were long, complicated struggles. The first ended in a draw; in the second, Geller (Black) got the better of his opponent. At Zagreb, 1955, Geller again won with the black pieces. The players next crossed swords in two of the traditional matches between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Their game in 1956, in Belgrade, was drawn. The following year, in Leningrad, the Soviet grandmaster again came out on top.

Efim Geller - Svetozar Gligorić

USSR v. Yugoslavia

Leningrad 1957



This position was reached after Black's 22nd move 22...♞ge6. Here Geller broke through with **23.♜c7! ♜c5** (after 23...♜c7 24.cd6 Black is routed) **24.♙c5 ♚c7 25.♙a7 ♞a8 26.♙g1**

Aronin, annotating this game in *Chess in the USSR*,³⁸ writes: "White has two pawns v. one on the queen's flank. His bishops are exerting strong pressure. The final defensive frontier on which Black tries to hold back the opponent is the square a5, which is controlled by several black pieces."

26...hg4 27.fg4 ♙d8 28.♞c1 ♚d7 29.♞fd1 ♜g7 30.♞c2 ♚e7 31.a4 ♜b6 32.♞a2 ♜c8 33.♞ad2 ♞h8 34.b6 ♚d7 35.a5

Time trouble! Aronin: "Instead White could have prepared this advance with 35.♞a2 and if 35...♞a5, then simply 36.♚b4 ♚c6 37.♙b5, and Black must give up the exchange. Now however Gligorić picks up the a5-pawn, giving him new defensive possibilities.

35...♞a5 36.♞f1 (36.♚c3 ♚a4) **36...♞f8**

In hurrying to defend the f4-pawn, Black in turn goes wrong. Correct was 36...♞a8!, and on Geller's intended 37.♞f4 ♙g5! 38.♞c2! ♙f4 39.♞c7 ♚c7 40.bc7 ♞a1 41.♜g2 ♞c1 42.♚b7 ♞c2 with a draw.

37.♚c3 ♚a4

On the withdrawal of the rook, 38.♚e5 is decisive. Black's situation is already hopeless.

38.♚c8 f3 39.♙f3 ♙g5 40.♚b7 ♜h6

On 40...♞f7 there follows 41.♚f7 ♜f7 42.♙d1

41.♞g2 This move was sealed, but Gligorić resigned on the eve of resumption.

All six encounters had featured the same opening – the King's Indian Defence. In the remaining years before the match in Belgrade, Geller and Gligorić would meet a further twelve times, a further six of which would also be King's Indians; all twelve games were relatively uneventful draws.

Thus, the head-to-head score between the players stood at 10 : 8 (+3, -1, =14) in favour of Geller.

Svetozar Gligorić (right) in play v. Sammy Reshevsky at the Dubrovnik Olympiad, 1950.

Board 6 – Smyslov v. Reshevsky
The Hand vs. The Accountant

USSR

Vasily Smyslov

b. 24th March 1921, Moscow

Age: 49

Vasily Vasilievich Smyslov was born in Moscow in 1921 and learned to play chess at the age of six. He was taught the game by his father, a strong amateur player who had in his time faced Alexander Alekhine over the chessboard.

Young Vasya Smyslov became involved in the chess section of the Moscow Pioneers' Palace, while at home he read everything in his father's extensive library of chess books and periodicals. Many years later, Smyslov would recall visiting the 2nd Moscow International tournament at the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts, together with his father.³⁹ There he saw the likes of Lasker, Capablanca, and his future rival Botvinnik. In 1938 he shared 1st-3rd place in the All-Union tournament of 1st-category players and then, sensationally, 1st-2nd place in the championship of Moscow. He made his international debut at the great 'Training Tournament' that took place in Leningrad and Moscow in early 1939. In 1940, he placed 3rd in his first USSR Championship final. It was clear to all that an exceptional new talent had appeared.

Smyslov was exempted from military service due to his poor eyesight, and he continued to play chess during the war years. After his 3rd place in the first great post-war tournament, the 1946 Staunton Memorial in Groningen, Smyslov was included among the participants in the 1948 Match-tournament for the World Championship. His 2nd place there, followed by his shared 1st-2nd place at the 17th USSR Championship in Moscow the following year, confirmed Smyslov as one of the world's leading players. During the mid-1950s he dominated world chess, winning the Candidates' tournaments of 1953 and 1956, and taking the World Championship from Mikhail Botvinnik, at the second attempt, in 1957. After losing the title the following year he never regained his former heights, but stayed among the World's elite, qualifying for the 1965 Candidates' matches after sharing 1st-4th place in the Amsterdam Interzonal. He continued to take the top prizes in major international tournaments; among his successes one may point to the Capablanca Memorials of 1964 (shared 1st-2nd) and 1965 (1st), the Rubinstein Memorials of 1966 and 1968 and his wins at Mar del Plata (1966), Hastings 1968/69 (1st-2nd) and Monte Carlo 1969 (1st-2nd).

Vasily Smyslov at the Interzonal tournament in Amsterdam, May 1964. (Photo: H. Pot, Anefo)



Smyslov had influential friends in the Soviet hierarchy, whose help he could call on when necessary. Thus, despite his failure to qualify for the 1964 Interzonal tournament via the Soviet Zonal, he was able to call on his contacts to secure him a place in Amsterdam.

In 1948 Smyslov met his wife, Nadezhda Andreevna,⁴⁰ who often accompanied him to tournaments. (Three years his elder, her first husband had fallen victim to the Stalinish repressions of the late 1930s. Their son, Vladimir (b. 1939) – a chess-player who represented the USSR at junior international level – was sadly to take his own life in 1960.)

Many years later, Nadezhda would recall how she was introduced to Vasily while at the Sports Department building. Later, as they were walking together in the streets of Moscow, Vasily was recognised by some youths, who broke into applause... her husband-to-be was already something of a celebrity in the Soviet capital, though he was nevertheless shocked. The couple married a year later. They lived in an apartment in the skyscraper on Kudrinskaya Square in central Moscow, and in the summer, at their dacha in Barvikha, to the west of the city.

Smyslov had a passion for opera singing; in 1951 he auditioned for the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow and his baritone voice was often to be heard at the closing ceremonies of tournaments in which he participated.⁴¹ For many years he was friends with the singer Ivan Kozlovsky.⁴²

Vasily Smyslov is regarded as one of the finest of all endgame players. His best games are models of the synthesis of strategy and tactics, and display an apparent effortlessness that is the sign of true greatness.

A deeply spiritual man, it is no accident that he named his best games collection “In Pursuit of Harmony”.

Vasily Smyslov in play at the 12th USSR Championship final, in Moscow

Rest of the World

Samuel Reshevsky (USA)

b. 26th November 1911, Orzoków

Age: 58

Samuel Reshevsky was born in Orzoków, near Lodz. He was the youngest boy in a family of six children.⁴³ At the age of four, he learned to play chess by watching his father play, and it soon became apparent that he had a remarkable talent; by the age of eight he was giving simultaneous exhibitions in countries across Europe. So that the most could be made of young Reshevsky's talent, in 1920 the family emigrated to the United States, initially settling in the Detroit area. In 1922 the young Reshevsky played in the New York Masters' tournament.

Reshevsky graduated from the University of Chicago in 1934 with a degree in accounting. Throughout his career he would continue to work as an accountant and so, unlike many of his national and international rivals, he was never chess 'professional' in the true sense.

In 1935 he travelled to England to participate in the international tournament at Margate, where he took first place ahead of Capablanca and Thomas, defeating the ex-World Champion in their individual encounter. In 1936 he won the first of what were to be seven US Championship titles, and took part in one of the greatest tournaments of all time, at Nottingham, where he defeated another two ex-World Champions – Lasker and Alekhine. By the time he shared 1st-3rd place with Flohr and Petrov at the great tournament in Kemerli in 1937, he was being spoken about as a potential World Championship challenger.

Many years later, Reshevsky himself expressed the view that had Alekhine granted him a match for the title during the period 1938-40, he would have been "in with a chance". As it was, war intervened and it was not until 1948 that he Reshevsky had the opportunity to fight for the highest title, when he was included among the participants in the 1948 Match-tournament for the World Championship. There he shared 3rd-4th place with Keres, behind Botvinnik and Smyslov.

In 1950 he was one of the inaugural recipients of the International Grandmaster title established by FIDE. He declined to participate in the 1950 Candidates' tournament, but took part in the famous 1953 event in Switzerland.

Smyslov-Reshevsky, World Championship Match-tournament, The Hague 1948.
(Photographer: J. D. Noske)




Throughout the 1950s and 1960s he continued to remain among the World's elite, qualifying for the 1968 Candidates' matches. He went into the match in Belgrade as reigning US Champion, having won the title, in Fischer's absence, in the tournament in New York in November-December of 1969. As a practicing Orthodox Jew, Reshevsky would not play on the Sabbath, which posed problems for tournament organisers throughout his career. His playing style was characterised by extreme toughness and fighting spirit. His greatest practical weakness was undoubtedly his poor time management.

Reshevsky and Smyslov were old rivals who had first met over the board as long ago as 1939, in the Leningrad/Moscow Training Tournament. There, the experienced American got the better of his 17-year-old opponent, winning the exchange in the early middle-game and converting in after 70 moves. The players next faced one another in the famous USSR v. USA radio match in 1945. There, Smyslov convincingly won both games.

Nearly three years later they again crossed swords in the World Championship match tournament (The Hague, Moscow 1948). Three of their encounters were drawn, but in the remaining one the Russian scored one of his finest victories.

Samuel Reshevsky in play v. Vasily Smyslov at the World Championship Match-tournament,
The Hague 1948. (Photographer: J. D. Noske)

Vasily Smyslov - Samuel Reshevsky
World Championship Match-tournament
Moscow 1948




This position arose after Black's 17th move (17...♔d8-e7). Smyslov increased pressure with **18.♕f5!** (With the threat of 19.♖d7, and also indirectly attacking the knight at g6) **18...♗f8 19.♙e3 ♘e6 20.♖ad1 ♜ed8 21.g3!** (limiting the knight at g6) **21...♖d6**

In the absence of counter-play Black tries to block the d-file, at the cost of a backward pawn on the open file.

22.♖d6 cd6 23.♕g4 ♖h8

Here 23...♗f8 was suggested, but after 24.♙b6! ♗c7 25.♕f5! White retains strong pressure.

24.♙b6! (taking control of the d8-square) **24...♗b8**



As Smyslov later pointed out, the preliminary 24...♖c8 is also insufficient on account of the variation 25.♖d2 ♗b8 26.♚d1 ♜c6 27.♙a7 ♗d7 28.♙d5 ♜c7 29.♙e6 ♚e6 30.♖d6, winning a pawn. Here Smyslov found a beautifully simple solution, winning a pawn and the game.

25.♙e6 fe6 26.♚h4!

After the exchange at h4, the d6-pawn is all the same lost.

26...♚d7 27.♚d8 ♚d8 28.♙d8 ♗d7 29.♙c7 ♗c5 30.♖d6 ♜c8

On 30...♗e4 31.♜e6 Black loses another pawn.

31.♙b6 ♗a4 32.♜e6 ♗b2 33.♜e5 ♗c4

In the case of 33...♜c3 34.♙d4 White organises an attack on g7.

34.♜e6 ♗b6 35.♜b6 ♜c3 36.♜b7 and Smyslov made no mistake in the purely technical phase of the game: **36...♜c2 37.h4 ♜a2 38.♙g2 a5 39.h5 a4 40.♜a7 ♙g8 41.g4 a3 42.♙g3 ♜e2 43.♙f3 ♜a2 44.♙e3 ♙f8 45.f3 ♜a1 46.♙f4 a2 47.e5 ♙g8 48.♙f5 ♜f1 49.♜a2 ♜f3 50.♙g6 ♙f8 51.♜a8 ♙e7 52.♜a7** and Reshevsky resigned.

At the 1953 Candidates' tournament the players again met four times, and again Smyslov won one game with the remaining three drawn. In the USA v. USSR match in New York the following year, the players once more faced each other over four rounds on the 1st board for their respective teams; on that occasion each game was drawn, though Smyslov was pushing hard for a win in the third game.

They met on only two occasions during the 1960s; both games (at the Amsterdam Interzonal, 1964 and at Mar del Plata, 1966) were fairly tame draws.

Thus, coming into the 'Match of the Century', the personal score between Smyslov and Reshevsky was 10½ : 7½ (+4, -1, =13) in favour of the Soviet grandmaster.

Rest of the World
Reserve (Round 4)

Friðrik Ólafsson (Iceland)

b. 26th January 1935, Reykjavík
Age: 35

Friðrik Ólafsson, who replaced Reshevsky in the 4th round, was born in the Icelandic capital, Reykjavík, in 1935. He became Icelandic champion in 1952 and a year later took first place in the Nordic Chess Championship.

His first great international breakthrough was in the traditional tournament at Hastings (1955-56), where he shared 1st-2nd place with Viktor Korchnoi. On the basis of this and other results, he was awarded the International Master title by FIDE.


In the FIDE Interzonal tournament in Portorož (1958), Ólafsson finished in 5th-6th place, qualifying for the 1959 Candidates' tournament and thereby gaining the title of International Grandmaster. In 1963 he took part in the elite Piatigorsky Cup tournament in Los Angeles, finishing in 3rd-4th place.

Like Reshevsky, Ólafsson was never a true chess 'professional'; he was a lawyer by training and worked for many years in the Icelandic Ministry of Justice.


Smyslov and Ólafsson had first met at the board in the spring of 1959, in the first of what proved to be a series of tournaments organised by the Moscow Central Chess Club. Their game was drawn.

Six months later, they faced each other four times at the Candidates' tournament in Yugoslavia. Two of the four games were drawn, but Smyslov won both games in which he had the black pieces, one of them a model example of Black's strategy in the ...♞b4 system of the English opening with 1.c4 e5.

Friðrik Ólafsson, pictured in play at Wijk aan Zee, 1969. (Photographer: E. Koch)




Friðrik Ólafsson - Vasily Smyslov
Candidates' Tournament
Belgrade 1959



In this position White has just played 23.c5 (23.f4 was more circumspect). Play continued **23...dc5!**
24.f4

If 24.♔c5, then 24...♔d2 25.♖f1 ♔a2 26.♔c6 ♖e8 27.♔c7 ♖e2 28.♙h3 ♖h2 29.♔c8 ♔h7 30.♔f5 ♔h8
 31.♔c8 ♘g8, and Black avoids perpetual check.

24...a4! 25.♔c5 ab3 26.ab3 ♔d2 27.♔e3 ♔b2 28.h3 ♖a2 29.♔f3 c5 30.g4 g6 31.c4 ♔g7 32.♖d1
♔c2! 33.♖e1 ♖b2 34.♖e3



34...h5!

With the threat of 35.-- 35...hg4 36.hg4 ♘g4 37.♔g4 ♔c1

35.g5 ♘h7 36.♖c3 ♔b1 37.♙f1

37.♖f1 ♜g2!

37...♗f8 38.♖e3 ♘e6 39.h4 ♖d1 40.♖e5 ♙h7 41.f5 ♜b1 and White resigned. After 42.fg6 fg6 43.♖f6 ♖g4 Black wins both of White's king-side pawns.

Smyslov and Ólafsson met again in the 1961 version of the Moscow International; their game was drawn. Thus, the personal score between the players ahead of the match in Belgrade was 4 : 2 (+2, -0, =4) in favour of Smyslov.

Board 7 – Taimanov v. Uhlmann
The Maestro vs. The Legend of the French

USSR

Mark Taimanov

b. 28th November 1926, Kharkov

Age: 43

Mark Taimanov at Wijk aan Zee 1970.
(Photographer: E. Koch)

Mark Evgenevich Taimanov was born in the Ukrainian city of Kharkov, where his parents were studying – his father Evgeny Zakharovich at the Polytechnic Institute, his mother Serafima Ivanovna Ilyina at the Conservatory. Soon the family moved to Leningrad. There, under the influence of his mother, the young Taimanov demonstrated an aptitude for music, attending a school for especially gifted children. At the age of 11 – under the influence of his father, who loved the game – he also became involved with chess at the local Pioneers' Palace.⁴⁴ His family did not escape the terrible events of those times – his maternal uncle was arrested and ultimately shot, while his aunt was imprisoned and eventually died in captivity. One of his father's brothers was also arrested and sentenced to eight years in a labour camp. On the outbreak of war in 1941, Taimanov and his father were evacuated to Tashkent, the capital of Soviet Uzbekistan. His mother feared that Mark's infant sister would not survive the trip, and so she elected to stay in the city, not knowing that it was about to be cut off. As a result, she and Mark's two siblings had to endure the dreadful privations of the blockade up till their evacuation in March 1942.⁴⁵



After returning to the city on the Neva, Taimanov finished music school and entered the Leningrad Conservatory, where he met his future wife and musical partner on the piano, Lyubov Bruk. The pair married at the age of 19.⁴⁶

Side-by-side with his musical career, Taimanov's chess went from strength to strength. He made his first breakthrough by finishing 2nd in the Semi-final of the 16th USSR Championship in 1947, thereby qualifying for the final in Moscow the following year. In 1949 he shared 1st-2nd with Bondarevsky in the Semi-final of the 19th USSR Championship, and in the final he shared 3rd-4th place with Geller – ahead of grandmasters such as Boleslavsky, Kotov and Keres – marked his arrival among the top players in the country. In 1950 he made his international debut at Szczawno-Zdrój and gained the title of International Master; that same year he also undertook a series of concerts across

the USSR together with his wife.⁴⁷

In 1952, at the Interzonal tournament at Saltsjobäden he qualified for the Candidates' tournament, thereby becoming an International Grandmaster, and shared 1st-2nd place with Botvinnik in the 20th USSR Championship – though he lost the subsequent play-off match. He made up for this in the 26th Championship, in his home city of Leningrad – after sharing 1st-3rd places with Averbakh and Spassky, he won the playoff-match tournament to take the title of Soviet champion.

He continued to take the top prizes in international tournaments throughout the 1960s. Just a couple of months before the event in Belgrade, he took 1st place in the traditional Hoogovens tournament in Wijk aan Zee, ahead of Hort and Ivkov.

As well as being an outstanding grandmaster, Taimanov was a renowned opening researcher and theoretician who had the distinction of having a major system in the Sicilian Defence named in his honour. He also made considerable contributions to the theory of the Nimzo-Indian Defence – with both colours – and the King's Indian and Grünfeld Defences with White. Taimanov was renowned for his optimistic outlook, both on the board and away from it. Many years later, he would say:

*I did not mix my two professions, I alternated between the two. As I used to say, when I gave concerts I was taking a rest from chess and when I played chess, I was resting from the piano. As a result, my whole life has been one long holiday!*⁴⁸

USSR Championship, Tbilisi 1959. (Photographer: V. Velikhanzin)

Rest of the World

Wolfgang Uhlmann (DDR)

b. 29th March 1935, Dresden

Age: 35

Wolfgang Uhlmann was born in Dresden in 1935. He learned the moves of the game from his father at the relatively late age of 11. He completed an apprenticeship as a printer, but soon abandoned this career in favour of chess.⁴⁹

He was awarded the title of International Master in 1956, and that of International Grandmaster in 1959. Uhlmann was a player of very active style. He had a relatively narrow and well-studied opening repertoire; in particular, he remained faithful to the French Defence throughout his career and came to be regarded as perhaps the greatest expert on this opening.


Taimanov and Uhlmann first met over-the-board at the Alekhine Memorial tournament in Moscow in 1956. That game, a King's Indian Defence with Taimanov playing White, was drawn after an eventful struggle. Their next meeting, at the international tournament in Uhlmann's native city of Dresden, resulted in a short draw. At Buenos Aires in 1960, Taimanov employed one of his patented systems with Black in a Nimzo-Indian Defence. Sacrificing a pawn, he soon developed a formidable initiative, and scored a crushing victory. Two more draws between the players followed at the Maróczy Memorial (1961) and the Capablanca Memorial (1964), and then at Reykjavík (1968), Taimanov scored another decisive win against his East German opponent.

Wolfgang Uhlmann, pictured at the IBM tournament in Amsterdam, July 1970. (Photographer: E. Koch)



Mark Taimanov - Wolfgang Uhlmann

Reykjavík International 1968



This position was reached after Black's 15th move (he has just exchanged ...♘c3 and then played ...e7-e6).


Taimanov immediately capitalised on the weakening of the black king's position with the energetic **16.g4!**

Black's situation is already critical. Uhlmann tried **16...♖fe8** (16...fg4 17.hg4 f5 18.♖h5! is hardly any better), but after **17.gf5 e5 18.♖g1! ♔h8 19.f6! ♕f6 20.♗f5 ♖e6 21.de5 ♗b2 22.♔d1!** (the key move), it was clear that Black was in insurmountable difficulties.

The point is that on 22...♗f2 there follows 23.♗g4!, and Black is defenceless (23...♖e5 24.♖c2!).

He tried **22...♕h4**, but after **23.♗f7 ♖e7 24.♗f5 ♗f2 25.♗g4** the threat of 26.♖c2 forced Black to play **25...h5**.

There followed: **26.♗h5 ♖h7 27.♗g4 ♗a2**



28.♙h6! ♚f2 29.♙g7 ♜g8 30.♙f6 ♜f7 31.♚g6 and Black resigned.

Thus, prior to the match in Belgrade, the head-to-head score between Taimanov and Uhlmann was 4 : 2 (+2, -0, =2) in favour of the Soviet grandmaster.

Board 8 – Botvinnik v. Matulović
The Patriarch vs. The Local Hero

USSR

Mikhail Botvinnik

b. 17th August 1911, Kuokkala

Age: 58

**Mikhail Botvinnik in play at the IBM
tournament in Amsterdam, July 1966.
(Photographer: J. de Nijs)**

Mikhail Moiseevich Botvinnik, one of the towering figures of 20th-century chess, was born in Kuokkala, on the Karelian isthmus of what was then the Vyborg Governate of the Grand Duchy of Finland. (The area was later ceded to the USSR during the Second World War).

The young Mikhail grew up in nearby St Petersburg, on the city's most famous thoroughfare, the Nevsky Prospect. Botvinnik's mother – Seraphim Samoilovna Rabinovich, and father – Moisei Lvovich Botvinnik – were originally from Belarus. They had met in the Russian capital; both had previously been arrested for revolutionary activity. Moisei had moved to St Petersburg to work as a dental apprentice, while Seraphim had come there to work as a dentist after spending two years exiled to Siberia. The young Mikhail had an older brother, Isaac (who was destined to die at the front in 1941) and a younger sister, Maria.



Botvinnik learned chess at the relatively late age of 12 and took to the game immediately. His extraordinary natural talent soon became apparent; aged 14, he defeated the visiting World Champion, José Raúl Capablanca, in a simultaneous display in Leningrad. In 1927 he qualified for the final of the 5th USSR Championship in Moscow, where he tied for 5th-6th place with Vladimir Makogonov and gained the title of Soviet Master.

At that time in the Soviet Union, chess was in the process of being transformed from an apolitical passtime into a genuine mass movement with social and political ends. Mikhail Botvinnik – who was himself a committed communist – came to be seen as the figurehead of this movement, ahead of other, older masters such as Grigory Levenfish, Peter Romanovsky and Ilya Rabinovich, who had developed their talent prior to the Revolution of 1917. Botvinnik took his first Soviet title in Moscow in 1931, winning a decisive game against the local favourite, Nikolai Riumin. He repeated his success in the following championship (the 8th, Leningrad 1933), to establish himself as the strongest player in the Soviet Union. In 1933 he was given the chance to test his strength in a match against Salo

Flohr, who was then considered to be one of the leading masters in the West. Recovering from a poor start, Botvinnik won two games near the finish to tie the match 6:6 (+2, -2, =8).

In May 1934, at a party organised in Leningrad by his mentor, Yakov Rokhlin, Botvinnik met Gayane Davidovna Ananova, a dancer with the Kirov Ballet. The couple married the following April, and they would have a daughter, Olga, in 1941.

That same year of 1934 a tournament was organised in Leningrad with the participation of the western masters Max Euwe and Hans Kmoch. The young Soviet champion took 1st place, while the modest showing of Euwe and Kmoch confirmed the growing strength of the Soviet chess movement as a whole. At the end of the year Botvinnik was sent to the tournament at Hastings, where he performed relatively poorly, but soon afterwards he achieved a major success by sharing 1st-2nd places with Flohr at the 2nd Moscow International tournament. The following year he finished runner-up to Capablanca in the 3rd Moscow International and then went on to share 1st-2nd place with the great Cuban in the tournament at Nottingham. He finished in 3rd place behind Keres and Fine in the AVRO tournament of 1938, defeating both Alekhine and Capablanca – the latter in what was to become one of the most famous games in chess history.

After his poor showing in the 12th USSR Championship in 1940, a marathon match-tournament for the title of ‘Absolute USSR Champion’ was held in Leningrad and Moscow during the spring of 1941. Botvinnik won this six-player, 20-round event by a crushing margin, scoring 13½/20 (+9, -2, =9) to leave no-one in any doubt as to his status as the pre-eminent player of his country.

In the spring of 1931, Botvinnik had graduated in electrical engineering from the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute. He stayed on at the institute and combined his studies with his chess activities. Following the outbreak of war in June 1941, he “gave all his time to his work as an engineer”, travelling a great deal during the summer and visiting power stations in the Urals to test their high-voltage insulation. During the winter he worked at a high-voltage laboratory in the city of Perm (then know as Molotov), before moving to Moscow with his family at the beginning of 1944.

Botvinnik was nevertheless able to devote time to chess during the war years. In 1943 he won a masters’ tournament at Sverdlovsk and at the end of the year (hors concours) the Moscow Championship, in which many of the country’s strongest players were competing. He took 1st place in the 13th and 14th USSR Championships in 1944 and 1945 respectively, the latter with the remarkable score of 15/17 (+13, -0, =4).

After the war he took 1st place in the first great post-war tournament at Groningen in 1946, he was clear favourite to take the World Championship title that had been left vacant following Alekhine’s death in 1945. In the match-tournament of 1948, he fulfilled expectations, winning the event by three clear points to become the sixth World Champion. He would hold the title intermittently until 1963, regaining it in return matches following the reigns of Smyslov (1957-58) and Tal (1960-61). He continued to play at the highest standard following his loss of the title to Petrosian; indeed, he played some of the finest games of his career when in the second half of his sixth decade. His victories at events such as the 1966 IBM tournament in Amsterdam and the Hoogovens tournament at Wijk aan Zee 1969 (1st-2nd=, along with Geller) showed that he was still a force to be reckoned with. Botvinnik had an enormous impact on the theory and practice of chess. His rigorously analytical

approach revolutionised the way in which the game is studied. Many years later, the 14th World Champion, Vladimir Kramnik, would say of him:

Botvinnik, of course, [signified] a new era in chess. I would call him the first real professional, the first person who realized that in chess result depends not only on the ability to play chess. He was the first to think about comprehensive preparation for competition: not only openings, but also sleep, diet, physical fitness - in this he was, of course, a pioneer.^{50, 51}

One of the sharpest opening systems in chess – the Botvinnik System of the Semi-Slav Defence – was developed by him in the 1940s and remains topical to this day.

He won a number of games early in his career that fundamentally changed view on certain pawn structures arising from the English Opening and Nimzo-Indian Defences.

He was at the apex of a movement that had brought the USSR to its position of undisputed dominance in the chess world, and it was not for nothing that he became known in Soviet chess circles as “The Patriarch”.

Mikhail Botvinnik in play v. Samuel Reshevsky in the USSR v. USA match, June 1955. Mark Taimanov looks on. (Photographer: A. Cheprunov)

Rest of the World
Milan Matulović (Yugoslavia)

chesstouring.com

b. 10th June 1935, Belgrade
Age: 34

Born in Belgrade in 1935, *Milan Matulović* gained the International Master title in 1961 and the International Grandmaster title in 1965.

He won the Yugoslav championship in 1965 and 1967.

During the 60s and early 70s he was one of the leading Yugoslav chess players, being a regular member of the national Olympic team.


Matulović, a renowned opening expert and a dangerous attacker, was one of the very first rivals young Bobby Fischer encountered in 1958 preparing for the Interzonal tournament.

Even though he was quite active tournament player, scoring numerous amazing wins over the years, Matulović clearly excelled when playing for the Yugoslav team, having a really excellent results in the Chess Olympiads.

He played 78 games in six events for Yugoslavia, with the overall result of 46 wins, 28 draws and four losses, for a 76.9 percent score, the 10th all-time best Olympic performance.


The selection of Matulović for the Rest of the World team undoubtedly represented a high-point in his career. A slight controversy attended this pairing, as Matulović had a history of poor results against the Soviet player; there were accusations that the Soviet team captain had placed Botvinnik on a lower board than his stature would warrant in order to take advantage of this.

Milan Matulović in play v. Duncan Suttles at the Sousse Interzonal tournament, 1967. (Photo via British Columbia Chess History)



Mikhail Botvinnik - Milan Matulović

Palma de Mallorca 1967



Here Botvinnik broke through with **47.♘g6!**

He later noted that his opponent reacted with surprise to this move.

Black has little choice: 47...♔g6 48.♚h8, 47...♘g6 48.♘f5, or... **47...♘d5 48.♘h5 ♘de7 49.♚g7** and Black resigned. On 49...♔e6 there follows 50.♘f8#

Two years later the players met in Belgrade, with Botvinnik having the black pieces. Evidently playing for a draw, Matulović for exchanges straight from the opening (a Pirc Defence). However, Botvinnik soon gained a clear positional advantage and converted his superiority in model fashion; he was awarded a special prize by the newspaper Sport for his play in this game.

Thus, the head to head score stood at 2 : 0 in favour of the Soviet grandmaster.

Mikhail Botvinnik in play v. José Raúl Capablanca in the 2nd Moscow International, 1935.

Board 9 – Tal v. Najdorf
The Magician vs. Don Miguel

USSR

Mikhail Tal

b. 9th November 1936, Riga

Age: 33

Mikhail Tal was born 1936 in the capital of then-independent Latvia, Riga. His parents, Nekhemy Borisovich Tal (a neurologist) and Ida Griogrievna Tal, were cousins.⁵² A precocious child, he evidently learned to read at the age of three and could perform complex arithmetic operations by the time he was five years old.

Following the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22nd June 1941, Riga was occupied in little over a week. The Tals had fled eastwards to the town of Yurla, some 250km to the north-west of the city of Perm, in the Ural region. Thought their train was bombed en route, their decision to leave almost certainly saved them from a far worse fate – very few of the 95,000 or so Jews living in Latvia before World War II were to survive. Riga was retaken by the Red Army during September-October 1944, and the Tals were able to return soon afterwards.⁵³

The young Misha initially learned the moves from his father, but it was not until 1946 that he went to the Riga Pioneers' Palace, where his love for the game blossomed under the tutorship of Yanis Kruskops. However, it was not until 1949 that a chance encounter with the famous master and trainer Alexander Koblencs⁵⁴ led to a quantum leap in his playing strength. Koblencs immediately fell under the spell of the young Tal, and their co-operation would prove to be one of the most productive and long-lasting in the history of chess. By 1951 Tal had qualified for the final of the Latvian championship and by 1953 he was champion of the Republic.

He gained the Soviet Master of Sport title the following year, by defeating the Belorussian master Vladimir Saigin in a qualifying match. In 1955 Tal won the Riga Semi-final of the 23rd USSR Championship. In the final (Leningrad, 1956) he finished in 5th-7th place.

In 1957 he created something of a sensation by winning the 24th USSR Championship, winning a decisive final-round game against his rival for the title, Aleksandr Tolush, to finish in clear 1st place.

Thus far in his career Tal had shown considerable promise, but there was still no indication of the

Mikhail Tal in play at the Wijk aan Zee, January 1968. (Photographer: E. Koch)



meteoric rise that was to follow. Within three years he would be World Champion, passing each hurdle on the road to the title at the first attempt – winning the 25th USSR Championship (which was simultaneously a FIDE Zonal), the 1958 Interzonal in Portorož, the 1959 Candidates' tournament in Yugoslavia, and then in 1960 the match for the title against Mikhail Botvinnik. At 23 years old, he was the youngest World Champion in the history of chess and, it seemed, he had the world at his feet. It was not just Tal's results that stunned the chess world; the manner in which he achieved them was no less shocking.

His superb calculational ability and boldness in attack made him the most fearsome of opponents. Like no-one before, he was ready to take risks and offer sacrifices for the sake of creating conditions in which his exceptional talents would prevail; the sacrifices may not have always been objectively sound, but all too often they proved difficult or impossible to refute in conditions of practical play. However, Tal's reign at the summit was to be short-lived. Botvinnik once again exploited his right to a return match and, having drawn the appropriate lessons from his defeat the previous year, regained the title in the spring of 1961.

Tal was to be plagued by chronic bouts of ill-health throughout his life, and this was to be a contributory factor to the many peaks and troughs that he experienced in his chess career. These health problems may have been inherited to some extent, but they were undoubtedly exacerbated by Tal's lifestyle.

Seldom, if ever, seen without a cigarette in his hand, he was fond of strong alcohol – brandy in particular – and he lived life to the full, with little thought for his future well-being. As Genna Sosonko has memorably expressed it:

He showed little interest in his health or his appearance, or in what others thought of him. He was as from another planet, and there was only one thing that really excited and interested him: chess... In burning out his life, he knew that this was no dress rehearsal, and that there would not be another one. But he did not want to and could not live in any other way.⁵⁵

During the 1960s he became addicted to the morphine that was originally prescribed as a treatment for kidney-related pain. Nevertheless, his quick-wittedness remained legendary. On one occasion, asked by a Soviet journalist if he was a morphine addict – in Russian, morfinist, Tal immediately replied “No! I am a Chigorinist!”.

Nonetheless, Tal retained his position among the world's elite throughout the decade following his loss of the World Championship title. He shared 1st-4th places in the Amsterdam Interzonal tournament of 1964, and made it to the final of the Candidates' series, where he lost to Spassky. In the following series of Candidates' matches, he was eliminated at the semi-final stage by Korchnoi. He shared 1st-2nd place in the 34th USSR Championship (Kharkov, 1967) and continued to take the top places in strong international tournaments – for example, Hastings 1963/64, Reykjavík 1964, Kislovodsk 1964, Sarajevo 1965 (1st-2nd), Palma de Mallorca 1966 and Tbilisi 1969 (1st-2nd).

Tal left no particular mark on theory, but his impact on the game was immeasurable and he inspired, and continues to inspire, generations of chess-players. When asked to give his opinion of Tal, the 14th World Champion, Vladimir Kramnik, would later say of him:

Tal was a star, a real chess genius. As far as I understand, this man was completely devoid of ambition and played chess primarily for his own pleasure...

This approach is absolutely not professional. But his talent was so incredible that even with this approach, he became world champion.⁵⁶

Mikhail Tal in play v. Paul Keres, at the 2nd USSR People's Spartakiad, Moscow 1959.

Mikhail Tal in play at the Amsterdam Interzonal tournament, May 1964. (Photographer: H. Pot)

Rest of the World

Miguel Najdorf (Argentina)


b. 15th April 1910, Grodzisk Mazowiecki

Age: 59

**Miguel Najdorf, pictured in play at Wijk aan Zee
1971. (Photographer: H. Pot)**

Miguel Najdorf was born Mojsze Mendel Najdorf in 1910 in Grodzisk Mazowiecki, a small town in central Poland. It seems that he learned chess at the late age of 14, and was tutored first by David Przepiórka and then by Savielly Tartakower. While still a teenager, he won a game v. Glücsberg that was destined to become known as the ‘Polish Immortal’.

Najdorf represented Poland in four pre-war Olympiads. He was a member of the Polish team that was in Buenos Aires for the 8th Olympiad when war broke out in Europe in August 1939. Najdorf was Jewish and he chose to remain in South America, eventually becoming an Argentinian citizen in 1944. His father was to die in the Warsaw uprising, and wife, daughter, parents and four brothers all perished in the Holocaust. Subsequently he remarried and had two daughters with his second wife, Adela, whom he met in 1947.⁵⁷



During the war years, Najdorf performed strongly in tournaments in Argentina. By the mid-late 1940s it was clear that he was one of the strongest players in the world. He won a hat-trick of victories in the tournaments at Mar del Plata, finishing in clear 1st place in 1945, 1946 and 1947. In 1946 he finished in 4th-5th place in the first great tournament of the post-war years, the Staunton Memorial in Groningen in 1946, and won the Treybal Memorial in Prague. The chessmetrics.com website rates him as having been number two in the world between 1947 and 1949 – but despite this, he was not included among the participants in the World Championship Match-tournament of 1948.

In recognition of his achievements, in 1950 he was among the inaugural awardees of the International Grandmaster title. He continued to record major successes on both sides of the Atlantic, winning the events in Bled and Amsterdam (1950) and sharing 1st-2nd place in Havana (1952). He was among the participants in the FIDE Candidates’ tournaments of 1950 and 1953.

While in his fifties, he won major tournaments at Mar del Plata (1961) and Havana (1962) and was invited to participate in both of the elite Piatigorsky Cup tournaments, in Los Angeles and Santa Monica, in 1963 and 1966, respectively.

He played on 1st board for Argentina in all of the post-war Olympiads prior to the USSR v. Rest of the World match. Najdorf was not a full-time chess professional; he worked in the insurance industry and, it seems, amassed a considerable personal fortune in doing so.⁵⁸ A player of enormous natural talent, his playing style was highly tactical in nature. He has the distinction of having one of the most popular and topical opening variations in chess – the Sicilian Najdorf – named after him. The English master William Hartston would later recollect:

Anyone passing through the Press Room of a World Championship match in the 1970s or 1980s would have noticed that one table always attracted the strongest grandmaster visitors and produced the most animated discussions.


chesstouring.com

And when an aged and podgy hand banged a piece down, accompanied by a gravelly cry of “Chess, easy game”, and a raucous laugh, everyone knew that the focus of all the attention was Miguel Najdorf, one of the most successful and respected figures of post-war international chess.⁵⁹


Perhaps surprisingly, Tal and Najdorf had only faced one another on four occasions prior to Belgrade. Their first meeting, in the preliminaries of the 14th Olympiad was a 12-move ‘grandmaster draw’. However, their encounter in the finals of the same event was vintage Tal.

Miguel Najdorf pictured with his second wife Adela at the closing banquet for the great Amsterdam international tournament of 1950, in which he took 1st place. (Photographer: C. L. de Vogel)

Mikhail Tal - Miguel Najdorf
Candidates' Tournament
Belgrade 1959



This position arose after Black's 17th move (17...ed5). Play continued: **18.♘f5 ♕c5 19.d4 ♕a7 20.♙h4 ♜e4** and here Tal broke through with **21.♞e4!** (21.♞g4 is parried by 21...f6) **21...de4**




22.♙f6!

After the forced reply **22...♞b6 23.♙g7**

23.♞h6? ♞f6!

23...♞fe8 24.♙e5 White's attack proved irresistible.

The game ended: **24...♞g6 25.♜h6 ♜f8**



26.f5 and Black resigned.

White wins by force after 26...♔g5 27.♘f7! ♔f7 28.♙h7 ♔f8 29.♙d6

Or 26...♙c6 27.♙h5 ♙c4 28.♙d6 ♖e7 29.♞d1!, etc.

The following year in the great tournament at Bled, the Latvian won a fine positional game with the White pieces.

The players met again towards the end of the tournament at Moscow, 1967. On that occasion, the Argentinian player had somewhat the better of an exciting draw.

Thus, the head-to-head score prior to Belgrade stood at 3 : 1 (+2, -0, =2) in favour of the Soviet player.

Board 10 – Keres v. Ivkov
The Uncrowned King vs. The First Junior Champ

USSR

Paul Keres

b. 7th January 1916, Narva

Age: 54

Paul Keres in play in the tournament at Madrid, 1943.

Paul Petrovich Keres was born in the Estonian city of Narva in 1916, in what was then the Petrograd Governate of the Russian Empire, during the First World War. His parents – his father a taylor, his mother a seamstress – had fled eastwards from their native Pärnu to escape aerial bombardment by the German forces. They remained in Narva for the duration of the war and the subsequent Estonian war of independence, returning to Pärnu only in 1922. Paul had learned to play chess at the age of four, but it seems he was discouraged from playing by his mother.⁶⁰ He nevertheless resumed his interest in the game when he started school. He and his brother Harald – who was destined to become a famous physicist – discovered the moves of a game in a local newspaper, and began to collect game scores. By the time he was in his early teens, Paul could no longer find a worthy rival in his home city, and he began to develop his exceptional talent via correspondence chess, at times having as many as 150 games in progress simultaneously.



His first breakthrough in over-the-board play came at the end of 1934, when he tied for 1st-2nd place in the Estonian Championship, winning the subsequent playoff match. He made his debut in the international arena at the 6th Olympiad in Warsaw in 1935, where he played on 1st board, where he crossed swords for the first time with Alekhine and gained notable victories over the likes of Petrov and Ståhlberg, as well as a celebrated win against the English master Winter. Next came a period of dramatic progress. In 1936 he shared 1st-2nd place with Alekhine at Bad Nauheim, and shared 3rd-4th place in the strong international tournament in Zandvoort. In 1937 he shared 1st-2nd place with Fine in the tournament at Margate (defeating Alekhine in their individual encounter) and scored another major success at the tournament in Semmering, where he took clear 1st place ahead of Fine, Capablanca and Reshevsky. The following year he took part in one of the most famous events of all time – the AVRO international in the Netherlands. He shared 1st-2nd place with Fine, ahead of Botvinnik, Euwe and Reshevsky – who themselves left Alekhine and Capablanca in their wake – allowed him to be considered one of the strongest players in the world. It seemed likely that a match

with World Champion Alekhine would take place, but world events intervened.

In August 1940 Estonia was forcibly incorporated into the USSR, and Keres became a Soviet citizen, almost immediately taking part in the 12th USSR Championship in Moscow, where, according to Genna Sosonko:

Keres was greeted enthusiastically and during the opening ceremony the most prolonged applause was given to the new Soviet citizen. Keres' external appearance - a dark grey pinstriped suit, a watch chain on his belt, a handkerchief in his jacket pocket, a sharply-defined parting, his manners - it all contrasted with the uniformity that reigned in Soviet Russia in those days.⁶¹

In the spring of 1941, Keres took part in the Match-tournament for the title of 'Absolute USSR Champion' in Leningrad and Moscow. However, a couple of months later the USSR was invaded, and by the end of August Estonia was in Nazi hands. During the war years, to earn a living Keres participated in tournaments in Nazi-occupied Europe, and in Spain.

Keres finished his studies at the University of Tartu in 1941 and the same year married Maria, with whom he had two children during the war – Peeter (b. 1942) and Kadrin (b. 1943).

By the summer of 1944 it was clear that Keres' homeland would soon be re-incorporated into the Soviet Union. At the invitation of Folke Rogard – who would later become FIDE President and play a part in the organisation of the 'Match of the Century' – Keres was playing in a tournament in neutral Sweden.

Conscious of the fact that his participation in Nazi-organised events would be held against him, he planned to escape there and returned to Estonia to collect his family. However, the boat that was to take them across the Baltic failed to appear, and the Keres family, along with writers, artists and members of the Estonian government, fell into the hands of the Red Army. Keres was interrogated several times by the NKVD in Tallinn, but his fate was saved by the intervention of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party, Nikolai Karotamm⁶² who, after only a few hours' conversation with Keres, took him under his personal protection. Nonetheless, it seems that Keres thereafter remained suspect in the eyes of the USSR internal security services.

Before long Keres was soon back in action in Republic, All-Union and International events. In 1947 he took 1st place in the 15th USSR Championship in Leningrad, and in 1948 he participated in the Match-tournament for the World Championship. In the next few years he took 1st place in two further USSR Championships – the 18th (1950) and the 19th (1951) - the latter ahead of Petrosian, Geller, Smyslov and Botvinnik. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s he remained at the very top of world chess, finishing runner-up in no fewer than four Candidates' events (Zürich 1953, Amsterdam 1956, Bled/Zagreb/Belgrade 1959 and Curaçao, 1962). He continued to win prizes in international tournaments, notably Zürich 1961, Los Angeles 1963 (the 1st Piatigorsky Cup, won jointly with Petrosian), Beverwijk and Buenos Aires 1964, Hastings 1964/65, Bamberg 1968 and, just a month before the match in Belgrade, he finished clear first in the tournament at Budapest.

Keres was a player of universal style, as comfortable in tactical skirmishes as he was in long technical endgames. He made significant contributions to opening theory, particularly in the Spanish Game, and wrote a best-selling guidebook on the theory and practice of the final stage of the game,

'Practical Chess Endgames'.

Paul Keres in play at Beverwijk, 1964. (Photographer: J. de Nijs)

Paul Keres in play v. Max Euwe at the World Championship Match-tournament, The Hague 1948. (Photographer: J. D. Noske)

Rest of the World

Borislav Ivkov (Yugoslavia)

b. 12th November 1933, Belgrade

Age: 37

Borislav Ivkov, pictured at the World Junior Championship in 1951.

Borislav Ivkov was born in Belgrade in 1933. At the age of 16 he gained the title of National Master after he shared 4th-7th places in the 1949 Yugoslav championship in Zagreb. He made his international debut in the tournament the following year at Bled, in which he defeated Miguel Najdorf.

In 1951 he won achieved international fame by winning the inaugural World Junior Championship (which took place in the English city of Birmingham), thereby gaining the title of International Master.


He took 1st place in the international tournaments in Buenos Aires and Mar del Plata in 1955, and on the basis of these and other results he was awarded the International Grandmaster title by FIDE.


In 1964 he qualified for the Candidates matches. By the late 1960s he was clearly established as being one of the leading players in the world, as evidence by his results in the international tournaments at Zagreb (1965), Sarajevo (1967), Malaga (1967 & 1968) and Belgrade (1969), in each of which he was among the winners.

Ivkov was a player of solid positional style.

Keres and Ivkov first met at the chessboard in 1956 and then again in 1957; on each occasion these encounters took place in the traditional friendly matches between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Both of those games were drawn without any particular excitement. Then, in 1961, in the tournament at Bled, the Estonian master won a decisive game with the white pieces in a variation of the Spanish game that was particularly favoured by Yugoslav masters.

The players met again at the traditional Hoogovens event at Beverwijk in January of 1964; there Keres (Black) employed his own patented variation in the Spanish game, and squeezed out a win in an endgame after Ivkov went wrong not long before the first time control.






This position was reached after White's 35th move (35.♙b3–c2). Here Keres exchanged rooks with **35...♞d1**

As he later pointed out in his annotations in *Chess in the USSR*,⁶³ White should have recaptured with the queen, since the opposite-coloured bishop endgame after 36.♞d1 ♞d1 37.♙d1 ♙b2 38.♚f1 is drawn.

Instead Ivkov, in time trouble, played **36.♙d1?**, but after **36...♞e6!** White's position already proved to be lost in view of the threats of 37...♞e1 and 37...♞a2.

There followed: **37.♞c2 ♞e1** (simpler was 37...♞a2 38.b3 ♞c2 39.♙c2 a3) **38.♚h2 ♙e5 39.g3 h4 40.♚g2 hg3 41.♙f3** (the sealed move) **41...gf2 42.♞f2**



42...♚c1! 43.b3

Or 43.♗d5 ♖f6, defending f7 and threatening 44...♚g5

43...ab3 44.ab3 ♚f4 45.♔f1 ♗d4 46.♚e2 ♚f5! Already the h3-pawn cannot be satisfactorily defended.

47.♚e4 ♚h3 48.♔e2 ♚d7 49.b4 ♗c3 50.♚c6 ♚d2 51.♔f1 ♚e1 52.♔g2 ♗d4 and White resigned.

Four years later, at Bamberg 1968, Keres (White) again got the better of Ivkov in an endgame, this time in a French Defence. The players agreed a short draw in their encounter in the international tournament at Budapest, played just over a month before the 'Match of the Century'.

Thus, the prior head-to-head score between Keres and Ivkov stood at 4½ : 1½ (+3, -0, =3) in favour of the Estonian.

THE GAMES OF THE MATCH

ROUND-BY-ROUND

The games of the match are presented with annotations by the players. The original source of these annotations is the book of the match, produced by *Chess Informant* in 1970.⁶⁴

ROUND 1

Sunday 29th March, 1970

The opening round saw the Rest of the World team dominate on the top four boards, but the Soviet team gaining the upper hand overall – a pattern that would ultimately set the tone for the match as a whole. However, the result could easily have been different.

Spassky and Larsen drew an entertaining game in the World Champion's favourite Leningrad Variation of the Nimzo-Indian Defence. Spassky sacrificed the exchange in the early middlegame and at one stage it looked likely that he would win. However, he failed to exploit his chances, and Larsen escaped with a draw.

On the second board, Fischer resurrected an old line against the Caro-Kann Defence, and introduced a new idea at the 11th move, preventing Black from advantageously exchanging the light-

squared bishops. Petrosian never came close to equalising, and in the middlegame was forced to resort to a desperate king-march across the board in search of safety. However, with powerful play Fischer forced the ex-World Champion's resignation shortly before the time control.

Korchnoi v. Portisch was a complicated affair. In a Spanish Game (an unusual choice for Korchnoi, but one which, as we have seen, he favoured against his Hungarian opponent), Black experienced no problems and even gained a clear middlegame advantage. Exchanges failed to bring any relief, and when the game was adjourned at the 41st move it was clear that White's position was absolutely hopeless.

However, on the resumption, Portisch played in very uncertain fashion, missing more than one winning continuation, and a draw by repetition resulted.

On the fourth board Hort played a quiet line against Polugaevsky's favourite Sicilian Defence, exchanging queens and taking play into an endgame where he held a slight initiative. His advantage steadily increased, and he converted it to the full point in textbook fashion.

Geller's win against Gligorić was one of the best games of the match. The players continued their theoretical dispute in one of the main lines of the Smyslov System of the Spanish game, and after the Yugoslav grandmaster chose the wrong plan, Geller achieved a dominating position in the centre. Giving up two minor pieces for rook and pawn, he obtained a crushing attack in the middlegame and forced Black's resignation before the time control was reached.

The Reshevsky v. Smyslov game took a fairly uneventful course, until Smyslov chose a fairly risky plan, moving his knight to a4 instead of retreating it to d7 at the 29th move. Immediately, a critical position was reached. On his next turn, Smyslov offered a draw, which Reshevsky initially rejected but, after thinking the better of it in the light of his habitual time trouble, he later accepted. Objectively, the final position was better for White.

On the seventh board Taimanov was able to make use of his opening preparation against Uhlmann. The Soviet grandmaster introduced a new idea for White, which subsequently became associated with his name. Uhlmann was unable to solve his problems over the board, and Taimanov won in fine style.

Mikhail Botvinnik won a fine game with the Black pieces v. Matulović on the eighth board. From a Pirc Defence, a middlegame was reached in which Black gained a strong attack against White's king thanks to the presence of opposite-coloured bishops. Exchanges failed to bring any relief for White, and although the ex-World Champion failed to play in the most precise fashion his advantage proved sufficient for victory. Tal v. Najdorf on Board 9 was an exciting draw. Tal gained the upper hand in a Sicilian Defence, but the veteran Argentinian grandmaster defended well and held the balance in a difficult queenless middlegame. The game was adjourned after the first time control, but a draw was agreed without resumption.

On the tenth board, Ivkov gained somewhat the better chances against Keres in a Spanish Game. At the 32nd move he had an opportunity to create difficult problems for Keres in an endgame where his bishop was considerably stronger than Black's knight. However, short of time, he chose an inferior continuation, and Keres escaped with a draw.

The scene on the stage of the Dom Sindikata. Spassky watches the progress of Fischer v. Petrosian; behind him, Mikhail Tal is seen in play. In the foreground, Hort faces Polugaevsky. (photo source: <http://www.gpntb.ru>).

Board 1

Boris Spassky – Bent Larsen [E 30]
USSR - ‘Rest of the World’

1.d4

Spassky: Usually in games with B. Larsen I prefer to play 1.e4. The choice of opening is explained simply by my mood.

1...♟f6 2.c4 e6 3.♞c3 ♟b4 4.♞g5

Spassky: I employed the Leningrad Variation only because I had noted the uncertain play of Larsen in the game v. Diez del Corral (Palma de Mallorca, 1969). Despite the fact that Larsen won that game beautifully, his position after his conduct of the opening gave rise to serious concern.

Larsen: Since 1957 nobody has played this variation! It is known, however, that this variation, of which among other things the Leningrad theoreticians have made a special study, is in Spassky’s repertoire. He won a game with Keres in 1965, using this variation. I did not have time for any theoretical preparations; otherwise, I should have studied this variation thoroughly. I did not, in any case, want to repeat the variation which I had once played in Reykjavik, for which Spassky might


have been prepared.

RR: - The Diez del Corral-Larsen game had instead seen the continuation 4.a3 ♘c3 5.bc3 c5 6.f3 ♔a5 7.♙d2 d6 8.e4 ♘c6 9.♙d3 e5 10.♘e2 ♔c7 11.♙g5 ♘d7 12.d5, reaching a structure similar to that which can arise in the Leningrad variation.

4...c5 5.d5 ♘c3

Larsen: Against Mititelu in Reykjavík I played 5...h6 6.♙h4 0-0, considering castling to be a useful waiting move. (RR: Larsen's memory seems to have been at fault. Against Mititelu, in the Student Olympiad, he had in fact played 6...b5 - Griffin.)

6.bc3 e5



Spassky: A move characteristic of the optimistic Larsen. Now Black has to reckon with the reply 7.d6!? But, clearly, this move would not have taken Larsen by surprise.

Larsen: In this particular variation it is better not to enter into ...h7-h6 at move 4 or 5, as after ...♔d8-a5 the knight could move to e4, gaining a tempo on the bishop at g5. Here I expected 7.f3 or even the apparently passive move 7.♖c1, such as Petrosian played against Benkö in the Candidates' tournament in 1959.

7.♘f3

Larsen: (!?)

7...d6

Larsen: I am ashamed to say, but I was really afraid of Spassky's special variation, otherwise I should surely have chosen one of the aggressive continuations: 7...♔a5 or 7...h6 with the idea 8.♙h4 e4 9.♘d2 e3 etc.

8.♘d2

Spassky: (!) In this variation it is very important that White should control the e4-square.

8...h6 9.♔h4 ♖bd7 10.e3 ♜f8 11.♙d3 ♜g6 12.♙g3 0-0

Larsen: Probably 12...♜e7 was more correct.

13.0-0 ♜e7

Larsen: I was not completely happy with the ensuing position, so I wanted to prompt a sacrifice of the exchange, which is what followed in the game.


14.f4

Spassky: (!) This move underlines White's active intentions. It is associated with the interesting exchange sacrifice that occurs in the game.

14...ef4 15.♞f4

Larsen: As expected. Maybe the more restrained move 15.ef4 would have given White a slight advantage, for in that case 15...♜f5? 16.♙f5 ♙f5 17.♙h4 would be unpleasant for Black. Probably 15...♙f5 would have been best.

15...♜g6



16.♞f6

Spassky: (!?) For the sacrificed exchange White obtains a pawn and opens up his bishops. Black's plan of defence is associated with control over the e5-square.

Larsen: (!?) After 16.♙g6 fg6 Black would have nothing to worry about.

16...♞f6 17.♜e4 ♞d8

Spassky: (!)

18.♜d6


Larsen/Spassky: 18.♔d6 will not do on account of 18...f5 and Black wins a piece.

18...♕g5

Spassky: (!)

Larsen: (!) A very good move which prevents White's queen from occupying h5, for a while. Here I thought about 18...f5. However, after 19.♖h5! the position would be critical. For instance: 19...♕g5 20.♕g5 hg5 21.♖f1 ♘e7 22.♗c8 ♜ac8 23.♔d6 and White gets another pawn for the exchange.

19.♕d2 b6



20.♗e4

Spassky: Not the best continuation for White. More promising was 20.♔g6 ♕g6 21.e4 and White has a good game.

Larsen: During the game I feared the possibility of 20.♖f1, which would probably have been followed by 20...♗e5.

20...♕d8 21.♖f1

Larsen: On 21.♔d6?, 21...f5 would follow.

21...f5

Spassky: (!) Now Black manages to consolidate the position and obtain good drawing chances.

Larsen: This reply was probably forced. Playing cautiously, Black cannot undertake anything, while White can consolidate his position unhindered.

22.♗d6

Larsen: This move was practically forced, as after 22.♗f2 Black would have time to mobilise the rook at a8.

22...f4 23.ef4

Larsen: If 23.♘c8? then 23...fg3, while 23.♙g6? would be followed by 23...♚d6 with gain of material.

23...♚d6 24.f5 ♖d8

Spassky: 24...♘e5 appeared tempting. However, after 25.♚e3 ♜e8 26.f6! White obtains a strong attack.

Larsen: Weaker is 24...♘e5? because of 25.♚e2 ♜e8 26.♞e1 etc.

25.fg6 ♜f1 26.♙f1 ♚f6 27.♚f4 ♙d7

Larsen: During the whole game I was in pessimistic mood, but at this moment I thought there might be a chance of winning. I soon realised that this was a delusion.


28.♙e2 ♜f8

Larsen: After 28...♜e8 29.♙d2 the position of the white king is quite safe.

29.♚f6 g6

Spassky: In the endgame that has been obtained the advantage is on the side of White. His plan consists in seizing the f5-square.

30.♙f3 ♜e8



Larsen: Probably 30...h5 was better.

31.♙f2

Spassky: (?) White should have played 31.♙f4!, after which Black would hardly have been able to save himself.

31...h5 32.h3 ♙g7 33.g4

Larsen: Here I feared the possibility of 33.♔f4, although 33...♖e7 would have been quite a good answer, for instance: 34.♙f5 ♘a4! 35.d6 ♖e2 36.♙e3 ♖e1 etc.

33...hg4 34.hg4 ♖h8 35.d6

Spassky: (?) In time trouble White does not play in the best way.

He ought to play 35.♙g3.

35...♖h1

Spassky: Stronger was 35...♙c6 36.♔e2 ♙e8 with winning chances for Black.


36.♙f5 ♙c6 37.♔e2 ♖h3

Larsen: Here 37...♖a1 would also ensure a draw, but the move in the text (as well as 37...♖h2) is safer.

38.d7

Larsen: 38.♙e3 was an attempt to play for a win after which Black would reply 38...♖h2 and after 39.♔d3, 39...♖h3.

38...♖h8



39.♙g3 ♖d8 40.♙c7

Larsen: After 40.g5 Black secures a draw with 40...♙d7 41.gf6 ♔f6 42.♙h4 ♔f5 43.♙d8 ♔g6 44.♙c7 ♙e6.

40...♖d7 Agreed drawn ½ : ½

[Larsen/Spassky]

Fischer and Petrosian before play in the opening round (photo source: <http://www.gpntb.ru>).

1.e4 c6 2.d4 d5 3.ed5 cd5 4.♙d3

Fischer: An old variation to get off the beaten track. More usual is 4.c4.

4...♘c6 5.c3 ♘f6 6.♙f4

Fischer: If 6.h3 e5. Or 6.♙g5 ♘e4 7.♙e4 de4 8.d5 ♘e5 9.♙a4 ♙d7 10.♙e4 ♙f5 Black regains the pawn with advantage.

6...♙g4

Fischer: Another possibility is 6...g6.

Petrosian: "In recent times Fischer has on several occasions employed this old system of development, which is not considered to be dangerous for Black. Interestingly, in the year 1946 I had to defend with Black in this system in a match for the title of Champion of Armenia, against the experienced master Kasparian..."

7.♙b3 ♘a5


Fischer: Better is Hort's 7...♙c8 with the idea of ...♙h5 and ...♙g6.

Petrosian: When I was 17 years old, Black's whole manoeuvre - ...♘a5, ...♙d7 - did not appeal to me, and I preferred to play 7...♙b6. I think that I was correct. Also good is 7...♙c8, as Hort has played.

8. ♖a4 ♗d7 9. ♖c2 e6

Fischer: Petrosian suggests 9...a6.

10. ♘f3 ♖b6



11. a4

Fischer: (!) To prevent 11...♗b5 exchanging the ‘problem bishop’. This move refutes Black’s opening strategy and gives White a clear advantage.

Petrosian: Practically forced, since after the exchange of light-squared bishops with ...♗b5, Black has an easy game. The invasion at b3 promises Black nothing.

11... ♖c8

Fischer: If 11...♗b3 12. ♖a2 ♖c8 13. 0-0 ♗e7 White has a harder time making progress, but Black’s bishops are still hemmed in. If 11...♖b3 12. ♖e2! ♗a4? 13. ♖a4 ♖a4 14. ♗b5.

12. ♗bd2 ♗c6

Petrosian: Seemingly, Black has made a concession. In fact, however, he is entering the path of carrying out a lengthy plan which, alas, is not destined to be realisable.

13. ♖b1 ♗h5


Fischer: Time-consuming. 13...g6 is safer.

14. ♗e3 h6

Fischer: 14...f5 is smashed by 15.g4! fg4 16. ♗g5 ♗d6 17. ♗h7 etc.

Petrosian: After the game it was unanimously stated that better was 14...g6, but I was attracted by a different idea.

15. ♗e5



15...♗f6

Fischer: If 15...♗e5 16.de5 ♕c5 17.a5 ♜c7 18.♗f3 with a bind.

Petrosian: This is, in fact, effective capitulation. When I played 11...♖c8, I intended in this position 15...♗e5 16.de5 ♕c5 and after the exchange of bishops the invasion of the knight at f4, in combination with the move ...f7-f6 and the possibility of ...d5-d4, gives Black a good game. What then is the problem?

The point is that only at the very last moment I saw that the intermediate move 17.a5! destroys all Black's plans, since on 17...♜c7 there follows 18.g4 winning a piece, for which after 18...♕e3 19.fe3 ♜e5 20.gh5 ♜e3 21.♕e2 ♕b5 22.♜d1, with the manoeuvre ♗d2-f1-g3, Black has no real compensation.

16.h3

Fischer: To prevent a later ...♗g4 in many variations, and maybe to play g2-g4 after Black castles.

16...♕d6 17.0-0 ♖f8


Fischer: (?) 17...0-0 is better.

Petrosian: Also after castling Black remains in a difficult situation. After, for example, 18.f4, I did not see how it was possible to oppose the plan of attack with the move g2-g4.

18.f4 ♕e8

Fischer: If 18...♗e5 19.fe5 ♕e5 20.a5 wins.

19.♕f2



Fischer: (!)


19...♔c7

Fischer: If 19...g6 20.f5! gf5 21.♘f5 ef5 22.♖f5 ♔d8 23.♙h4 wins.

20.♙h4 ♘g8

Fischer: Black has a very passive position and hopes to regroup his forces.

21.f5 ♘e5 22.de5 ♙e5 23.fe6 ♙f6 24.ef7 ♙f7 25.♘f3



Fischer: (!)


Petrosian: White brings up the reserves and it is clear that, without counter-play and without co-

ordinated piece action, Black cannot hold on for long.

25...♔h4

Fischer: If 25...g5 26.♙f2 ♔g7 27.♙d4 etc.

26.♖h4 ♜f6 27.♗g6 ♙g6 28.♙g6



28...♔e7

Fischer: (!) Petrosian finds an ingenious defence in a difficult predicament, trying to bring his king to safety on the queen-side. I was almost expecting him to resign instead.

Petrosian: Black's only chance. Along the dark squares, the king sees if it can find shelter on the queen's flank.

29.♙f5 ♔d8 30.♗ae1 ♙c5 31.♔h1 ♜f8

Fischer: Losing by force. 31...♜c6 holds out longer.

Petrosian: Somewhat better was 31...♜c6, in order in reply to the move 32.♙e5 to have the possibility of 32...♙d6. Instead now there follows a forced finale.

32.♙e5

Fischer: (!) Black is now virtually in zugzwang. The king is cut off from c7.

Petrosian: (!)


32...♜c7

Fischer: 32...♙c7 loses to 33.♜f6! or 33.♙d5!, and wins.

33.b4

Fischer: (!)


33...♔c6



34.c4 dc4 35.♙f5 ♜ff7 36.♞d1 ♞fd7

Fischer & Petrosian: If 36...♘d7, then 37.♞fe1 wins.

37.♙d7 ♞d7 38.♜b8 ♔e7



Fischer: Or 38...♜c8 39.♞d7 ♘d7 40.♜d6 and wins.

39.♞de1 1 : 0

Fischer: Because if 39...♔f7 40.♜e8# mate.

[*Fischer/Petrosian*]

Board 3

Viktor Korchnoi – Lajos Portisch [C 95]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.e4


Korchnoi: I do not often play this 1st move, but I think that Portisch plays Open games less strongly than Closed ones. Nonetheless, in the present game my understanding of the position was not equal to that of my opponent.

1...e5 2.♘f3 ♘c6 3.♙b5 a6 4.♙a4 ♘f6 5.0-0 ♙e7 6.♖e1 b5 7.♙b3 d6 8.c3 0-0 9.h3 ♘b8

Korchnoi: One of the most topical variations of modern theory. It is not completely clear how White can achieve an advantage.

Portisch: By all accounts the Soviet team was well prepared for Smyslov's variation 9...h6, which could also be seen in the game between Geller and Gligorić in this round. Instead, I thought it better to play Breyer's Variation, since Korchnoi in his match with Reshevsky showed that he knew the Smyslov's Variation down to the smallest detail.

10.d4 ♘bd7 11.♘bd2 ♙b7 12.♙c2 ♖e8



13.b3

Korchnoi: Natural now was the move 13.♘f1, but White feared the move 13...d5 for Black, followed by 14.ed5 ed4 15.♘d4 ♘d5 16.♘f5 ♙f6 and White obtains a slight advantage, though not of the sort that he wanted.

Portisch: 13.♘f1 is played much more often, but it seems that Korchnoi had decided to conduct an operation on the queen's wing.

13...♙f8 14.♙b2

Korchnoi: Interesting was 14.d5 with the idea of a pawn-advance on the queen's wing.

14...g6 15.a4 ♖g7 16.♗d3 c6

Korchnoi: Or 16...♗c6 17.d5 ♘c5 18.♗f1 ♗d7 19.♗a3 with a clear advantage for White.

Portisch: The follow-up 16...d5 would lead to an uncertain position after 17.ab5, while the whole variation after 16...ba4 17.♖a4 d5 18.de5! ♘c5 19.♖d4 ♘fd7 20.b4! ♘e6 21.♖d5 ♗d5 22.ed5 ♘f4 23.♘c4! would give White the advantage.


RR: Remarkably, this variation was repeated exactly in the game Timoshenko - Balashov (USSR Team Championship, Naberezhnye Chelny 1988 - Griffin.)

17.♞c2 ♞c8 18.de5

Korchnoi: (?) A huge mistake, after which there is a significant advantage on the side of Black.

Correct was 18.b4! with the threat of 19.de5 de5 20.c4, and White's chances are better.

Portisch: This move suits Black. 18.b4?! would not be good because of 18...ed4! 19.cd4 c5! 20.ab5 c4! with an advantage for Black, but another possibility was 18.♗f1!?



18...de5 19.b4

Korchnoi: Or 19.♗a3 ♞b6, and then 20...c5.

Portisch: If 19.c4, then 19...♗f8! and Black has slightly the better position.

19...♗f8

Portisch: (!)

20.♖ed1 ♞b6 21.♞b3 c5

Portisch: (!)


22.ab5

Portisch: An interesting possibility now was 22.♘g5, as 22...c4 23.♘c4 bc4 24.♙c4 would compensate White for the lost material. However, after 22...♖e7! 23.ab5 ab5 24.bc5 ♘c5 25.♚b5 ♚b5 26.♙b5 h6 Black would have the better game.

22...ab5 23.bc5 ♙c5 24.♚b5

Korchnoi: Also possible was 24.♖f1, but I think that after this too Black's chances are better. He plays simply 24...♙c6, threatening ...♗f6-h5.

Portisch: After 24.♖f1 ♙c6 Black would have the better position, for White's pieces are out of harmony while the e4-pawn is weak.



24...♙f2 25.♗f1 ♖e7


Korchnoi: By no means 25...♚e3, on account of 26.♘c4 ♖c4 27.♙c1!, and White repulses the attack.

Portisch: There would be an unpleasant surprise for Black on 25...♚e3? because of 26.♘c4! ♖c4 27.♙c1!, and White wins.

26.♚b6 ♙b6 27.♙a6

Portisch: (!)

27...♙a6 28.♖a6 ♙e3



Korchnoi: White's position is desperate. He has two weaknesses - at c3 and e4, and a weakened king's flank. Natural for Black now was the move 28...♖h5 with the idea of ...♖g3 and possibly ...f7-f5.

However, Black plays mistakenly and gives White the chance to defend.

Portisch: (!) To lure White's king to the square e2, which is a weaker position than at f1.

29.♕e2 ♜c5 30.g4

Portisch: (!!) A further weakening, though in many variations there is the threat of ...♖h5, which White clearly wished to avoid.

30...♜b8 31.♞a2

Korchnoi: (?) Bad. 31.♞a1 had to be played.

31...♖f8 32.c4 ♜6d7 33.♕f1

Korchnoi: Clearly, better was 33.g5 ♜e6 34.h4 but in this situation Black is ready to attack the king: 34...♖f4 35.♕f1 ♜d3 36.♞a1 ♜f8!, and then 37...f6.


33...f6 34.♜b1

Korchnoi: White tries to occupy the square d5 with the knight. However, this possibility is now denied to him.

34...♜b6 35.♜fd2 ♞d7 36.♞c1 ♜e6 37.♞a3 ♞d3

Portisch: 37...♞bd8!? may have been stronger, retaining both pairs of rooks on the board.

38.♞c3 ♞bd8 39.♞c5 ♜c5 40.♞d3 ♞d3



41.♖a5

Korchnoi: The sealed move. After analysis, it became clear to me that the position is completely hopeless.

Portisch: (!) The only counter-chance. 41.♖a3 would have been weaker because of 41...♗d4 42.♞c3 ♗c8! with the idea of transferring the knight to the d6-square.

41...♗bd7 42.♖a3

Korchnoi: Interesting is the variation 42.♔g2 ♞e3 43.♖a7 ♗f8 44.♖a3 ♗d3 45.c5 ♞e2 46.♔f3 ♗f4 47.c6 ♗8e6 and White has no possibility of defending against mate.

42...♗d4 43.♞e3

Portisch: A more complicated continuation for Black would have been 43.♖a7, since now after 43...♗f8 44.♖a8! ♗e4 45.♗e4 ♞e4 46.♗d2 White would have enough compensation in the form of the passed pawn.

But after 43...♗b6! 44.♞c7 ♗c4 45.♗c4! (with 45.♞c5 ♗d2 46.♗d2 ♞d2 47.g5! fg5, even in the case of a passive defence, Black would win the rook endgame) 45...♞c4 46.♗a3! ♞c1! (not 46...♖a4? because of 47.♞c5 ♖a3 48.♔g2 with a draw) 47.♔g2 ♗d3 48.♞c1 ♗c1, in this endgame with an extra pawn for Black, his winning chances are better than White's are of drawing.

However, after the move in the text, Black can exchange rooks in more favourable circumstances.

43...♗b6 44.♔e2 ♗c4 45.♗c4 ♞c4 46.♗c3 ♔g7

Portisch: Perhaps 46...♔f7 would have been better.


47.♔f3 ♗e6 48.h4 ♗d4 49.♔f2 ♖b4 50.♗d1

Portisch: (!) I expected 50.♗d5! followed possibly by 50...♖b2 51.♔g3 and it is doubtful whether Black would have anything better than to exchange rooks.

50...♖a4 51.♔g3

Korchnoi: (?) A mistake in time trouble. Better was 51.♔g2 and then ♖f2.

51...h5



52.♖f2

Korchnoi/Portisch: If 52.g5, then 52...f5!, to Black's advantage.

52...♖a2

Portisch: (!) If 52...hg4 53.♔g4!, but not 53.♖g4? because of 53...♖f5! 54.ef5 gf5, winning.

53.g5

Korchnoi: (?) Better was 53.g5 f5 54.♔g2, whereas now White loses immediately.


53...fg5 54.hg5 h4 55.♔g2 ♖e6 56.♔f3 ♖g5 57.♔g4 ♖f7

Korchnoi: (??) Over this move Portisch thought for 40 minutes. Clearly, he was exhausted. After 57...♔f6 or 57...♔h6 White would have had to resign at once. Now, however, the struggle only heats up.

Portisch: (?) Black failed to see the wood for the trees. I spent so much time thinking unnecessarily about the consequences of the rook endgame after 57...♖f2 58.♔g5 h3 59.♖h3 ♖g2 60.♔h4 ♖e2 61.♔g5 ♖e4 62.♖a3 ♖f4, which would probably also win, that I completely forgot about the simplest way to victory, by 57...♔f6!.

After this move White might well have resigned, since 58.♖h3 would have been followed by 58...♖g2 59.♔h4 ♖h2, or 58.♖d3 h3, after which White would have no move.

Of course, I was sure that what I played was of no consequence, since it was all good, and this may also explain the later slips.



58. Rf3 g5 59. Kh5 Ra8

Korchnoi: (?) This was evidently a fateful mistake, after which it became impossible for Black to win the game. Necessary was 59...Re2.


Portisch: (??) A completely incomprehensible mistake, with which Black puts his active rook in a passive position.

There was no need at all to drive White's king from h5, since after 59...Re2! White would be in zugzwang. 60. Rf5 would be followed by 60...Re3!, and 60. Kh3 by 60...Rg2 61. Kh2 Rg3 62. Rg3 h3 63. Kh3 g2 64. Kg4 Kh6 65. Kf3 Kh6 with an easy win.

60. Rb3

Portisch: (!)

60...Rh8 61. Kg4 Rh6 62. Kh3 Rf6 63. Rb8



Korchnoi: (!) Preventing the threatened 63...♔g6. White replies with the check 64.♖g8.

63...♖d6

Portisch: Now 63...♔g6 would be followed by 64.♖g8, and this was what I had not noticed when I moved the rook into a passive position.

64.♔h5 ♖h6

Korchnoi: Interesting appears the variation 64...♖g6 65.♖g8 ♔g8 66.♔g6, and although Black has two extra pawns, he does not win the game.

Portisch: If 64...♖g6 then 65.♖g8! and Black cannot win the endgame, but 65.♔g4 ♖h6 66.♔h5 would also have been good, since now on 66...g4 White would be able to play 67.♖g5! with a draw.

65.♔g4 ♖d6 66.♔h5 ♔f6 67.♖b2 ♔g7 68.♖b8 ½ : ½

Korchnoi: The position has been repeated three times.

Portisch: Here the opponents agreed to a draw because the position has been repeated three times, but Black no longer has winning chances.

[Kortschnoi/Portisch]

Mitja Ribičič, the president of the Federal Executive Council makes the first move

Board 4

Vlastimil Hort – Lev Polugaevsky [B 22]

‘Rest of the World’ - USSR

1.e4 c5 2.c3


Polugaevsky: In this way White moves avoids the topical variations of the Sicilian Defence and chooses a rarely-encountered continuation.

2...♘f6 3.e5 ♘d5 4.d4 cd4 5.♚d4

Hort: A very quiet continuation. 5.cd4 might have brought about something more complex.

Polugaevsky: An interesting idea. Usually 5.cd4 is played. The capture with the queen had been encountered in the game Bronstein - Hort (Monaco, 1969).

5...e6 6.♘f3 ♘c6 7.♚e4 d6 8.♘bd2




Hort: 8.♘c4 is also worthy of attention. Against me at Monte Carlo (1969), Bronstein employed the move 8.♘bd2.

8...de5 9.♘e5 ♘f6

Hort: It is not clear whether 9...♘e5 10.♙e5 ♙c7 would have given better chances of equalising.

Polugaevsky: In the above-mentioned game there occurred 9...♘e5 10.♙e5 with advantage for White. Now it is unfavourable for White to play 10.♘c6, on account of 10...♙d2!.

10.♙a4



Hort: Certainly not 10.♘c6 because of 10...♙d2! and Black has the better position.

10...♚d5

Polugaevsky: A risky move. Quieter was 10...♚c7, and White has only a minimal advantage.

RR: 20 years later, this continuation occurred in the game between the same opponents in the tournament at Biel - Griffin.

11.♘df3 ♕d6 12.♗f4 ♚e4

Hort/Polugaevsky: There was the threat of 13.♖d1, so that the exchange of queens was forced.

13.♚e4 ♘e4 14.♗d3

Hort: White is content with the slightest advantage.

Maybe 14.♗b5 0-0 15.♗c6 bc6 16.♗g3 together with 17.0-0-0 would have been better.

Polugaevsky: This move permits Black to defuse the situation. To fight for an advantage was possible only by means of 14.♖d1 or 14.♗b5. For example, 14.♗b5 ♗d7 15.♘d7 ♗f4 16.♘de5. On 14.♗b5 it is best for Black to play 14...0-0.


14...♘e5 15.♗e5

Polugaevsky: If 15.♘e5, then 15...g5!.

15...♗e5 16.♘e5 ♘c5

Hort: At this point White declined the offer of a draw.

17.♗c2




17...f6

Polugaevsky: Black fails to sense the danger. After all, he could easily achieve equality, if he had played 17...♘d7. After 17...♘d7 18.♘c4 ♖e7 19.0-0-0 ♘f6 20.♘d6 ♖d8 the position is level.

18.♘c4 ♖e7 19.0-0-0

Hort: 19.b4 ♖a6 20.♙e4 ♜b8, in conjunction with 21.♘a5, also deserved attention. However, White chooses another plan.

19...♙d7 20.b4 ♖a6 21.♘d6 b6 22.♞he1 g6 23.♙b3



Hort: It would have been better to play 23.f4 immediately.

Polugaevsky: White has achieved a noticeable advantage, but now it was more energetic for him to reply immediately 23.f4!.

23...♞ad8


Hort: Black also fails to play in the right way. 23...♘c7 would have been correct, so as to answer, on 24.f4 ♞ad8!.

Polugaevsky: (?) Permitting White to begin a strong attack. Correct was 23...♘c7 24.f4 ♙c6! 25.f5 e5. If 25.b5 then 25...♞ad8.

24.f4 ♘c7 25.f5

Polugaevsky: (!)

25...gf5 26.♘f5 ♙f7



Hort: Definitely not 26...♔f8 because of 27.♙e6.

27.♖d3

Hort: It is not at all easy for White to find an effective way to proceed. Polugaevsky suggested 27.♖d6, in order to be able, after 27...♙c8, to reply 28.♖c6. However, it is not clear how White ought to proceed after 27...♔e8.

Polugaevsky: Stronger was 27.♖d6!. Now Black rids himself of the immediate dangers.

27...♙c8

Hort: The only move.

28.♖g3 ♘e8 29.♘d4 ♘c7

Polugaevsky: (!)

30.♘f5

Polugaevsky: Giving White nothing is 30.♘c6 ♖d6 31.♘a7? ♙d7.


30...♘e8 31.♘d4 ♘c7

Hort: Time pressure! The opponents repeat their moves.

32.♖e4 ♖dg8 33.♖g8 ♖g8 34.♘f5 ♖d8

Hort: Again the only move. After 34...♔f8 White would have had the winning move 35.♖c4!.

35.♖g4 ♘e8 36.♖h4



36...h5

Polugaevsky: (!)


Hort: By sacrificing a pawn, Black tries to consolidate his position. However, it is not quite clear whether this decision is correct.

37.♖h5 ♜g6 38.♗g3 ♜g7

Hort: Certainly not 38...♖d3, because of 39.♙c2!.

Polugaevsky: Once again Black does not play in the best way. After 38...♗d6! 39.♖h4 e5! Black has for the pawn an active position and good counter-chances.

39.♖h4 ♙b7 40.♖g4 ♜f7 41.♗e2



Hort: Here the game was adjourned. White has the better position, but Black has drawing prospects.

41...f5

Hort: The sealed move. White was more concerned about 41...♖h8, having in mind the following variations: 42.♞c4 ♜e8 43.♞d4 ♔e7 44.♞f4 ♞h2 45.♙e6 ♞d6 46.♙b2 (46.c4 would have been a poor move because of 46...♙g2 47.c5 bc5 48.bc5 ♞b5 49.♞d7 ♔e8 50.♞g7 ♙c6, and Black defends) 46...b5 47.♞d2. A difficult endgame, with an extra pawn for White, but with Black retaining saving chances.

Polugaevsky: (?) The sealed move, losing the game. If Black had sealed 41...♞h8, then as analysis showed, he would have had good chances of salvation. Here is a possible variation: 41...♞h8 42.♞c4 ♜e8 43.♞f4 ♞h2 44.♞d4 ♔e7 45.♙e6 ♞d6.

42.♞c4 ♜e8

Hort: The right move was 42...♞d7 43.♞f4 ♔f6 44.♞d4 ♙c6 etc.

Polugaevsky: Also losing is 42...♞d7 43.♞f4 ♔f6 44.♞d4 ♞c7. Impossible is 42...♙g2 43.♞f4! ♙f3 44.♞c7 ♔f6 45.♞g7!.

43.♞d4

Hort: (!)


43...♞d6 44.♞f4 ♙c8

Hort: After this last move Black is lost, he has to go into an unpleasant endgame.

45.♙a4 ♞d4 46.♙e8 ♔e8 47.cd4 ♔e7 48.♔d2 ♔f6 49.♞d3

Hort: Not allowing Black to play ...e6-e5.

49...♔g5 50.♔e3 ♙a6 51.♞f4 ♙c4 52.a3 a5 53.g3 ♔g4 54.♔f2 ♔g5 55.h4 ♔f6 56.♔e3 ab4 57.ab4



57...e5 58.♘d3

Hort: The last move of importance to the outcome of the game. Black's position is hopeless.

58...ed4 59.♖d4 b5 60.♗f4 ♕f1 61.♗d5 ♖c4 62.♗d6 ♖b3 63.♗d5 ♗g6 64.♗e5 ♖c2 65.♗e7 ♗h5 66.♗f5

Black resigned. 1 : 0

[Hort/Polugaevsky]

Board 5

Efim Geller – Svetozar Gligorić [C 93]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.e4 e5 2.♗f3 ♗c6 3.♖b5 a6 4.♖a4 ♗f6 5.0-0 ♖e7 6.♞e1 b5 7.♖b3 d6 8.c3 0-0 9.h3 h6

Geller: Beginning with this move is Smyslov's System, which is perhaps Gligorić's main weapon against the Spanish Game. The Yugoslav grandmaster is among the World's greatest experts in this system. During the match USSR - Yugoslavia (Sochi, 1968) I tried to breach the opponent's defensive lines, but without success. In this game I was successful only because Gligorić himself later refrained from the correct order of moves.

10.d4 ♞e8 11.♗bd2 ♖f8 12.♗f1 ♖b7

Gligorić: With Black I vigorously defend this method of development, which launches the counter-attack ...d6-d5 in the centre and brings pressure to bear on the e4-pawn, instead of the more cautious and more passive 12...♖d7, which protects the sensitive points f5 and b5. Admittedly, some grandmasters prefer the latter treatment.

13.♗g3 ♗a5 14.♖c2 ♗c4


Gligorić: This occurred in the game Spassky - Stein (Amsterdam, 1964). Black improves the position

of his worst piece - the queen's knight at the edge of the board. 14...c5 could have been followed by 15.b3, making it more difficult for Black to find the correct place for this piece.

15.b3

Glorigić: Geller played this way in 1968, against the same opponent in the USSR - Yugoslavia match.

15...♞b6 16.♙b2



16...♞bd7

Geller: In Sochi, Glorigić played 16...c5, whereas now White obtains the possibility of disposing his major pieces in the optimal fashion.

Glorigić: For the first time in the game, it took Black somewhat longer to decide on his move. The game played at Sochi went 16...c5 17.de5 de5 18.c4 ♔c7 19.♙e2 b4! (after 19...bc4 20.bc4 White's bishop would have had an undesirable exit at a4) 20.♞ad1 ♞bd7 21.♞d2 ♞b8 22.♞f5 ♞c6 23.f4 g6 24.fe5 ♞e5 25.♞g3 ♙g7, and with each side having equal assets, the game ended in a draw at the 28th move.

Black's chosen move shows that he intends to thwart any preparation that White might have made for this course of play. He decided on it directly at the board.


17.♙d2

Glorigić: Not the strongest. White lets himself be taken in by Black, and his manoeuvre to avoid the course of the earlier encounter. Certainly, White's queen could not have been posted at e2 because of 17...ed4 18.cd4 ♞e4!, but 17.a4! would have been more unpleasant for Black, now that the b5-square has been weakened by the knight's move to d7.

17...c5 18.♞ad1 ♙a5

Gligorić: (?) Black relies on an obvious threat instead of the sounder 18...♙c7 19.de5 de5 20.c4 ♘b8! with a rapid transfer of the knight to c6. Black's troubles begin from this point. In fact, White had given him a chance to recover by bringing his heavy pieces to the d-file, but Black failed to take advantage of the opportunity.

19.dc5 dc5 20.c4



Gligorić: (!) The only possibility, but a decisive one. After 20.♙b1 Black would have had enough time to regroup his pieces.


20...b4

Geller: Better was to transpose to a slightly worse endgame after 20...♙d2. *Gligorić* hoped, by the usual manoeuvre in such circumstances, ...♘d7-b8-c6, to equalise the game.

However, he had overlooked, or under-estimated, a combinational blow for the opponent.

Gligorić: 20...♙d2 21.♖d2 would have given Black a passive role, since there would not be time for the vital manoeuvre ...♘d7-b8-c6, while 20...♙a2 21.♖a1 ♙b2 22.♖eb1 would have trapped the queen.

21.a4 ♙c7 22.♘f5 ♘b8



Geller: Here it is, the decisive moment in the present game. Black is only one move away from complete security, and White cannot delay.

Glorigić: This is a mistake, but Black had no other way to strengthen his position. The time lost by the manoeuvre ...♔d8-a5-c7 has been the cause of all Black's troubles.

Had he played 22...♖ad8 23.♔e2 Black could still not have posted his knight at b8 because of the threat to the e5-square.

23.♘e5

Geller: (!)

Glorigić: The only possibility, but again a decisive one. All of White's pieces are deployed so as to put pressure on the king's wing and along the central files.


23...♞e5 24.♙e5 ♖e5 25.f4 ♗e6

Geller: After 25...♔c3 26.♔f2 the black queen falls into a trap.

26.e5 ♘e8

Glorigić: Black defends as well as he can. After 27.♘d6 ♘d6 28.ed6 ♗f6 29.d7 ♘c6 30.♞e8 ♘d4! he has some hope for the future.

27.♘h4



Geller: The most energetic way of continuing the attack.


Glorigić: (!) An excellent move. White is preparing to crush Black on the king's wing. The way to victory is now open and clear.

27...♞c6 28.♚d3 g6 29.f5 gf5 30.♞f5

Geller: In view of the threat of 31.♞e7 and 32.♚h7, the following move by Black is forced.

Glorigić: Black is now helpless, unable to defend himself against the threat of 31.♞e7 with mate at h7. For instance, 30...♙g7 31.♞g7 ♔g7 32.♚h7 ♔f8 33.♙f5! or 31...♞g7 32.♚h7 ♔f8 33.♚h8 ♔e7 34.♚g7 etc.

30...♚g6 31.♚e2



Gligorić: 31.♚d7 is also a winning move.

31...♜g5

Geller: After this Black loses his queen. But also after 31...♚e6 32.♚e4 ♜g6 the attack was irresistible.

I had examined during the game the following two methods:

- 1) 33.♞e3 ♜d8 34.♞d5 ♞d5 35.cd5 etc.;
- 2) 33.♞d7! ♞c8 34.e6! ♞d7 35.ed7 ♜g7 36.♜g7 ♚g7 37.♚g6 fg6 38.♞e4.

Gligorić: (?) Black loses immediately, but in any case there was no defence. He would have done better to resign earlier.

32.h4 ♜f4 33.g3 ♚e5 34.♚g4 ♚g7 35.♜g7 ♜f6 36.♚f4 ♞g7 37.♚c7 ♞b8 38.♞d6 ♜g4 39.♞c6 ♞d4 40.♚f1

Black resigned. **1 : 0**

[*Geller/Gligorić*]

Board 6

Samuel Reshevsky – Vasily Smyslov [A 07]

‘Rest of the World’ - USSR

1.g3 d5 2.♜f3 c6 3.♞g2 ♞f5

Reshevsky: Here I expected 3...♞g4, a move which otherwise Smyslov most often plays in this position.

4.0-0 e6


Smyslov: This defensive scheme was already employed in his time by Em. Lasker. The pawn triangle

c6-d5-e6 limits the sphere of influence of White's fianchettoed bishop.

5.d3 ♕e7 6.♖bd2 ♜f6 7.♚e1 h6 8.e4 de4

Smyslov: The exchange of pawns eases the defence. In the case of 8...♙h7 9.e5 it would have been more difficult for Black to obtain counter-play.

9.de4 ♙h7 10.♚e2 ♜bd7



Reshevsky: At first I intended to play here 11.b3, but I realised that after 11...♜c5 White has no way to protect the attacked e4-pawn. For instance: 12.♙b2 ♕e4 13.♜e4 (if 13.♙f6 ♙f3 14.♙e7 ♙e2 15.♙d8 ♜d8) 13...♜ce4 and Black has an extra pawn.

11.e5 ♜d5 12.♜e4 ♜c5 13.♜c5 ♙c5 14.♜d2

Reshevsky: So that the knight will reach the e4-square. 14...♙c2 will not do because of 15.♚c4.


14...♚c7

Smyslov: The attack on the e5-pawn constrains the opponent's activity.

15.a3

Reshevsky: White has the better position because of the strong pawn at e5, so that Black's knight is a potential object of attack, and because of his control of the centre.

15...0-0



16.♘b3

Reshevsky: Instead of this move 16.♙h1, with the idea of preparing f2-f4, would have been better. Then it also would be possible to play ♘d2-e4, since for Black there is no point in taking at e5 because of f2-f4. After the move in the game White's advantage becomes no more than minimal.

16...♙e7 17.♙e4 ♙e4 18.♚e4 ♜fd8

Reshevsky: The position is equal.

19.♙d2 ♙f8

Smyslov: By freeing the square e7 for the knight, Black forestalls the manoeuvre 20.c4 ♘b6 21.♙a5!.

20.♜fd1 ♘b6 21.a4

Smyslov: If 21.♙a5, then 21...♜d5.

21...♜d5

Smyslov: (!)

22.a5 ♘d7 23.♙c3 ♜d8 24.♜d5 cd5

Smyslov: If 24...ed5, then 25.♚d4 a6 26.♜e1.

25.♚e3 a6 26.♙d4 ♜c8

Reshevsky: There is no point in playing 26...♚c2 because of 27.♜c1 ♚f5 28.♜c7, and White stands better since he will take Black's b-pawn, and keep his rook on the 7th rank.


Smyslov: By sacrificing a pawn, White frees himself from the unpleasant pressure on the c-file. In the case of 26...♚c2 27.♜c1 ♚f5 28.♜c7 he obtains sufficient compensation, thanks to the active position of the rook on the 7th rank.

27.c3 ♚c6 28.♘c1 ♘c5 29.b4 ♘a4

Reshevsky: (?) 29...♞d7 would have been better.

Smyslov: A risky manoeuvre. It was better to retreat the knight to d7 with a level game.

30.♞d3 ♚b5 ½ : ½



Reshevsky: Here Smyslov offered a draw. I considered the matter for a while, and accepted the offer. However, there is no doubt about White's advantage in this position. After 31.♞a3 followed by ♚e3-d2-d1, attacking Black's knight, Smyslov would have been in serious trouble.

The only defence to 31.♞a3 seems to be 31...b6 32.ab6 ♚b8 33.♞c5, but there is no clear way for Black to equalise.

Smyslov: Impossible is 30...♞c3 on account of 31.♞c3 ♚c3 32.♞c1. In this position Reshevsky at first declined the offered draw, but then, experiencing a shortage of time, agreed to a peaceful outcome of the encounter. In view of the poor position of the knight at a4, difficulties have arisen for Black.

After 31.♚d2 b6! 32.♚c2 (or 32.ab6 ♞b6 33.♞a5 ♞c4 34.♞b5 ♞d2) 32...ba5! (worse is 32...♞c3 33.ab6!) 33.♞a4 ab4 34.♞c1! White achieves an advantage.

[*Reshevsky/Smyslov*]

Board 7

Mark Taimanov – Wolfgang Uhlmann [D 80]


USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.d4 ♞f6 2.c4 g6 3.♞c3 d5

Taimanov: Uhlmann is among those grandmasters who unchangingly defends his creative convictions. His opening repertoire is not wide, but it has been worked out to perfection. Therefore I did not doubt that the Grünfeld Defence - one of Uhlmann's 'hobby horses' - would certainly be encountered in the games of our duel. The task of preparation consisted in the necessity to find a

variation which, even to such an opening expert as Uhlmann, would prove to be a surprise.

4.♔g5 ♖e4 5.♔h4



Taimanov: This was my preparation. Theory in the main examines the continuation 5.♔f4 or 5.cd5 ♖g5 6.h4. In my opinion, the bishop stands very well at h4, since it later exerts pressure on the e7-pawn. I had already employed this idea twice - against Savon in the most recent championship of the USSR, and against Filip in the tournament at Wijk aan Zee - and both times with success, but I knew that these games had still not been the focus of attention of the theoreticians and I reckoned on an element of surprise. As the further course of events showed, I was mistaken in my assumption, but only in part.

5...c5 6.cd5

Uhlmann: (!)


6...♖c3

Taimanov: If 6...♔a5, then 7.♔d3!.

7.bc3 ♔d5

Uhlmann: 7...♔a5 would be followed by 8.♔d2 ♔g7 9.e3 with a slightly better game for White.

8.e3



8...cd4

Taimanov: All of these moves were played very quickly by Uhlmann, which was evidence of his preparedness for my variation. However, after this last exchange I understood that Uhlmann had assessed it incorrectly. There now arises an endgame which, despite its seeming simplicity, contains no little ‘venom’.

9.♙d4

Taimanov/Uhlmann: (!)

9...♙d4 10.cd4

Taimanov: White’s advantage takes shape from several small plusses - a slight advantage in development, a firm pawn centre and the eventual possibility of pressure on the pawns at e7 and b7. Do not dare to claim that this is sufficient for decisive play for the win, but White probably has many chances to present ‘problems’ for the opponent. At any rate, in preparation for this match, I very much wanted to obtain this endgame.


10...♞c6

RR: Subsequently, the plan 10...e6(!), followed by the development of the bishop on the diagonal f8-a3, was found for Black here. - Griffin.

11.♞b5 ♞d7 12.♞f3 ♞g7 13.0-0 e6 14.♞ab1

Taimanov: (!)

14...0-0



15. ♖d2

Uhlmann: (!)

Taimanov: Black has made only natural developing moves and, it seems, does not experience any difficulties. Meanwhile, his position is already difficult. There is threatened the manoeuvre ♖d2-e4 (or ♖d2-b3), forcing a weakening of Black's position, and to counter these is not a simple matter. Possibly, Uhlmann had played inaccurately? It is difficult to say, and moreover it would not have been practical to seek an improvement for him while the match was still in progress. We were faced with playing one more Grünfeld Defence, and Uhlmann's task was to himself find a better method of development. But perhaps one does not exist, and the entire system with the exchange of queens is faulty?

15...f5

Taimanov: Both now and previously, the move ...a7-a6 would, after the withdrawal of the bishop, have only laid bare new weaknesses in Black's position.

16. ♖b3 b6

Taimanov: Since to permit the knight to c5 would have been altogether bad, he has to agree to a new weakening.

17. ♜fc1 ♜ac8 18. ♙a6 ♜ce8

Uhlmann: If 18...♜b8?, then 19. ♙g3 e5 20. ♙b5, and White would win the e5-pawn.

19. ♙b7

Taimanov: White's initiative develops of its own accord. It is not in Black's power to prevent an invasion along the c-file.

19... ♖d8 20. ♜c7 ♜f7

Taimanov: Naturally, Black would have been sorry to immediately part with a pawn, but perhaps, rather than going over to 'deep' defence it was worth trying to enliven the pieces with 20...♖b7 21.♖b7 ♘c6 22.♞a7 ♞a8 23.♞a8 ♞a8 24.♘c1 b5.

Uhlmann: Sacrificing a pawn might have given Black a good defensive opportunity:

20...♖b7 21.♖b7 (not 21.♞d7 because of 21...♞f7 22.♞f7 ♔f7 23.♞c1 ♘f6 with equality) 21...♘c6 22.♞a7 ♞a8 23.♞a8 ♞a8 24.♘c1 b5 with good drawing chances.


21.♘a6 ♘a4 22.♞bc1 ♘f8 23.♞1c4 ♞c7 24.♞c7 ♘c6

Taimanov: For the time being Black has managed to retain the material balance, but one feels that, under the pressure of the white pieces, his fortifications could collapse from one minute to the next.

25.♘c4

Taimanov: (!)

25...♘g7



Uhlmann: 25...♘d6 would be followed by 26.♞b7.

26.♞c8

Taimanov: (?) This outwardly spectacular move, winning a pawn, deserves not praise, but censure. I simply 'sold myself short', in trading my huge positional advantage for a single pawn. During the game I was aware of the fact that strengthening the pressure by means of 26.♘g3 was more in keeping with the demands of the position, but the desire to have a 'bird in the hand' took precedence over the demands of reason.

Uhlmann: (!?) Probably, 26.♘g3 would have been more precise, as Black could not have done anything to counter the threat of ♞c7-c8; 26...♔h8 would not do because of 27.♘e6.

26...♞c8 27.♘e6 ♔f8 28.♘c8 ♘b4 29.♘c1 ♔f7

Taimanov: (!) Suddenly the character of the struggle has changed. Now the black pieces become active, while White's prove to be isolated and disunited. And, although the extra pawn at d4 as if 'smooths over' White's chagrin, the win has become very problematic.

30. ♖g3

Taimanov: Otherwise 30...f4! is unpleasant.

30... ♜f8 31. ♜b7

Uhlmann: (?) This definitely lessens White's chances of victory. A much better move would have been 31. ♜b8, since on 31... ♘c6 he would have had ready the reply 32. ♜d7.


31... ♘e6 32. ♜b8 ♘d7

Taimanov/Uhlmann: (!)

33. ♜f3

Taimanov/Uhlmann: It is clear that both now and at the following moves, it was impossible to take the pawn at a7 on account of the reply ... ♘d7-c7.

33... ♜b5 34. ♜d1 a5 35. a4 ♜c4



Taimanov: As previously, White retains a material advantage, but already now it is obvious that for the pawn Black has active piece play, giving him good chances of salvation.

36.g4

Taimanov: (!) The best plan of counter-play. White strives to create pawn weaknesses in the enemy camp. After other continuations Black would, in general, have had no concerns.

36...b5

Taimanov: Black's main trump is the passed pawn.

Uhlmann: A very dangerous passed pawn has been created; this represents a good chance for Black.

37.gf5 gf5 38.♙e5 ♖c6

Taimanov: With this natural move (winning a tempo!) Black significantly complicates his defence. Correct was 38...♗d5!, which after 39.ab5 ♙b5 40.♙c2 ♗e6 41.♗d3 a4 retained for Black chances of a successful resistance.

Uhlmann: (?!) 38...♗d5 might have been better.

39.♙h8 ♙a3 40.ab5 ♙c1

Taimanov: More tenacious was 40...♙b5, for example: 41.♗b3 a4 42.♗c5 ♙c5 43.dc5 ♗e6. The recent poor decisions were taken by Uhlmann in time trouble.

41.bc6 ♗c6 42.♙a4 ♗d5

Taimanov: The opinion was expressed that with 42...♙b5 it was still possible to save the game, since White is given nothing by 43.d5 ♗c5 44.♙d4 ♗b4. However, it is not clear how Black would have held on after the simple 43.♙c2.

Uhlmann: (?) 42...♙b5 should have been played, since the reply 43.d5 is not dangerous because of 43...♗c5 44.♙d4 ♗b4, giving equal chances.

White would have had to play 43.♙c2, but after 43...a4 44.♙f5 a3 45.♙h7 ♙c4 Black would still have had excellent drawing chances.

43.♙c2

Taimanov: Here too this manoeuvre is very strong.

43...♗e6 44.♗g2

Taimanov: The threat of transferring the king to f4 presents Black with irresolvable difficulties.

44...♙a3 45.♙e5 ♙f8 46.♙c7 ♙d5 47.f3 ♙b4 48.♗g3

Taimanov: In this position the game was adjourned. As analysis showed, for White's victory, mere technical accuracy is sufficient.

48...♗f6

Taimanov: If 48...♙d6 49.♙d6 ♗d6, then simplest of all is 50.♗f4 ♙e6 51.e4 fe4 52.fe4.

49.♙e5 ♗g6 50.♗f4 ♙e6 51.♙a4

Uhlmann: (!)

Taimanov: (!) Not only blocking the pawn, but in some cases threatening a check at e8.

51...♙f8 52.e4

Taimanov: Naturally, not 52.♙e8 ♙f7 53.♙f7 ♗f7 54.♗f5 in view of 54...a4, and the pawn becomes dangerous. Instead now the game is won automatically. There still followed:

52...♙h6 53.♗g3 fe4 54.fe4 ♙d2 55.d5 ♙e1 56.♗f3 ♙h3 57.♙e8 ♗h6 58.♙f6

Black resigned. 1 : 0

[Taimanov/Uhlmann]

Board 8

Milan Matulović – Mikhail Botvinnik [B 06]

‘Rest of the World’ - USSR

1.e4 g6 2.d4 ♗g7 3.♘f3 d6 4.♗c4


Matulović: At this point in my game against Botvinnik at the ‘Liberation of Belgrade’ tournament in 1969, I played 4.♘c3. I tried the more aggressive text move at the Zonal Tournament in Athens, 1969, against Hübner.

4...♘f6 5.♖e2

Botvinnik: A popular variation of the Pirc-Ufimtsev Defence. White’s king’s bishop is very active and Black should limit its role with ...c7-c6 followed by ...d6-d5. This plan Black has successfully carried out in the games Gipslis - Botvinnik and Matanović - Botvinnik.

RR: The first of these encounters took place, in the 3rd USSR People’s Spartakiad (Moscow, 1963); the second is referenced below. - Griffin.

5...c6 6.♗b3 0-0 7.♗g5



Matulović: I also played this move in the above-mentioned game against Hübner at Athens. It is more usual to play 7.0-0, as for instance, in the game Matanović - Botvinnik, Belgrade 1969.

Botvinnik: Matulović’s invention. White prevents the above-mentioned plan by Black, since now in some variations the e7-pawn will be pinned (the advance ...e7-e6 is an essential link in this plan). But at h4 White’s queen’s bishop will occupy a not entirely successful position.

7...h6 8.♗h4 e5

Botvinnik: Thus, White retains an active bishop at b3. Black's counter-play consists in the manoeuvre ...♘h5-f4.

9.de5 de5 10.♘bd2

Botvinnik: Naturally, not 10.♘e5 ♔a5. Now the e5-pawn is in need of immediate defence.

10...♔c7 11.♘c4 ♘h5 12.♙g3

Matulović: This move is forced. White cannot allow the knight to remain at f4, since after 12.0-0-0 ♘f4 13.♔f1 ♙g4 Black would have good chances.


Botvinnik: Cleverly played. After 12...♙g4 13.♙e5! ♙e5 14.♘ce5 ♘f4 15.♔d2 White's advantage is obvious. Therefore Black has no choice.

12...♘f4

Matulović: (!) An excellent move. Although it doubles Black's pawns and opens the path to White's e-pawn, Black correctly foresees that eventually Black's bishop will have the chance to operate.

12...♘g3 would have been weak because of 13.hg3 b5 14.♘e3 with the idea of 15.0-0-0, and White has good prospects of an attack with 16.g4 etc. 12...♙g4 is not good either, as White would win a pawn.

13.♙f4 ef4 14.0-0-0



Matulović: (?!) A 'normal' move. More precise would have been 14.e5 and 14...♙g4 15.♔e4 ♙f3 16.gf3 with good chances for White. After playing the move in the text, after which a tempo is lost, Black gains the opportunity to become active.

Botvinnik: Somewhat more active was the immediate 14.e5. Long castling has the shortcoming that White has to reckon with a possible attack on the b2-square. Black managed to carry out an analogous plan in the game Medina - Botvinnik (Palma de Mallorca, 1967).

14...♙g4 15.e5


Botvinnik: In the case of 15.h3 ♗f3 16.♖f3 ♘d7 17.♘d6 ♘e5 18.♖f4 ♜fd8! White is left minus a piece.

15...♘d7 16.♖e4 ♜ad8

Matulović: (!) An excellent move. Black now completes the development of his pieces and equalises, with better prospects ahead.

Botvinnik: This is naturally stronger than 16...♗f3 17.gf3 ♘e5 18.♘e5 ♖e5 19.♖e5 ♗e5 20.♜d7!.

17.♖f4 ♗f3 18.♖f3 b5 19.♘e3 ♘e5 20.♖g3 a5 21.a3 ♘h7



22.♘g4

Matulović: (?) An illogical move, taking White into a semi-ending with bishops of opposite colour, but at the expense of many tempi, which Black will exploit to become active on the queen-side. A much better move would have been 22.f4! ♘d7 23.f5 ♗e5 24.♖f3 ♗f4 25.♙b1, and White would certainly not be in a worse position.

Botvinnik: White exchanges knights in order to ease the defence, but this is a mistaken decision. Correct was 22.f4 ♘d7 23.f5!, offering the exchange of queens and weakening the position of the black king.

22...h5 23.♘e5 ♗e5

Matulović: Naturally, Black does not wish to exchange queens since the position of White's king is very insecure, and Black has good prospects for attacking White's castled position, despite the bishops of opposite colour*. White is unable to take the initiative, and Black has a solid advantage.

RR: Rather than "despite", it is precisely because of the presence of opposite-coloured bishops that Black's attack against the b2-square will prove to be so strong. - Griffin.

24. ♖f3 ♔g7 25. ♝he1

Matulović: White's only chance lay in exchanging pieces, first of all the queens and then the rooks. Therefore the right move was 25. ♞d8 ♞d8 26. ♞d1 etc. Later, White will have to seek a reduction in the material, but it will already be too late.

25... ♙f6 26. c3 c5

Botvinnik: The attack on the b2-pawn begins. White's last hope consists in the exchange of heavy pieces. Nothing was given by 26... ♚h2 on account of 27. g3 or 27. ♚c6.

27. ♞d8 ♞d8 28. g3


Matulović: White must now lose a tempo to protect the pawn; Black uses this to organise a decisive attack. The opposite-coloured bishops gives Black the better chances.

Botvinnik: More circumspect was 28. h3. The king-side pawns on dark squares can become an object of attack.

28... c4 29. ♙c2 b4

Matulović: This should have decided the game within a few moves.

30. cb4 ab4 31. ab4



31... ♚b6

Matulović: Carelessness, allowing White to offer resistance. After 31... ♚a7! White would have had no means of defence, since 32. ♚a3 would have been followed by 32... ♚f2, while after 32. ♔b1 ♞a8 33. ♚a3 ♞d4! 34. ♚c3 ♞c3 Black would have won the rook.


Botvinnik: Perhaps simpler was 31... ♚a7! 32. ♔b1 ♞d4 33. ♚c3 ♞f2 34. ♚e3 ♞h2, or 32... ♞a8 33. ♚a3 ♞f2 (33... ♞d4 34. ♞d1 ♞e5 35. f4) 34. ♚e3 ♞h2.

32. ♞d1 ♞b4

Matulović: Black is content with having one more pawn as the pieces are reduced. After 32...♖e8! White would have been in a hopeless position, since the b4-pawn is indefensible. After the text move White still has some hope of saving himself.

Botvinnik: (?) A serious mistake. After 32...♖e8! (during the game Black examined only 32...♖b8) 33.♞d7 ♜b4 34.♞d5 ♞e1 matters conclude with mate, if White avoids the variation 33.♞a3 ♜f2.

33.♞d8 ♜b2 34.♞d1 ♞d8 35.♞d5 ♜f6



36.♞e2

Matulović: (?) A mistake due to time pressure. After 36.f4! White would have exploited the chance offered to him, since after 36...c3 37.♞b3, by bringing pressure to bear on f7 he could have held Black in check. Instead now Black's pieces become very active.

Botvinnik: Greater chances of a successful defence were given by the immediate 36.f4 ♜a1 37.♞e2 ♞f6 38.♞c4 ♜g1 39.♞b3. Now however, 36...♞c3 37.♞g6! will not do.

36...♞b6 37.f4 ♜c3 38.♞e4 ♞d4

Botvinnik: A new blunder. After 38...♞g1 39.f5 gf5 40.♞f5 ♞e3 41.♞f1 ♞h2 Black wins a second pawn. Here with 38...♞d4 39.♞f1! ♜a1 40.♞g2 ♜g1 41.♞h3 ♞f1 42.♞g2 White could still have retained hopes of saving the game. The following move leads to the loss of two further pawns.

39.f5

Matulović: White opens the position at his own expense. By 39.♞f1 White could probably have continued his resistance, although Black would still have good winning chances. Now White loses two pawns, and that is the end of the game.

39...gf5 40.♞f5 ♞e3 41.♞f1

Botvinnik: Or 41.♞d1 ♞c3 and mate is inevitable. The above-mentioned game Medina - Botvinnik

concluded with precisely such a mate.

41...♔g1 42.♕e2 ♖h2 43.♕d1 ♔g1 44.♕e2 ♚e3 45.♕f1 ♔g3 46.♖h7 ♕f8

White resigned. 0 : 1

[Botvinnik/Matulović]

Board 9

Mikhail Tal – Miguel Najdorf [B 48]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.e4 c5 2.♘f3 ♘c6 3.d4 cd4 4.♘d4 e6


Tal: The old love of the Argentinian grandmaster - the system with 2...d6 and 5...a6 - has been replaced with a new. In recent times Najdorf has played the Paulsen Variation often, enthusiastically and with success.

5.♘c3 ♚c7 6.♙e3 a6 7.♙d3 ♘f6 8.0-0 ♘e5

Tal: The plan chosen by White is very popular. Now, in this position, 8...♘d4 9.♙d4 ♙c5; and 8...b5 are also encountered.

Najdorf: Up to this moment the game proceeds along well-known lines.

9.h3



Tal: Deserving attention is 9.♙e2, leaving, in a number of cases, the square h3 free for the queen, which could from there display noticeable activity on the queen's flank. The move 9.♙e2 was tested in a series of games at Palma de Mallorca (1969), although the first conclusions have still to be drawn. For the time being White does not depart from the beaten path.

Najdorf: In the game against Penrose (Palma de Mallorca, 1969), on 9.♙e2 I played 9...b5 10.f4 ♘c4 11.♙c4 ♚c4 12.e5 ♘d5 13.♘d5 ♚d5 with good prospects for Black.

9...♙c5

Tal: This continuation gained popularity after the 23rd game of the World Championship match, when Petrosian employed it against Spassky. In general, it seems, it has been studied by Leningrad chessplayers.

10.♖h1

Tal: (?) Coming to the game, I intended to continue here 10.♘a4 ♙a7 11.c4!?, and the capture of the pawn is fatal: 11...♗c4 12.♙c4 ♖c4 13.♖c1 ♗b4 14.♘e6!. At the board, however, I changed my mind, and began to test a continuation rejected by theory, 10.f4?? ♗c6 11.♘f5 ♖b6 12.♘d6 ♔f8 13.♙c5 ♖c5 14.♖h1 ♖d6 15.e5, and then decided that in the first round - which is, as a rule, an unlucky one for me - such a gambit would not do, and I instead played a meaningless move. Stronger is 10.♖e2, as Spassky played in the above-mentioned game.

RR: - Subsequently, the move 10.♖h1 came to be regarded as the main line here. - Griffin.

Najdorf: If 10.f4, then 10...♗c6 would have been a good answer. The move in the text is a new one, as until now 10.♖e2, together with 11.♘b3, was usually played. The aim of the text move is quite clear: after a later f2-f4 the knight can now move from d4 and then the bishop at e3 will not be captured with check.

10...d6 11.f4 ♗ed7


Tal: In reply to 11...♗c6 there could follow 12.♙e2, as well as the sharper 12.e5!?

Najdorf: 11...♗c6 seems more natural, after which 12.e5! ♙d4 (12...de5 13.♘e6! - cf. White's 10th move) 13.♙d4 ♗d4 14.ef6 gf6, and as compensation for the pawn White has good attacking chances, regardless of the fact that with 15.♙a6 he could regain the pawn. Also after 13...de5 14.fe5 ♗e5 15.♘e4! White retains the better position. Against Tal I did not wish to attempt such a hazardous course.

12.♖f3

Tal: This is also probably not the best. I did not reply 12.g4 on account of 12...h6. The position of the queen on the long light-squared diagonal provokes a natural reaction by Black.

12...b5



Tal: (!)

Najdorf: With no fear at all! 13.e5 would now be followed by 13...♙b7 14.ed6 ♜b8! (not 14...♙d6 because of 15.♘db5!) 15.♞f2 ♙d6 and Black has a good position.

It should also be noted that White could not play 15.♞g3 with the intention of winning a pawn, as after 15...♙d6 16.♞g3? ♜g8 Black would take at g2.


13.♘b3

Tal: It was in a below-par mood that I played this move. White recognises that he has gained nothing from the active play on the king's flank. Instead of this move I examined 13.e5 ♙b7 (possibly, 13...de5 is also not bad) 14.♘e4 ♘e4 15.♙e4 ♙e4 16.♞e4 d5 with a comfortable game for Black. In reply to 13.♞ad1 (with the idea, on 13...♙b7, of sacrificing a piece at b5), good is either 13...b4 or 13...♞b8 (as pointed out by Najdorf).

13...♙b7

Najdorf: Owing to the fact that White's queen has been posted at f3 (rather than e2), Black had no need to be apprehensive of the exchange at c5 followed by e4-e5.

14.a4 b4 15.♘e2



15...♔e3

Tal: Of course, one cannot speak of Black having an advantage, but every Sicilian player, when making the first move, could only dream of such a position. Now Black, in my opinion, ought to simply castle (15...0-0), not determining his plans for the time being and not ‘disarming’ White’s inactive pieces that are crowded together in the centre. At some point there would arise the possible breaks ...e6-e5 or ...d6-d5.

Najdorf: In Tal’s opinion, 15...0-0 would have been slightly better. I intended to delay castling as long as possible, so as to “give my opponent the address of my king” at the last possible moment.

16.♕e3 ♖c5

Tal: Had White been forced to exchange at c5, Najdorf’s plan would have been fully justified. However...


17.♞g3

Tal: ...it becomes clear that there is no serious threat - a capture, both at b3 and at d3 - cedes the c-file, disadvantageously for Black.

17...♞c8

Tal: Evidently, more accurate was 17...0-0.

18.♕e2




Tal: (!) In some cases, the a6-pawn proves to be under attack, while the variation 18...♘d3 19.cd3 ♕c2 20.♕c2 ♖c2 21.♘a5 and 22.♖fc1 secures White an advantage in the endgame.

Najdorf: From this moment on Black must consider the possibility of e4-e5, as well as the defence of his pawn at a6.

18...0-0

Tal: The sharp 18...h5 19.e5 h4 20.ef6 hg3! could have led to a position where the black king finds itself in greater danger than its White rival.

19.♘c5 ♕c5



20.♖ad1

Tal: Nothing is given either by 20.♔a6 ♔a6 21.♚a6 ♚c2 or by 20.e5 de5 21.fe5 ♖d7 22.♞ae1 (still worse is 22.♔h7 ♔h7 23.♚d3 ♔g8 24.♚d7 ♞c7) 22...♚d4. Perhaps it was all the same worth deciding on 20.e5.

Najdorf: 20.♔a6 would not be good because of 20...♔a6 21.♚a6 ♚c2 22.♞ac1? ♚c1 and Black has the better position; if White plays 20.e5 then 20...de5 21.fe5 ♖d7 may follow and after 22.♔h7 ♔h7 23.♚d3 ♔g8 24.♚d7 ♞c7 White would have nothing. With the move in the text White prevents the knight from retreating to d7.

20...a5

Tal: Only after this inaccuracy can one speak of any sort of serious advantage for White.

Najdorf: (?) Weakly played. After 20...d5! 21.ed5 (if 21.e5 then 21...♖e4!) 21...♖d5 22.♖e4 ♚e7 23.♚h5 h6 24.f5 ef5 25.♚f5 g6 Black can successfully organise his defence.

21.e5

Tal (!)

21...de5 22.fe5 ♖d5

Tal: A difficult, but practically forced decision. Losing is 22...♖d7 23.♔h7 ♔h7 24.♞d7.

Najdorf: 22...♖d7 would be followed by 23.♔h7 ♔h7 24.♞d7 ♔c6? 25.♚h5 followed by capturing at the f7-square.

23.♖e4

Tal: White agrees to transposition to an endgame (it is the first round!).

23...♚e3

Najdorf: Black must not remain passive, as White will open an attack.

24.♚h5


Tal: In reply to 24.♚g4 there could follow 24...♚h6 25.♖f6 ♔h8! 26.♖d5 ♔d5 27.♞f4 f5 with unclear consequences. Now Black's reply is forced - the attack threatens to become irresistible.

24...♚h6

Tal: (!)

Najdorf: White is now forced, because of the threat of 25...♖e3, to exchange queens. However, he retains the better position. It should be mentioned that 24...h6 would be weak because of 25.♞f3, as would 24...g6 because of 25.♚h4.

25.♚h6 gh6



Tal: Black's position is very unpleasant - the weaknesses at the squares d6 and f6 and the backward pawn at f7 determine a significant advantage for White. However, I was not able to find a clear-cut plan for the realisation of this advantage.

26. ♖f3

Tal: Also not bad was 26. ♗f6 ♗f6 27. ♖f6; also not bad was 26. ♗d6. It is quite possible that had I chosen one of these continuations and failed to win the game, then in the commentary it would have been noted: also not bad was 26. ♖f3.

26... ♖c7

Najdorf: Probably 26... ♗c6 would now be better, so as to limit the action of the knight, which will move to d6.


27. ♖df1

Najdorf: With the strong threat of 27...-- 28. ♖g3 ♖h8 29. ♗f6!, and after 29... ♗f6 30. ♖f6 Black would be helpless.

27... ♗e7

Tal: (!)

28. ♖g3 ♖h8



Najdorf: 28...♖g6 would not be good, because of 29.♗f6 ♜h8 30.♗h7! etc.

29.♗d6

Tal: To begin with, I intended 29.♗f6. After this, bad was 29...♗f5 30.♙f5 e5 31.♗f5 ♜c2 32.♗h5 ♙c8 33.♗h6 ♙f5 34.♗h5 ♜c1 35.♜h2 ♙c2 36.h4. On 29...♗g6 strong is 30.♗h7! ♜g8 31.♙g6 fg6 32.♗f8! g5 33.♗f6. At the last moment I refrained from the move 29.♗f6, since I could not assess precisely the consequences of the move 29...♗d8 30.♗h7 ♗f5, but obviously, this should have proved to be in White's favour. In playing the move 29.♗d6 I was in a very optimistic mood - the f7-pawn is under attack, while on 29...♗g8 there follows the deadly move 30.♙c4! ♙c8 (otherwise the e6-pawn is undefended) and after 31.b3 Black proves to be in an original zugzwang.

29...♗c6

Tal: the only move. White does not have time to invade at f6 on account of the capture at e5.

Najdorf: The only defence. 29...♗g6 would not be good because of 30.♙g6 hg6 31.♗g6 ♜c2? 32.♗b7 etc. After 29...♗g8 30.♙c4! Black would almost be stalemated!

30.♗e3

Najdorf: For a while White must halt his attack to protect his pawn. However, 31.♗f6! is immediately threatened.

30...♜g7

Najdorf: (!) Now 31.♗f6 would certainly be followed by 31...♗e5!.

Tal: Again preventing 31.♗f6.

31.♗f4 ♗e7


Tal: The oldest participant in the match conducts a difficult defence in excellent fashion - the wandering knight is now ready to occupy an ideal position at the g6-square. Now at White's

disposition there was a little combination with the win of a pawn - 32.♖f7 ♖f7 33.♘e8, but it seemed to me that after 33...♔f8 34.♗c7 ♗d5 the activity of Black's rook and bishop gives him considerable saving chances. However, it was probably necessary to play this way - after the continuation chosen in the game there is simply nothing left for White.

32.♗b5

Najdorf: (?) White misses a chance of winning a pawn with 32.♖f7 ♖f7 33.♘e8 ♔h8 34.♗c7. He could continue with 34...♗d5 35.♗d5 ♗d5 36.♔g1, but it is not quite certain that White would win this endgame. After the move played, however, White achieves much less.

32...♗g6 33.♖d4



Tal: In reply to 33.♖f2 there could follow 33...♗c6, whereas now in reply to this move unpleasant is 34.♖c4.

33...♗d5

Tal: (!) An absolutely correct exchange sacrifice - 34.♘e8 ♖e8 35.♗e8 ♖c2 leads to Black's clear advantage.

34.c4

Najdorf: With 34.♘e8 ♖e8! 35.♗e8 ♖c2 it might be said that Black has the better prospects.

34...bc3 35.bc3 ♖c5

Najdorf: (!) The threat is 36...♗a8, winning the e-pawn.

36.♘e8 ♔h8 37.♗f6

Tal: An amusing oversight. White sets the trap 37...♗e5?? 38.♖e5 ♗g2 39.♔g2 ♖e5 40.♗d7, overlooking that 38.♗d5 wins a piece immediately.

37...♖fc8 38.c4

Najdorf: White has no choice, and must continue as follows.

38...♙c4

Tal: Leading to a forced draw. 38...♙c6 39.♙c6 ♖5c6 40.♖ee4 ♖c5 also looks acceptable.

39.♘e4

Najdorf: 39.♘d7 might also have been played, likewise with a draw.

39...♙b5

Tal: (!) Avoiding, for the last time, 39...♖e5 40.♙c4! f5 41.♘d6!.

40.♘c5 ♖c5 41.ab5

Najdorf: The game was adjourned, but a draw was agreed without the game being continued.

½ :½

[*Najdorf/Tal*]

Playing Hall before the first round, Dom Sindikata Belgrade

Board 10

Borislav Ivkov – Paul Keres [C 75]

chesstouring.com

1.e4 e5 2.♘f3 ♘c6 3.♙b5 a6 4.♙a4 d6

Ivkov: Many games played recently have shown that Black finds it rather hard to equalise in the different variations of the Classical Closed System. Maybe that is the reason that Keres sometimes resorts to the Steinitz Defence Deferred; or perhaps it is due to the fact that it is slowly falling out of use, unlike the modern variations, the analysis of which may go as far as the 30th move.

5.0-0

Keres: A modern continuation, which began to be employed after the fear of the 5...♙g4 6.h3 h5 had been permanently overcome.

5...♙d7 6.c3


Ivkov: After 6.c4 ♘f6 7.♘c3 ♙e7 8.d4 ♘d4 9.♘d4 ed4 10.♙d7 ♘d7 11.♙d4 ♙f6 the position has been simplified too early and White's advantage is hardly noticeable.

Keres: In recent times the move 6.d4 has also been encountered often, in view of the fact that the pawn sacrifice 6...b5 7.♙b3 ♘d4 8.♘d4 ed4 9.c3 gives White the possibility of developing a dangerous initiative. After the move in the text, Black has a great choice of continuations.

6...♘ge7 7.d4 ♘g6 8.♘bd2 ♙e7 9.♙e1 0-0

Keres: Another possibility was the continuation 9...h6 10.♘f1 ♙g5 with the exchange of dark-squared bishops.

10.♘f1



10...ed4

Ivkov: (!?) An interesting idea: Black abandons the centre of his own accord, reckoning on countering with an attack on White's central pawns.

Keres: In keeping with the subsequently-constructed plan 10...♘h4 was now more expedient.

11.cd4 ♘f6


Ivkov: Black had at his disposal the good move 11...♞e8, with the idea of playing to gain a tempo.

Keres: An illogical reply. The preliminary exchange in the centre could be justified only in connection with 11...♙g4. After 12.♙c6 bc6 13.♘e3 ♙d7 Black would have had compensation, in the pair of bishops, for his restricted position.

12.♘e3 ♞e8 13.♙c2 ♘h4

Keres: In the given case, also possible is 13...♘b4 14.♙b1 c5, but I did not like the position after 15.d5 a5 16.a3 ♘a6 17.♘c4. With the text move, White retains a significant spatial advantage.

14.♘h4 ♙h4 15.♘d5



15...♘e7

Ivkov: Keres considered for quite some time the possibility of striking with 15...f5, but sensibly refrained. White would have two good replies: 16.♙f4, and 16.e5! with definite superiority.

Keres: In connection with 15...f5 I did not like the eventual sacrifice of a pawn with 16.e5 de5 17.de5 ♞e5 18.♞e5 ♘e5 19.♙f4!, besides which, also not bad was 16.♙f4, which Ivkov suggested after the game.


16.♘c3

Ivkov: Exchanging the second pair of knights would obviously not suit White. After 16.♘c3 it becomes clear that the white knight could have occupied that square in one move, instead of making a circle: ♘d2-f1-e3-d5-c3. It is, of course, true that Black has made similar manoeuvres: ...♘e7-g6-h4, and has thereby withdrawn from the centre. All in all, the position is a normal one, with White holding an advantage.

16...♖g6

Keres: The loss of a piece by 17.g3 ♕f6 18.e5 was threatened.

17.g3 ♕f6



18.♕e3

Ivkov: (?!) This would seem to be a logical developing move, but it is a mistake, costing White almost all of the advantage that he had. After 18.f4 White would have had a still greater superiority in the centre.

Keres: After this move Black finally begins to breathe more freely. Clearly, stronger was 18.f4, after which for Black there hardly remained anything better than 18...c5 19.dc5 ♕c3 20.bc3 dc5. All the same, despite the move in the text, White's position is better.

18...c5

Keres: (!) Sacrificing a pawn, Black to a significant extent frees himself from the pressure. The acceptance of the sacrifice, 19.dc5, after 19...♖e5! with the threats of 20...♕g4 and 20...♖c4, is fairly unpleasant for White.

19.f4

Ivkov: Because of the weakness of the f3-square it was impossible to play 19.dc5 ♖e5 20.f4 ♕g4 21.♗d6 ♖f3 22.♔f2 ♖e1 23.♗d8 ♗ad8 24.♖e1 ♕c3!, and White stands no better.

19...cd4 20.♕d4 ♕c6


Ivkov: Maybe it would have been better to play 20...♖f8 right away.

Keres: Judging from everything, more accurate was the immediate 20...♖f8. White threatened 21.♕f6 ♗f6 22.e5 etc.

21.♕b3 ♖f8

Keres: Threatening, with 22...♔d4 23.♚d4 ♖e6 and ...♗c5, to obtain counter-pressure against the e4-pawn.

22.♔f6 ♚f6 23.♗d5



23...♚d8

Ivkov: After 23...♚b2 24.♖e2 ♚a3 25.♗c7 ♚c5 26.♗f2 Black would not have had adequate compensation for the exchange.

Keres: The exchange sacrifice 23...♚b2 24.♖e2 ♚a3 25.♗c7 ♚c5 (25...♔b5 26.♖c2) 26.♗f2! is not correct.

24.♚h5

Keres: White has a spatial advantage, but his weakened pawn structure gives Black reasonable counter-chances.

The attack begun with the move in the text is parried by Black without difficulty.

24...♗d7

Ivkov: (!)

Keres: On the possible 24...♗e6, the reply 25.f5! would have been very unpleasant.

25.♖ad1 ♗c5

Keres: The continuation 25...♗f6, after 26.♗f6 ♚f6 27.e5 de5 28.fe5 ♚g6 29.♚g6 hg6 30.e6!, led to an insignificant advantage for White.

26.♔c2 g6 27.♚g5

Ivkov: White is forced to exchange queens, though at any rate he is still better off in the endgame.


Keres: After 27.♚h6 White is threatened with material loss after 27...♔d5 28.♖d5 ♚b6, and this same

manoeuvre would have been employed on 27.♔f3. Both opponents were already experiencing a shortage of time.

27...♖g5 28.fg5 ♕d5 29.♖d5 ♜e6

Keres: On 29...♖ad8 the reply 30.e5 would have been very unpleasant.

30.b4 ♘d7 31.♗b3 ♘e5



Keres: If 31...♖ae8, then 32.♖d4 ♘e5 33.♗e6 ♘f3 34.♔g2 ♘d4 35.♗d5 with the better game for White.

32.♖c1

Ivkov: (?) We each had only 7-8 minutes before the time control, which was the reason I did not play the intended 32.♔g2!.

In that case Black would have had to solve some rather difficult problems, which would not have been so easy in the time scramble. For instance, after 32.♔g2 one of the possibilities was: 32...♘c6 33.♖dd1 ♜e7 34.♖d6 ♘b4 35.e5 ♖ae8 36.e6 fe6 37.♖de6 ♜e6 38.♖e6 ♜e6 39.♗e6 and the superiority of the white bishop over the knight, as well as the quick movement of White's king to the centre, leaves no doubt about whose position is better.

32...♘c6 33.b5 ab5

Keres: Still simpler was 33...♘a5.

34.♖b5 ♜e7 35.♖d1 ♖a5

Ivkov: (!) After this there are no longer any dangers for Black.

36.♖a5

Keres: On 36.a4 sufficient would have been 36...♖b5 37.ab5 ♘a7 with a level game.

36...♗a5 37.♙d5 ♖c7

Ivkov: (!)

38.♖b1 ♔f8 39.♖b5 ♗c6 40.♖b6 ♔e7

Agreed drawn. ½ : ½

[Ivkov/Keres]

ROUND 2

Tuesday 31th March, 1970

The Soviet team gained a decisive victory in Round 2, to open up a three-point lead over their opponents.

The highlight of the round was Spassky's spectacular victory on top board. He punished Larsen for some highly provocative opening play, and the Danish grandmaster was forced to resign after only 17 moves.

On the second board, Fischer won in fine positional style against Petrosian. On the black side of a symmetrical English opening, he introduced a plan of blockading White's passed but isolated pawn (...♖c6-a5, ...♗b7-c6 and ...♘a5-b7) that subsequently became standard in this set-up. Petrosian soon had to acquiesce in the loss of the pawn, and while he retained drawing chances, ultimately the strain of defending the position proved too much and Fischer scored his second successive victory.

On third board Portisch, on the white side of a Nimzo Indian Defence, gained another highly promising position against Viktor Korchnoi and missed a clear win at the 27th move. With both players in time trouble, a draw was agreed four moves later.

In Polugaevsky v. Hort, the Czechoslovak grandmaster chose an offbeat opening set-up and White soon gained a clear positional advantage. However, White went wrong at the 25th move, and in typically resourceful fashion Hort managed to stay in the game by means of a pawn sacrifice that gave him good practical chances on account of having the safer king in a complicated middlegame position. With both players in time trouble, a draw was agreed at the 30th move.

The Gligorić v. Geller, as in so many of the previous encounters between these players, saw a King's Indian Defence. Neither player made any particular headway and a draw was agreed before the time control.

Smyslov won a very fine game with the white pieces against his American opponent on board 6. Reshevsky obtained a somewhat cramped game from the opening, and after he ceded important squares with 17...e5?, he was soon reduced to passive defence. Though the game lasted 63 moves, the victory of the ex-World Champion was never in any real doubt.

On the seventh board Taimanov scored a second successive victory over Uhlmann. The East German grandmaster employed his patented system against the Queen's Indian Defence, involving a pawn sacrifice. Taimanov declined the offer, and gained easy equality. In the resultant middlegame he gradually took full control of the position, and decided the game with a direct attack on the white king.

On the next board Matulović equalised effortlessly on the black side of a Maróczy Bind against Botvinnik and even stood somewhat better in a position where, somewhat inexplicably, he did not even try to exploit his advantage.

On board 9, Miguel Najdorf scored a very fine win with the white pieces against Tal after the Latvian turned down a draw offer in the early middlegame arising from a Semi-Tarrasch Defence. White immediately offered a pawn and gained a strong attack in return. The game was adjourned in a position where there was a forced win for White, and on the resumption Najdorf made no mistake.

On the last board, Keres and Ivkov played what was perhaps the most complicated and difficult game in the event. On the black side of a Spanish Game, Ivkov obtained a difficult position and saw his pawn structure badly compromised. A further mistake left him with little alternative but to sacrifice a piece in an attempt to stay in the game. At several points, Keres failed to choose the best continuation, and the game was adjourned in an endgame where White has two knights against a bishop, with Black having two extra pawns and good practical drawing chances. In the highly intricate play, Keres eventually found a way to win to give his team victory in the match by the score 6 : 4.

Board 1

Bent Larsen – Boris Spassky [A 01]

'Rest of the World' - USSR

1.b3

Spassky: Larsen willingly employs this incorrect opening. He aims to transfer the weight of the struggle from the opening to the middlegame, in passing displacing the opponent from the usual opening lines.

1...e5 2.♘b2 ♗c6

Larsen: In the twenty-odd games that I have opened with 1.b3, until now nobody has played this way.

3.c4 ♗f6 4.♗f3

Larsen: After 4.g3 d5 Black would have a good position.


4...e4 5.♗d4 ♘c5

Spassky: The shortcoming of White's opening set-up is that Black can develop his forces without hindrance, at the same time consolidating his position in the centre.

6.♗c6

Larsen: 6.e3? would have been followed by 6...♘d4 7.ed4 d5, with advantage for Black.

6...dc6



Larsen: The position has now become Nimzowitsch's variation of the Sicilian Defence with colours reversed: ^(to the line)1.e4 c5 2.♗f3 ♗f6 3.e5 ♗d5 4.♗c3 ♗c3 5.dc3. In this position Nimzowitsch, in his time, played 5...b6?, which was later displaced by 6.e6!. White has an extra tempo in comparison with the above position, and besides it is not quite certain that the bishop's position at c5 is the best one.

7.e3 ♘f5 8.♙c2 ♙e7 9.♘e2

Larsen: This move is weak as it closes the square e2 to the knight in certain variations.

9...0-0-0

Spassky: Black completes the mobilisation of his forces. He has reinforced the e4-square and now prepares an offensive on the king's flank, simultaneously intending pressure, along the d-file, against White's backward pawn.

10.f4

Larsen: (??) A very weak move that loses the game. Apart from the usual line of development, another possibility was 10.a3.

Spassky: (?) A mistake, after which it is already hardly possible to save White's position? How can it be explained? It seems to me that Larsen associated this move with the idea 11.♔f6 ♕f6 12.♘c3. However, White's plan meets with a refutation.

10...♘g4

Larsen: White has no adequate defence. Had White decided upon 11.0-0, it would have been followed by 11...♕h4.


RR: 11...♖d2! is immediately decisive: 12.♘d2 ♘e3 13.♕c1 ♘f1 14.♔f1 ♕h4 etc. 12.h3 h5 with an attack, while 11.♔g4 would have been followed by 11...♕h4 - Griffin.

Spassky: (!) This simple move puts White in a critical position.

11.g3 h5

Spassky: Very tempting appears the rook sacrifice 11...♖d2. After 12.♘d2 ♘e3 13.♕c3 ♖d8 Black has a formidable attack. However, to demonstrate a win for Black is very far from simple. Therefore I preferred a more solid path.

12.h3



Spassky: It is difficult to advise White of anything. Thus, on 12.♘c3 there could follow 12...♖d2! with decisive effect.

12...h4


Spassky: (!) Sacrificing a piece, Black opens the position of the white king.

13.hg4

Larsen: After 13.♙g4 ♘g4 14.hg4 hg3 15.♖g1, 15...♖h2 is again a winning move.

Spassky: Larsen thought for almost an hour over his move. But there is no salvation. On 13.♙g4 there could follow 13...♙g4 14.hg4 hg3 15.♖g1 ♖h1! 16.♖h1 g2 17.♖g1 ♗h4 18.♔e2 ♗g4 19.♔e1 ♗g3 20.♔e2 (20.♔d1 ♗f2 21.♗e4 ♗g1 22.♔c2 ♗f2 and wins) 20...♗f3 21.♔e1 ♙e7 and mate is inevitable.


13...hg3 14.♖g1



14...♖h1

Larsen: (!) White had placed all his hopes on 14...♗h4, which would have been followed by 15.♖g2 ♗h1 16.♙f1 ♙g4 17.♗e4 ♖he8 18.♙e5 f6 19.♘c3 and White might try to resist.

15.♖h1 g2 16.♖f1



Larsen: If White plays 16.♖g1 then 16...♗h4 17.♔d1 ♖h1 etc. would follow.

Spassky: The move 16.♖g1 was no better. After 16...♗h4 17.♔d1 ♖h1 18.♗c3 ♗g1 19.♔c2 ♗f2 20.gf5 ♗e2 21.♟a3 winning most simply of all is 21...♞b4. During the game I was attracted by another possibility, that is 21...♗d3 22.♗d3 ed3 23.♔c3 ♞e3 (23...a5 24.♟c2!) 24.de3 d2 25.♞d1 ♞h8!, and Black promotes one of his pawns to a queen.

16...♗h4 17.♔d1 17...gf1=♗

White resigned. **0 : 1**

Spassky: After 18.♞f1 ♞g4 mate is inevitable.

In the commentary to the game I have made use of an idea of grandmaster D. Bronstein and indicated the time spent in thought over each move. It seems to me that chronometry often makes it clear, over what the chess player was thinking; what were his doubts and hesitations. In a word, chess fans obtain the possibility to penetrate, to some extent, into the internal secrets of the laboratory of the chess master.

[Larsen/Spassky]

Board 2

Tigran Petrosian – Robert Fischer [A 37]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.c4 g6 2.♟c3 c5

Fischer: (!) I knew that Petrosian had to play to win, so I chose the safest follow-up.

3.g3

Fischer: In the case of 3.♟f3 ♞g7 4.d4 cd4 5.♟d4 ♟c6 is no problem for Black.


3...♞g7 4.♞g2 ♟c6 5.♟f3

Fischer: 5.e3 is better but after 5...e6 it is almost a drawing variation.

5...e6

Fischer: (!) Now it is Black who is playing for the centre space.

6.0-0 ♖ge7



7.d3

Petrosian: If desired, it was possible to play 7.e3 followed by d2-d4, which, however, after the natural retort by Black 7...d5, would have led to a symmetrical pawn configuration. All this has already been met with in tournament practice and as a rule represents one of the ways for the opponents to tacitly agree to a draw. After defeat in the first game, I was naturally aggressively inclined, although already here I was aware that with the disposition of forces intended by Black, the stereotyped plan of plan on the queen's flank promised nothing good.

How often even experienced chessplayers forget that after a loss, a draw is a much more pleasant result than a second defeat. At the present moment I too forgot this.

Fischer: Even more active is 7.e3 0-0 8.d4 cd4 9.♘d4 ♘d4 10.ed4 d5 11.cd5 ♘d5 12.♙b3 ♙b6! as in the second match between Botvinnik and Smyslov in 1957, a game which ended in a draw. Although Reshevsky tried to win this endgame against Robert Byrne, it ought to be an easy draw for Black if he plays correctly.

RR: Here Fischer is referring to the 19th game of the Botvinnik - Smyslov match, and the game Reshevsky - R. Byrne (US Championship, 1965). - Griffin.

7...0-0 8.♙d2 d5 9.a3 b6 10.♙b1 ♙b7

Fischer: I played the same position with opposite colours against Benko with the other side to move, and since I tried the same plan that Petrosian tried here, I knew that it would not succeed.

RR: It may be assumed that the game referred to here is Benkő - Fischer (US Championship, New

York 1958).- Griffin.

11.b4

Fischer: (?) 11.cd5 ♘d5 12.♘d5 ♚d5 was perhaps better, but it is difficult to say whether White equalises.

11...cb4 12.ab4 dc4 13.dc4 ♝c8


Petrosian: White already feels uncomfortable. The weakness of the c-pawn is unpleasant. Probably best of all was 14.♘b5, intending to play c4-c5, and in the case of 14...a6, to retreat the knight to a3, agreeing to a slightly worse position.

Fischer: Now Black has a clear plan as to how to proceed against White's 'hanging' pawns on the queen-side.

14.c5

Fischer: In the case of 14.♚a4 ♘d4! Black has the initiative, and after 14.♘e4 Black has an excellent answer in 14...♘a5!. On other moves Black might play 14...a5!.

14...bc5 15.bc5 ♘a5



Fischer: (!)

16.♘a4

RR: Subsequent practice showed that the best continuation for White is 16.♘b5!, and on 16...♝c5 17.♚a4 with compensation for the sacrificed pawn.- Griffin.

16...♝c6


Petrosian: (!) Black begins a siege of the c5 pawn. White's misfortune consists in the fact that it is not so simple to find an antidote against this. Black has no weaknesses, and therefore it is necessary to seek tactical tricks, in order to somehow avoid immediate material loss. chesstouring.com

Fischer: (!) Now White's c-pawn is in danger.

17. ♖c2

Petrosian: The first attack is repulsed. Impossible is 17... ♔a4 18. ♚a4 ♜c5 19. ♘b4, and the black rook cannot find a stable place to stop on the fifth rank.

17... ♞b7 18. ♞fc1 ♚d7 19. ♞e1



Petrosian: It may readily be noted that, as previously, Black is promised nothing by the direct pursuit of the c5-pawn, in view of the fact that both the pawn at a7 and the knight at b7 prove to be under attack. Fischer continues to strengthen the pressure.

Fischer: A clever move. After 19... ♔a4 White moves into a drawing position with 20. ♞b7.

19... ♞d5 20. ♞b2 ♘b5 21. ♞ed3

Petrosian: 21. ♞bd3 was not much better, on account of the same reply 21... ♔d4.

Fischer: Someone suggested 21. ♞bd3 as a better move, but I simply wanted to reinforce my position with 21... a6 22. ♚b3 ♞d8 and 23... ♞c6 with pressure.

21... ♔d4


Petrosian: Now the fall of the c5-pawn is inevitable and for White there remains only the possibility of selling it 'dearly'.

Fischer: Now the game enters a new phase. Black will win a pawn.

22. ♚b3 ♞c5 23. ♞c5 ♜c5 24. ♞c5 ♔c5 25. ♞d3

Fischer: White could not try 25. ♔d5? ♚d5 26. ♚b5? ♔f2!.

25... ♔d3 26. ♚d3



Petrosian: White has lost a pawn, but has definite consolation in the form of the two bishops. He ought to have adhered to temporising tactics, waiting for active operations by the opponent.

26...♖d8 27.♗f3 ♕c7 28.♗g5

Petrosian: Stronger was 28.♗e1. Surprisingly, White begins to simplify the position.

28...♗e7 29.♗e7 ♕e7 30.♖d4

Petrosian: (??) A terrible move. Any of the continuations 30.♖a1, 30.♖a6 or 30.♗d5 was better. After the obvious reply by Black, it becomes clear that White has a 'bad' bishop.

Fischer: White could simplify with 30.♗d5 ♖d5, but it would leave White without any counter-play.

30...e5

Petrosian: (!)

Fischer: (!) It is hard for Black to win with an extra pawn on the edge of the board, so he tries to build up chances on the other side as well.

31.♖c4 ♜b6 32.♖c2 ♖c8 33.♖d3 ♖c4

Fischer: (!) Threatening 34...e4, and 34.♖b6? does not work because of the intermediate 34...♖c1.

34.♗g2 ♕c7

Fischer: 34...♖c5! was more active and better.


35.♖a3 ♖c3 36.♖a5 ♖c5 37.♖a3

Fischer: 37.♖a6! ♖c1 38.♖c1 ♖c1 39.♗f1 ♖c7 40.♖a5 was better, with a long fight ahead.

37...a5 38.h4 ♜c4 39.♖d3 ♜d6 40.♔h2

Fischer: With this move White avoids the exchange of rooks on the 1st rank.

40...♔g7



Petrosian: The time control has been reached. The nightmare for White has come to an end. Looking at the previous 10-12 moves, somehow I cannot believe that it was I who played them. White's position is hopeless. The black pieces have taken up invulnerable positions and White's bishop plays the role of an extra. The a-pawn is ready to move forward.

Fischer: (?) An unnecessary preventive move. 40...h5 was better, not allowing 41.h5, but White misses this opportunity.

41.♖d1

Fischer: (?) The sealed move. After 41.h5 I did not see a clear winning plan, as White still has counter-chances on the king-side. Black cannot play 41...gh5 because of 42.♖d1! and 43.♗f5; 41...a4 would have been followed by 42.♗a3!.

41...♘e8 42.♗d7

Petrosian: White has to try his luck in an endgame. If he tries to retain as many pieces as possible, then he can easily come under attack. For example: 42.♗a6 ♘f6 43.♙a8 (so that the bishop should not be blocked in after ...e5-e4) 43...a4! 44.♗a4 ♖a5 45.♗c6 ♗a7 and Black wins.

Fischer: White could not wait until Black consolidated his position on the king-side with 42...♘f6.

42...♗d7 43.♖d7 ♘f6

Petrosian: (?) Black retained a great advantage after 43...♘c7, after which there was no way for the white rook to occupy a position behind the passed pawn.


Fischer: Black should have played simply 43...♘c7 with the advance of the a-pawn and an easy win. If 44.♙e4 a4 45.♙b1 ♘b5 46.♙a2 ♖c7 etc.

44.♖a7 ♘g4 45.♔g1 ♖c1 46.♙f1 ♖a1 47.e4

Petrosian: (!) It transpires that everything is not yet so simple. In some cases an attack on the f7-pawn is possible.

Fischer: (!) After 47.e3 Black would win easily with 47...e4 and 48...♖e5.

47...a4 48.♔g2 ♖a2



49.♖f7

Petrosian: Without detailed analysis, one cannot express an opinion on this move. But there was another move - a more promising chance in practice - 49.♔g1. After all, the f2-pawn is essentially inviolable: 49...♖f2 50.♗h3 ♖f3 51.♔g2, or 49...♗f2 50.♗c4 ♗h3 51.♔h1 ♖f2 52.♗e6!. On 49...h5 there follows 50.♗h3 with the same idea: 50...♗f2 51.♗e6. In the case of the exchange at g4 the rook endgame promises White good drawing chances.

But how is one to know where the greatest practical chances lie?

Fischer: (?) An attractive move, but after the game Petrosian suggested a much better one - 49.♔g1!. 49...♖f2 does not work because of 50.♗h3 ♖f3 51.♔g2 with a draw, and after 49...♗f2 50.♗c4! ♗h3 51.♔h1 ♖f2 52.♗e6! is also uncertain for Black, so the only way is 49...a3 50.♗h3! h5 51.♗g4 hg4 but the endgame is probably a draw. Also interesting is 49.♔f3!?


49...♔f7 50.♗c4 ♔e7 51.♗a2 a3

Fischer: The endgame is lost for White, since his pawn structure on the king-side is weak.

52.♔f3 ♗f6 53.♔e3 ♔d6 54.f4

Fischer: 54.♔d3 ♔c5 55.f3 ♗h5 is hopeless too, or 55.♗e6 ♗g4!, forcibly weakening the king-side, and if 56.f4 ♔d6 and 57...♗f6, or 56.♔e2 ♔d4.

54...♗d7!



Fischer: Black wants to win a piece. The rest of the game is clear.

55.♙b1

Petrosian: (??) It was possible to fight for a draw by manoeuvring with the bishop on the long diagonal a2-g8. White's defensive idea consists in having, at the moment when Black plays ...♞c5, the move ♙c4, and on ...♞a6 - ♚d2. The move in the game, however, is equivalent to capitulation.

55...♞c5 56.f5 ♞a6 57.g4 ♞b4 58.fg6 hg6 59.h5 gh5 60.gh5 ♚e6 61.♚d2 ♚f6 62.♚c3 a2 63.♙a2 ♞a2 64.♚b2

Fischer: 64.♚c4 would have been followed by 64...♞c1 65.♚d5 ♞d3.

64...♞b4 65.♚c3 ♞c6 66.♚c4 ♞d4

White resigned. **0 : 1**

Fischer: 67.h6 would have been followed by 67...♞f3.

[*Fischer/Petrosian*]

Board 3

Lajos Portisch – Viktor Korchnoi [E 55]

'Rest of the World' - USSR

1.d4 ♞f6 2.c4 e6 3.♞c3 ♙b4 4.e3 0-0 5.♙d3 d5 6.♞f3 c5 7.0-0 dc4 8.♙c4 ♞bd7 9.♙b3


Portisch: (!?) In comparison with the usual 9.♙c2 this move holds an element of surprise, which was confirmed by the length of time Korchnoi used to consider the next move.

Korchnoi: (!?) A rarely-encountered continuation. Theory maintains that the strongest is 9.♙c2, but the move in the text has its pluses.

9...a6

Korchnoi: Black aims at a complicated struggle, but he does not succeed in equalising. Theory advises 9...cd4 10.ed4 ♖c3 11.bc3 b6, or 10.♗b4 dc3 11.♗c3 b6 - possessing the two bishops, White stands more actively, but with accurate play Black can equalise the chances.

10.a4



10...♙a5

Portisch: (!?) Theory suggests at this point 10...♞b6.

Korchnoi: Deserving attention is another plan: 10...♙e7 11.♞d1 ♞d8 and then perhaps 12...♞f8. However, in this case too Black does not have an easy game.

RR: Interestingly, at the end of 1970 the game Tukmakov - Korchnoi (from the 38th USSR Championship, in Riga) continued 10...♙e7 11.♞d1 ♙a5 12.♙c2 cd4 13.ed4 ♞b6 14.♙a2 h6 15.♞e5 ♙d7 16.♙b1 ♞fd8 17.♞d3 and White developed a strong attack. - Griffin.

11.♞d1 cd4 12.ed4 ♗b6


Portisch: (!) After 12...♞b6?! 13.♞e5! Black would have had difficulty extricating himself.

Korchnoi: On 12...♞b6 White could reply 13.♙g5 with an obvious advantage. Therefore, he has to play some rather unnatural moves.

13.♙c2

Korchnoi: The exchange of queens would have eased Black's defence.

13...♙c7 14.♙d3



Korchnoi: Not 14. ♖e2 in view of 14... ♙c3 15. bc3 ♘b6 16. ♙d3 ♘bd5! and Black, threatening 17... ♗c3 or 17... ♗f4, satisfactory resolves the problems of his position.

14...h6

Portisch: (!) This is a dangerous weakening. The right move would be 14...b6!, after which the sacrifice of a pawn with 15. ♖e2!? ♙c3 16. bc3 ♖c3 would be doubtful. Instead 15.d5!? followed by 15...ed5 16. ♗d5 would give White the advantage, but with 15... ♙c3 16. de6 ♙e5 (16... ♗e5 17. ef7 with an unclear follow-up) 17. ed7 ♙d7 would give Black an equal position.

RR: Here 18. ♙h7 ♗h7 19. ♖c7 ♙c7 20. ♖d7 would seem to be strong. - Griffin.

Korchnoi: A questionable move. The weakening of the king's flank later proves to be perceptible. Better would have been 14...b6. Admittedly, in this case I was worried by the fate of the bishop at a5, which due to the threat of b2-b4 could prove to be in a desperate position...

15. ♙d2 ♙b4

Portisch: It would still be correct to play 15...b6!?, after which I intended to play 16. ♖ac1 ♙b4 17. ♖b3, and Black would have had an extra, useful, tempo in comparison with the way the game developed.

Korchnoi: For White there had already arisen the serious threat of 16. ♖c1 followed by the sacrifice of the bishop at h6. Therefore, Black intends to return with the bishop for the defence of the king's flank. (16. ♖c1 ♖e8!)

16. ♖b3


Portisch: (!) This was better than 16. ♖ac1, which could have been followed by 16... ♖a5.

16... ♙d6

Korchnoi: 16... ♖a5?! would have been followed by 17. ♙f4! which, together with ♗f3-e5, would have

been unpleasant for Black.

17.♖ac1 ♜d8 18.♙b1 b6



Portisch: This is a critical position, where White has two plans with promising chances. The first one can be seen in the later development of the game; the other begins with 19.♘e4!? with the following possibilities: 19...♗e4 20.♙e4 ♖a7! 21.♗e5 ♙e5 22.de5 ♘c5 23.♞e3 ♗e4 (23...♞d7 would be weaker because of 24.♙c2, with a clear advantage for White) 24.♞e4 ♞d5! 25.♞d5 ed5 and although with 26.♙e3 or 26.♙b4 White could win a pawn, he most probably would be unable to win because of the bishops of opposite colour.

19.♘e5

Korchnoi: (!) The signal to attack! White's forces are now co-ordinated for the storming of the opponent's king's flank. It is unfavourable to take the knight: 19...♗e4 20.de5 ♙e5 21.♙h6 followed by 22.♙e3 with advantage. Also good was 19.♗e4.


19...♙b7

Portisch: 19...♗e5?! would not be a good move because of 20.de5 ♙e5 21.♙h6 with complications that are to White's advantage.

20.♙f4 ♞e7 21.♞e1

Korchnoi: Threatening 22.♗g6! fg6 23.♞e6!

21...♞fe8



Portisch: (!) A very important defensive move, since in some variations ♞e5-g6! ? is threatened.

22. ♖c2 ♜ac8

Korchnoi: It was possible to defend against the immediate threat to the black king with 22... ♞f8 , but White could then continue the attack without hurrying - 23. ♖d2, then ♜e1-e3-g3 etc. Therefore Black leaves the square f8 free for the possible flight of his king.

23. ♞d7

Portisch: After 23. ♖d3 ♞f8 I could not see a definite continuation of White's attack.

23... ♖d7

Portisch: Black could also have played 23... ♞f4! ? and after 24. ♞f6 ♖f6 25. ♖h7 ♞f8 26. ♞d5! ? ♞d5 27. ♜c8 ♜c8 28. ♖h8 ♞e7 29. ♖c8 ♖d4 it is doubtful whether White could win.


Korchnoi: (?) Weak! After 23... ♞f4! 24. ♞f6 ♖f6 25. ♖h7 ♞f8 26. ♞d5! ♞d5 27. ♜c8 ♜c8 28. ♖h8 ♞e7 29. ♖c8 ♖d4 Black does not lose in view of the centralised position of his pieces. Or 25. ♞d5 ♞h2 26. ♞h1 ♞d5 27. ♖c8 ♞f8 with a complicated struggle.

24. ♞e5 ♖d8

Korchnoi: (?) This should have led to a rapid loss.

More tenacious was 24... ♞e7 25. d5! ♜c3.

25. ♞f6 ♖f6 26. ♖h7 ♞f8



27.d5

Portisch: (?) Now, 27.♘d5? would be a weak move because of 27...♙d5 28.♖c8 ♖c8 29.♚h8 ♔e7 30.♗c8 ♗f4! and Black would have the better prospects, but 27.♙e4! ♙e4 28.♘e4 would lead directly to victory, as 28...♖c1 would be followed by 29.♚h8 ♔e7 30.♗e8! with an extra exchange for White.

Korchnoi: (?) Deciding immediately is 27.♙e4! ♙e4 28.♘e4 ♖c1 (what else is there to be done?) 29.♚h8 ♔e7 30.♗e8 ♔e8 31.♘f6 etc.

27...♔e7

Korchnoi: Here too 27...♖c3 deserved attention.

28.♖cd1

Portisch: If 28.de6 fe6 29.♙e4! ♙e4 (not 29...♗h8? as White would have the advantage after 30.♙b7 ♗h7 31.♘d5 ♔f7 32.♘f6 ♖c1 33.♖c1 ♔f6 34.♖c6!) 30.♗e4 ♔f8 31.♗b7 then Black, with 31...♗f4! 32.g3 ♗b4! can maintain his position within the margins of a draw.

Korchnoi: (?) White begins to play very uncertainly and lets slip the advantage. Good was 28.de6 fe6 29.♙e4, and also 28.♙a2.


28...♗h8 29.♗d3 ♗hd8

Portisch: (!) It is interesting that Korchnoi finds the best replies even when pressed for time.

30.♗e2 ♙c5 31.♙a2

Portisch: Another possibility was 31.de6!? but after 31...♖d1 32.ef7 ♔f7 the pair of bishops would compensate Black for the lost pawn.

31...♔f8



Portisch: The opponents agreed to a draw, at Black's suggestion. White no longer has the better position, as Black could answer 32.♖e4 with 32...♔e5.

For the remaining moves before the time control Korchnoi has only one minute and I only two, and in the event of play continuing, anything could have happened.

Therefore, in my opinion a draw was quite correct.

Korchnoi: Black has defended his king while maintaining material equality. In circumstances of serious mutual time trouble, the opponents agreed to a draw.

½ : ½

[Korchnoi/Portisch]

Board 4

Lev Polugaevsky – Vlastimil Hort [A 28]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.c4 e5 2.♘c3 ♘c6 3.♘f3

Polugaevsky: Another method of development is 3.g3 g6 4.♕g2 ♕g7 5.♖b1 with a complicated struggle.

3...♘f6 4.e3

Polugaevsky: White could follow a different path: 4.d4 ed4 5.♘d4 ♕b4 6.♕g5, which was often encountered in the practice of Mikhail Botvinnik.

4...d6

Polugaevsky: Black turns along King's Indian lines. More reliable was 4...♕e7 5.d4 ed4 6.♘d4 d5.


Hort: 4...♕b4, which might have been better, could also have been played. Black's whole plan is

doubtful.

5.d4 ♖g4

Polugaevsky: An original, but perhaps the best, course in the given situation.

6.d5 ♜b8 7.e4 ♙e7 8.h3 ♙h5



Polugaevsky: (!) Only with this method does Black have counter-chances. In the case of 8...♙f3 9.♞f3 White's advantage is undisputed.

Hort: The best continuation, since 8...♙f3 9.♞f3 ♜fd7 10.♙d3 gives Black nothing, as 10...♙g5 would have been impossible because of 11.♞g3 followed by ♞g7.


9.♙e3 a5 10.♙d3

Polugaevsky: White could play 10.♙e2, but then he would have had to reckon with 10...♙f3 11.♙f3 ♜fd7 followed by 12...♙g5.

10...♜a6 11.g4 ♙g6 12.♞e2

Hort: White plays in strictly positional style and does not attempt the possibility of 12.c5, with unclear consequences.

12...♜d7 13.h4 h5 14.g5 ♜dc5 15.♙c2 c6



Polugaevsky: There has arisen a complicated position that is favourable for White, who possesses greater space.


16.a3 0-0 17.♘d2

Hort: White has the better prospects after normal manoeuvring by both sides, so Black must try something riskier.

17...cd5 18.cd5

Hort: Weaker would be 18.♘d5 ♖c7, after which Black gains a stronghold in the centre.

18...♖c8



Hort: At this moment it might have been better for Black to play 18...♙b8 followed by ...♖c8.

However, the position is very complex and it is not easy to weigh up the chances.

19.♖b1

Polugaevsky: (!) A strong move, forcing Black to reckon the whole time with the threat of b2-b4. In search of counter-play, Black takes the correct decision to undermine White's pawn chain on the king's flank.

Hort: Oddly enough, White's move does not threaten 20.b4, to which Black would have the good answer 20...♘e6!. However, the move eliminates the possibility of Black playing 19...♔d7.

19...f6

Polugaevsky: (!)

20.♖g1 ♘h7

Hort: 20...fg5 would have been weaker because of 21.hg5 - Black would have no counter-play.

21.♖g3


Polugaevsky: More consistent was 21.♘f1 and then 22.♘g3. Nothing was given by 21.b4 on account of the unexpected reply 21...ab4 22.ab4 ♘e6!.

Hort: This seems much too artificial. White already had a much better position and could make the necessary manoeuvre in this position, 21.♘f1-g3-f5, retaining the advantage.

21...♔e8

Hort: Time pressure, and the complications have just started. Black threatens 22...a4.

22.♘c4 b5



Polugaevsky: Clearly, it was more accurate to play first 22...fg5 and only then 23...b5!

23.gf6


Polugaevsky: (!) An important finesse. After 23.♘a5 fg5 24.hg5 b4! 25.♙c5 ♖c5 26.♚a6 bc3 27.b4 ♜c8 there arises an unclear position with chances for both sides.

Hort: It seems that Polugaevsky did not want to risk 23.♘a5 b4 24.♙c5 ♖c5 25.♚a6 bc3 26.b4 ♜c7 27.♘c6 fg5 28.hg5 h4. The position remains highly complicated, but White probably still has the better chances.

23...bc4

Hort: What else?

24.fe7 ♚e7



25.♞g5

Polugaevsky: (?) A blunder, destroying the fruits of the previous work. The correct 25.♔d2! ♙e8 (otherwise 26.♞bg1) 26.♚c4 permitted White to count on success.

Hort: A mistake which costs White his advantage. A better move would surely have been 25.♔d2 or 25.♚c4, after which Black would not have an adequate defence.

25...♘d3

Polugaevsky: (!) Black sacrifices a pawn, gaining a strong initiative.

Hort: (!) A fully justified sacrifice of a pawn.

26.♙d3 cd3 27.♚d3 ♘c5 28.♙c5 ♖c5

Hort: Black is no longer worse.


29.♔e2

Hort: In grandmaster Evans' opinion, 29.f3 would have been better.

29...♚b7

Polugaevsky: (!)

30.b4



Polugaevsky: In this position the opponents agreed to a draw. For the pawn Black has strong pressure. An interesting struggle lay ahead. But experiencing a shortage of time for thought, the opponents decided not to tempt fate.

Hort: When making this move Polugaevsky offered a draw. Black did not wish to take any risks. However, after 30...ab4 31.ab4 he would very likely have had to decide on 31...♖c3!? 32.♔c3 ♕e4 33.♖b1 g6, sacrificing the exchange, for after 30...♖c7 White would have had a good reply in 31.♖b3!.

½ : ½

[Hort/Polugaevsky]

Board 5

Svetozar Gligorić – Efim Geller [E 92]

‘Rest of the World’ - USSR

Geller: In my meetings with Gligorić the King’s Indian Defence is a frequent guest. And this is natural, since we are both ‘incorrigible’ King’s Indian supporters. This is perhaps why the player with White has found it difficult to achieve anything significant, since it has long been known that the most difficult thing is to fight against oneself. In the present game too the opening turned out to be ineffective for Gligorić, and I succeeded in seizing the initiative. But subsequently, Gligorić sensed the danger in good time, and this is also understandable; the methods of conducting an attack for Black are well known to him. Not chasing after the ‘ghosts’ of an ephemeral offensive on the queen’s flank, he nearly nipped in the bud Black’s offensive on the king’s. And a drawn result became natural.

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1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 g6 3.♗c3 ♕g7 4.e4 d6 5.♗f3 0-0 6.♖e2 e5 7.d5 a5

Geller: (!)

8.♖e3


Glorigić: At this point it is usual to play 8.♖g5 or 8.0-0. As ...a7-a5 has already been played, White tries to continue along lines similar to those arising from 7.♖e3.

Geller: This is a 'provocative' move, and it essentially represents a loss of time.

8...♗g4

Glorigić: A reasonable answer. Otherwise White could redeploy his pieces, starting with 9.♗d2.

9.♖g5 f6 10.♖h4 ♗a6 11.♗d2



Geller: Here the knight does not have prospects and therefore White ought to have first castled, and then carried out the manoeuvre ♗f3-e1-d3.

11...♗h6

RR: Later, in a game v. Petrosian at the Chigorin Memorial tournament (Sochi, 1977) Geller was to prefer the alternative 11...h5. - Griffin.

12.f3

Glorigić: The bishop at h4 is not very well posted, and is there only temporarily, to prevent ...f6-f5 or to weaken the square f5 after ...g6-g5. The text move allows the bishop to come back towards the queen's wing, and sets up a natural pawn chain in the centre.


12...♖d7

Glorigić: It is characteristic of Black's tactics that he is not in a hurry to put his knight on c5, as White would then have been able to more quickly bring pressure to bear by means of b2-b3-b4.

13.0-0 ♖f7 14.♗b3

Glorigić: The knight at d2 is in a passive position and may come under attack from the bishop at h6; something has to be done with it.

14...b6 15.♗c1 ♖c5 16.♗d3



Geller: The knight has arrived at d3 from f3 not in two, but in four moves! It is understandable that White must now go over to defence.


16...♕e8

Glorigić: White does not take the knight, as after 16...♗d3 17.♗d3 the manoeuvre would have given White a strategic advantage.

17.b3 f5 18.a3 ♗h6 19.♗f2

Glorigić: Preventing the activation of the bishop via e3.

19...♕e7 20.♕c2



Gligorić: 20.b4 ab4 21.ab4 ♖a1 22.♙a1 ♞b3 etc. was still impossible. Now there is the threat of 21.b4, but Black promptly takes counter-measures, putting pressure on the e4-square.

20...fe4

Geller/Gligorić: (!)


21.fe4 ♞g5 22.♞c5

Gligorić: Thus, White has failed to achieve his main purpose, which was that he should bring pressure to bear on the queen's wing with his pawns.

22...dc5

Gligorić: (!) In this way Black gets the square d6 for his knight, while the weak e5-pawn is easy to protect. After 22...bc5 Black's a-pawn would be weak, and it would be easier for White to advance b3-b4.

23.a4



Geller: (!) White refrains from aggression on the queen's flank and aims to provoke simplification.

Glorigić: After 23.♙d3, 23...a4 would have been inconvenient.

23...♘f7 24.♚d3 ♘d6 25.♙f3


Glorigić: (!) So that 25...♙f4 can be answered by 26.♘e2.

Geller: On the immediate 25.♙e3 there would have followed 25...♙f4 or 25...♚h4.

25...♞f7


Geller: Playing 25...♚g5 Black could retain the advantages of his position, but now the game rapidly proceeds to a draw.

26.♙e3 ♙g5 27.g3!



Geller/Gligorić: (!)

27...♖af8 28.♙g2 ♔g7 29.♜f7 ♜f7 30.♚d2 ♙e3 31.♚e3 h5 32.♞d1



Gligorić: (!) As a pair of rooks have been exchanged, White has no worries about the f-file, which is now easily protected. In the meantime, ♞d1-f2-d3 is threatened, but Black can easily defend e5.

Agreed drawn. ½ : ½

[*Geller/Gligorić*]

Board 6

Vasily Smyslov – Samuel Reshevsky [A 17]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

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1.c4 ♘f6 2.♗c3 e6 3.♗f3 b6 4.e4

Smyslov: I wanted to get away from the Queen's Indian set-ups arising after 4.g3 ♗b7 5.♗g2.

4...♗b7 5.d3 d6

Reshevsky: Another possibility was 5...c5 and if 6.e5 ♗g8.

6.g3 ♗e7 7.♗g2 0-0 8.0-0 c5 9.h3 ♗c6 10.d4

Smyslov: (!)

10...cd4


Smyslov: (?!) Now White obtains the freer game. Black's position remains solid, but passive. It was better to reply 10...e5.

Reshevsky: 10...e5 would have been better.

11.♗d4 ♖c8

Reshevsky: 12.♗c6 and 13.e5 was threatened.

12.♗c6 ♗c6 13.♗f4 ♕c7 14.♕e2



14...a6?

Reshevsky: White has a slight advantage. Instead of the move in the text, however, 14...♗d7 should have been played, with a nearly-equal position.

RR: Here the standard tactic 15.♗d5!/? should be examined. - Griffin.

15.♖ac1 ♖fd8 16.♖fd1 ♕a7

Reshevsky: It was impossible to play 16...♖b7 because of 17.b4 b5 18.a4 ba4 19.b5.

17.a4


Smyslov: By simple means White prevents attempts by Black to free himself by means of ...b6-b5 or ...d6-d5.

Reshevsky: White has the advantage. Black cannot move his knight to the square e5 via the d7.

17...e5?

Reshevsky: A mistake, which will put Black into a completely passive position. It would have been better to play first 17...h6 and then ...e6-e5.

18.♙g5 a5 19.♘b5 ♚b8



Smyslov: If 19...♙b5, then 20.cb5 ♜c5 21.♙e3 ♜c1 22.♜c1, and the white rook penetrates to the c6-square.

20.h4

Smyslov: (!)

20...h6 21.♙f6 ♙f6

Reshevsky: Black is in a passive position with no opportunity for counter-play.

22.♘c3


Smyslov: (!) This quiet reply underlines White's supremacy. In the case of 22.♙h3 there could follow 22...♙b5 23.♙c8 (or 23.cb5 ♜c5) 23...♙a4 24.b3 ♙b3 25.♞d3 a4 with counter-play for Black.

Reshevsky: Why not 22.♙h3? Because of 22...♙b5 23.♙c8 (23.cb5 ♜c5) 23...♙a4 24.b3 ♙b3 25.♞d3 a4 and Black has at least an equal position.

22...♙e7 23.♙h3 ♜c7 24.♞d3 ♙b7 25.b3 ♙c6 26.♞cd1 ♙f8 27.♚e3 ♚b7 28.♔h2

Reshevsky: White can play practically whatever he wants! His opponent can do nothing but wait.

28...♔h8



29.h5

Smyslov: Beginning a plan of attack on the king's flank. The invasion of the knight at d5 follows only after thorough preparation. Black cannot undertake anything, and he must await the development of events.

29...♔g8 30.♙f5 ♚b8 31.♛f3 ♞e7 32.♛g4 ♚c7 33.♞f3 ♞ee8 34.♞c1 ♞e7

Smyslov: If 34...♛e7, then possible is 35.♘d5 ♙d5 36.cd5, and the open c-file permits the white rooks to invade the opponent's camp.

35.♘d5 ♙d5 36.ed5 e4

Smyslov: The pawn sacrifice is insufficient, but it enlivens Black's game.

Reshevsky: Black must sacrifice a pawn. The threat was ♙e4, when there is no defence against the mating threats.

37.♙e4 ♞e5 38.♙d3 ♞de8 39.♔g2 ♚e7

Reshevsky: (?) Time pressure! A form of resistance would have been 39...♞g5 and if 40.♛h3 then 40...♞ee5 or 40...♛c8.


Smyslov: If 39...♞g5, then 40.♛h3 ♞ee5 41.♙f5 ♞d5 42.cd5 ♛c1 43.♙e6! with an attack.

40.♞f5 ♞e1

Smyslov: A serious mistake in time trouble. Now White wins easily.

Reshevsky: (??) The losing move. There were some chances with 40...♛c7 41.♞e5 ♞e5 42.f4 ♞e3 43.♛f5 g6 44.hg6 fg6 45.♛g6 ♛g7.

41.♞e1 ♛e1 42.♞f3



Smyslov: Threatening 43.♙f5. It is impossible to reply 42...♚e5 on account of 43.♞e3. If 42...♞e5, then 43.♙d7 f6 (43...♙e7 44.♙e8) 44.♞f6 ♞e7 45.♙h7 ♔h7 46.♙f5 with a mating finale.

42...♙e7 43.♙f5 g6 44.hg6 f6 45.♙f6 ♙g7 46.♙f7 ♔h8 47.♙e7 ♞e7 48.♞f4 ♔g8 49.♞h4

Smyslov: Preventing the following regrouping by Black: the bishop moves along the long diagonal, and then ...♔g7. Despite the large material advantage, the endgame still demands a certain accuracy of White.

49...♞e5 50.♔f3 h5 51.♞f4 ♞e8 52.♙f5 ♙f6 53.♙d7 ♞f8 54.♞f5 h4 55.gh4 ♙h4 56.♙e6 ♔g7 57.♙f7 ♞h8 58.♔g4 ♙f6 59.♞f3

Smyslov: Freeing the path of the king.

59...♞h1 60.♔f5 ♞e1 61.♞e3 ♞f1 62.♔e6 ♙d4

Smyslov: Or 62...♙e5 63.♞e5 de5 64.d6 ♞f2 65.d7 ♞d2 66.♔e7 etc.

63.♔d6

Black resigned. **1 : 0**

[Reshevsky/Smyslov]

Board 7

Wolfgang Uhlmann – Mark Taimanov [E 17]

‘Rest of the World’ - USSR

1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 e6 3.♘f3 b6 4.g3 ♙b7 5.♙g2 ♙e7 6.0-0 0-0 7.d5

Uhlmann: (!?) An interesting and hitherto little-studied pawn sacrifice.

Taimanov: Uhlmann’s ‘patent’, which has brought him no little success. I had expected this variation, and after preparation, intended a new reply.

7...ed5 8.♘d4

RR: A decade later, in the 12th game of his Candidates' Semi-final match v. Korchnoi in Buenos Aires, Polugaevsky introduced the idea 8.♘h4!. This has subsequently been considered the critical line here. - Griffin.

8...♘c6

Taimanov: In my opinion, this is the most reasonable decision. Rather than aiming at a material advantage, Black seeks to mobilise his forces as rapidly as possible.

Uhlmann: Black decides against defending the pawn by 8...♙c6 or 8...c6, since in both cases White would have some attacking chances.


9.cd5 ♘d4 10.♙d4 c5 11.♙d3

Taimanov: Clearly, after 11.dc6 dc6 White cannot count on anything.

11...d6 12.♘c3

Taimanov: As a result there has arisen a position in the spirit of the Benoni Defence, but in a version favourable for Black. Firstly, the exchange of a pair of knights facilitates his manoeuvring; secondly, White cannot prevent the activation of the black queen-side pawns, since on 12.a4 all the same good is 12...a6 13.♘c3 b5 14.ab5 ab5 15.♖a8 ♗a8. Thus, on this occasion the opening duel has not brought White success.

RR: In the 6th game of the above-mentioned match, Polugaevsky continued instead 12.a4 a6 13.♘a3 b5 14.♙f4 b4 15.♘c4 a5 16.e4 ♙a6 17.♙c2 ♙c4 18.♙c4, etc. - Griffin.



12...a6 13.♙f4

Uhlmann: It would have been better to play 13.a4, so as to prevent Black from taking action on the queen's wing.

13...b5 14.a4

Taimanov: Uhlmann aims to provoke a weakening of the light squares on the opponent's queen-side, in order to then establish himself with his pieces at the c4-square.

The following stage is devoted to a struggle for this point.

14...b4 15.♘d1

Taimanov: Also in the case of 15.♘b1 a5 16.♘d2 ♘a6 17.♘c4 ♘d7 18.♙c2 ♘c4 19.♙c4 ♘b6 20.♙b5 ♘f6 Black has good piece play.

15...a5 16.b3 ♘a6 17.♙c2 ♘d7 18.♙e4 g6 19.♙d3


Uhlmann: This position, with the possibility of a blockade on the c4-square, was White's line of strategy.

However, as can be seen from the further development of the game, the threat of a breakthrough at c4 in conjunction with threats along the half-open e-file gives Black the advantage.

19...♘b6 20.♙h6

Taimanov: Since the immediate 20.♘e3 is bad on account of 20...g5, Uhlmann is ready to spend a tempo so as to carry out his plan. The move 20.e4, reliably consolidating the d5-pawn, had its shortcomings: 20...♘f6 21.♞c1 ♙d3 22.♙d3 c4!

20...♞e8 21.♘e3



Taimanov: White has finally completed the intended disposition of his forces and, it would seem, achieved success in the struggle for the key c4-square.

However, the activity of his pieces and the prospects of pressure along the e-file, more than compensate Black for this concession.

21...♙f6 22.♞ad1 ♙c8

Taimanov: (!) A good move. The queen is now ‘looking’ towards two important squares - h3 and a6, and it prevents the move ♖e3-g4.

23.♙g2 ♕d3 24.♖d3

Taimanov: A natural decision, but hardly the best. Better was 24.♗d3, intending in some cases to become active with ♗d3-b5.


24...♞a7

Taimanov: Here Uhlmann thought for a long time, from which it may be concluded that it is already not easy to find a good plan for White. Indeed, the threat of tying down his pieces with the move 25...♞ae7 looks unpleasant, while a way to activate his pieces is not apparent. Therefore the German grandmaster took a realistic decision. With his following move he decided to simplify the game and to occupy himself with the consolidation of the position.

25.♘c4

Taimanov: At this point I declined the offered draw. I understood that Black’s advantage is insignificant, but considered that the fighting resources had still not been exhausted.

25...♗c4 26.♗c4 ♞ae7 27.♞f3 ♞e4 28.♗b5 ♗d8



Uhlmann: (!) After this move it is very difficult for White to find a satisfactory plan of play. The weaknesses in White’s position - the points e2 and d5 - are more serious than the weaknesses a5 and d6 in Black’s camp.

Taimanov: (!) All the same, this position is of course more promising for Black. He possesses the e-file, has the eventual threat of ...c5-c4, and can attack the ‘detached’ d5-pawn. However, for the time being White’s defensive possibilities are perfectly sufficient, and I think that after the correct move 29.♞e3 the game would have ended peacefully. But Uhlmann feared the reply 29...g5, and he chose a different move, which proved to be clearly weaker.

29.♙e3

Taimanov: (?)

Uhlmann: 29.♖e3 would have been a slightly better move.


29...♗d4

Taimanov: (!)

30.♗d4 ♖d4 31.♗d3

Taimanov: The only move. On 31.e3 there would have followed not 31...♗d5 in view of 32.♖f7! ♔f7 33.♗c4, but simply 31...♗d2, with a dangerous initiative for Black.

31...♗de4 32.e3 h5



Uhlmann: It is very difficult to parry this wing attack effectively. Besides, White was already pressed for time.


Taimanov: Despite the simplification, Black's initiative has sharply increased during the last moves. White's pieces lack co-ordination and occupy clumsy positions, and this complicates the defence.

33.h4 ♔g7

Uhlmann: (!?) A much better continuation would have been 33...g5, so as on 34.hg5 to reply 34...h4.

Taimanov: A delay which could have cost Black his advantage. I naturally intended to attack the white king with the move 33...g5, but decided to make this move 'in all comfort', opening the 8th rank for the possible transfer of the rook to the h-file.

However, it is well known that one must not lose time in the attack and my opponent could now have prepared to repel the assault with the move 34.♖e1. Then on 34...g5, possible is the reply 35.f3 and the worst for White is behind him. To my good fortune, Uhlmann underestimated the danger and the following move that he played fails to penetrate the subtleties of the position. chesstouring.com



Taimanov: (!)

White resigned. **0 : 1**

[*Taimanov/Uhlmann*]

Board 8

Mikhail Botvinnik – Milan Matulović [B 36]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.c4 c5 2.♘f3 g6 3.e4

Botvinnik: As often occurs, from the English Opening there is obtained the Maróczy Variation of the Sicilian Defence.

Matulović: Quite unexpected from Botvinnik, who rarely opens with the king's pawn. He obliges me to play Simagin's Variation of the Sicilian Defence. Was this a psychological tactic?

3...♗c6 4.d4 cd4 5.♗d4 ♗f6 6.♗c3 d6

Botvinnik: Matulović plays the opening in exemplary fashion. Black does not agree to exchange of knights at the d4-square, simultaneously complicating of the development of the c1-bishop at the square e3 (♗e3 provokes the reply ...♗g4). In this way Black sidesteps the variation 6...♗d4 7.♙d4 d6 8.f3 ♗g7 9.♗e3 - a continuation which the specialists assess as favourable to White.

Matulović: This move is not considered best, as it allows the knight to retreat to c2. However, as seen in Bárczay - Matulović and Korchnoi - Matulović (Sarajevo, 1969), after 7.♗c2 ♗g7 8.♗e2 ♗d7!, Black has good prospects.


7.♗e2

Botvinnik: If 7.f3, with the aim of developing the c1-bishop at e3, White runs into slight difficulties. For example: 7...♙b6 8.♗c2 ♗g7 9.♙b1 ♗b4.

7...♖d4 8.♚d4 ♘g7 9.♙e3

Botvinnik: Also possible was 9.0-0 0-0 10.♙d2 avoiding simplification, as per the recommendation of Smyslov and Korchnoi.

9...0-0 10.♚d2 ♙e6 11.f3



Matulović: A more common move is 11.♖c1, with the possible continuation 11...♚a5 12.0-0 ♜fc8 13.b3 a6 with chances for both sides.

11...♚a5

Botvinnik: If 11...♖c8, then 12.b3 b5 13.e5 de5 14.♚d8 ♜fd8 15.♘b5 with a slight advantage for White.

Matulović: The best move at this point. 11...♖c8, which also looks enticing, could be followed by 12.b3, and now 12...b5 would be weak because of 13.e5! with complications in White's favour.

12.♘b5

Botvinnik: In this way White enters a slightly better endgame, thanks to the central position of his king and the possibility of seizing the bishop-pair.

Matulović: This plan was seen in O'Kelly - Matulović (Palma de Mallorca, 1967). With correct play, Black equalises.


12...♚d2 13.♙d2 ♘d7

Botvinnik: This move Matulović had already employed several times. Black is ready to give up the bishop-pair in return for the central square d4 for his knight.

Matulović: (!) A good move, with which Black begins the manoeuvre of his knight via e5 to c6, thereby gaining control of the central squares d4 and e5.

14.♜ab1

Matulović: In the game Benkő - Matulović (Venice, 1969) White decided on 14.♘c7, but after 14...♞ac8 15.♗e6 fe6 16.♞ab1 ♗e5 17.♞hc1 ♘c6 Black, who is threatening ...♙d4, has equal chances.
14...♗e5



Botvinnik: It was necessary to play 14...♞fc8 (preventing 15.♘c7) and if 15.♗a7, 15...♞a7 16.♙a7 b6 with advantage to Black. After Black's last move, it was necessary to play 15.♘c7 ♞ac8 16.♗e6 fe6 17.b3 ♘c6 18.f4!, and the endgame is much better for White, on account of the threat of ♙e2-g4 or the advance of the pawns on the king's flank: g2-g4-g5, h2-h4-h5.

15.♞hc1

Botvinnik: Now the initiative passes to Black and White's advantage is gone.

15...♞fc8 16.b3 ♘c6

Matulović: Black has had no difficulty in carrying out his plan, and now has a good position. White no longer has the advantage.


17.f4 f5

Botvinnik: Matulović finds the correct solution - this is introduced by the exchange of the black pawn at g6 for the active e4-pawn. After this, Black obtains a pawn majority in the centre.

18.♙f3 fe4 19.♙e4 ♙f5

Botvinnik: (!). The logical completion of the manoeuvre begun at the 17th move.

20.♙f5 gf5



21.♔e2

Botvinnik: White does not want to reconcile himself to the loss of the advantage that he had in the opening, and, as often occurs, it is just at such a moment that he chooses a bad move! With his last move, White loses at least two tempi, since the king should be at d2 to defend the rook at c1.

The only correct course was 21.h3 h5 22.g4 hg4 23.hg4 fg4 24.♖g1 with the simplification of the game.

21...♕f7 22.♞d1

Botvinnik: (?) A new mistake! The rook should have been left at c1, since after 22...a6 the knight could retreat to c3 and then move to a4. After White's new inaccuracy, Black leads the game by force into a favourable ending.

22...a6 23.♘d4 ♘d4 24.♙d4 b5

Botvinnik: (!) It is now clear why it was a mistake to remove the king from the d2-square, and the rook from the c-file.

25.♙g7 ♕g7 26.♞dc1

Botvinnik: Peace was concluded on White's proposal. For the sake of objectivity, it must be noted that Black has the better endgame, since after ...♞c6 followed by ...♞ac8, ...♔f6, ...a6--a5 White is forced to oppose the pressure.

Matulović: At this juncture I accepted the draw offered by Botvinnik. Perhaps with 26...♞c5 I might have tried to continue, but it is doubtful whether this would have been successful.

½ : ½

[*Botvinnik/Matulović*]


1.♘f3

Tal: The Argentinian grandmaster refrains from his beloved 1.d2-d4, clearly wishing to avoid various sorts of ‘Benoni’ schemes (1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 c5). However, it must be recognised that I had no particular desire to go in for an immediate sharpening of the game. And in this case, a Queen’s Gambit would have been probable.

1.♘f3 ♘f6 2.c4 e6 3.♘c3 d5 4.d4 c5

Najdorf: After an unusual beginning the game has moved on to well-trodden paths


5.cd5 ♘d5 6.e3 ♘c6 7.♙c4



Najdorf: These moves have been in use for a long time.

Tal: The choice between this move and 7.♙d3 is a matter of taste. In recent times the continuation chosen by Najdorf has been encountered most often. In particular, Larsen played this way in the 1st game of the 1969 match, where I replied 7.♙c4 ♙e7 and after 8.♙d5 ed5 9.dc5 Black had to overcome certain difficulties. I naturally did not wish to repeat this game.

7...cd4 8.ed4 ♙e7 9.0-0 0-0 10.♖e1



10...♞c3

Najdorf: In my game against Larsen (Palma de Mallorca, 1969), at this point I withdrew my knight to f6.

Tal: After the game my opponent was very critical regarding this move, which to me however seems to be not bad. While ridding White of concerns associated with the isolated d-pawn, Black intends to ‘press’ along the c-file against the backward pawn at c3, recognising, of course, that he will have to reckon with serious threats on the king’s flank. However, also having its pluses is 10...♞f6, going over to the lines of the Queen’s Gambit Accepted.

11.bc3 b6 12.♙d3 ♟b7 13.♚c2 g6

Najdorf: 13...h6 is not advisable because of 14.♚e2.

14.♙h6

Najdorf: 14.♚d2 was another possibility.


14...♞e8 15.♚d2

Najdorf: In the same position against Szabo (Groningen, 1946), Botvinnik played 15.♙b5. The text move is more aggressive and more in line with my style.

Tal: Also interesting was 15.h4, and if 15...♙h4 16.d5 on this I intended to continue 16...♚d5 17.♞h4 ♚h5. The position after the move in the text had already been encountered in my game with L. Grigorian (White) from the USSR People’s Spartakiad (1967). Then, it seems, I played 15...♙f6 16.♚f4 ♟g7 17.♞g5, which gave White a definite advantage.

RR: There seems to be some confusion here on Tal’s part. Against Grigorian, he continued, as in the present game, 15...♞c8, and on 16.♞ac1 ♞c7 17.♙f4 ♞d7, etc. - Griffin.

15...♞c8 16.h4



Tal: The sacrifice of a pawn is fictitious - after 16...♙h4 17.♘h4 ♚h4 there follows with great strength 18.♙g5. Into White's plans comes the further weakening of the opponent's king's flank.

16...♘a5

Najdorf: We have a familiar set-up in this position. White is active on the king's side, and Black seeks chances on the queen's. It would be a mistake now to play 16...♙h4 because of 17.♘h4 ♚h4 18.♙g5 with a decisive attack.

Tal: It is necessary to deflect the opponent and therefore Black immediately brings the c3-pawn under fire.

17.♘g5


Najdorf: Was 17.h5 stronger? After 17...♙f3 18.gf3 ♚d5 19.hg6 hg6 20.♙e4 ♚h5 21.♔g2 ♘c4 22.♚c1 ♙a3 23.♚f4 ♙d6 Black could gain a draw by repeating moves.

Tal: In reply to 17.♘e5 Black could without particular risk play 17...♙h4. A very sharp situation arose after 17.h5, permitting the doubling of the pawns, but in so doing Black is deprived of the strong light-squared bishop. The Argentinian grandmaster prefers a somewhat more restrained path.

17...♙f8

Tal: Already there is perhaps nothing else. The proximity of the bishop and knight is very much not to the liking of Black's king.

18.♙f8 ♚f8 19.h5



Najdorf: Mobilising my rook would not yield the desired result: 19.♖e3 ♜c4 20.♙c4 ♝c4 21.♞g3 e5! etc.

19...♜c4

Tal: Just in time! It transpires that White's attack is not so dangerous. Instead of the move in the text I also examined the exchange sacrifice 19...♞c3, but rejected it on account of the fact that after 20.♚c3 (amusingly, the intermediate 20.hg6 will not do on account of 20...♞d3!) 20...♚g5 21.♙e4 ♙e4 22.♞e4 ♚h5 23.♞e5 the poor position of the knight at a5 guarantees White the better chances.

20.♙c4

Najdorf: At this juncture I was disappointed. I had intended to proceed with the attack by 20.♚f4, but then I realised that the situation after 20...h6! is not clear at all. Here are the variations:


- a) 21.♜h3 g5! 22.♚g3 ♜b2;
- b) 21.♜e4 g5 22.♚g3 ♚c7 23.♚f3 f5 24.♙c4 ♚c4 25.♜f6 ♞f6 26.♚b7 ♞c7 with advantage for Black;
- c) 21.♜e6 fe6 22.♚h6 ♚f6! and White's assault is repulsed.

Tal: Dangerous looks 20.♚f4 with the unambiguous intention of transferring the queen to h4. On 20.♚f4 unfavourable is 20...♜b2 21.hg6 hg6 22.♚h4 and also 20...e5 21.♚g3.

The 'essence' of Black's defence is the move 20...h6! and it is unfavourable for White to sacrifice a piece - 21.♜e6 fe6 22.♚h6 ♚f6! 23.♞e2 ♚g7, while after 21.♜e4 g5 22.♚g3 ♚c7 chokes White's initiative. The exchange of the active bishop is no little achievement for Black.

RR: - A few years later, the game Langeweg - Faragó (IBM Tournament, Amsterdam 1976) indeed continued 20.♚f4 h6!, and then 21.♜e4 g5 22.♚c1 ♜g7 23.f4 g4 24.f5 ♙e4 25.♞e4 ef5 26.♞f4 ♜d6 27.♙f5 ♜f5 28.♞f5 ♚c7, and a draw was agreed. - Griffin.

20...♞c4 21.hg6 hg6 22.♚f4



Najdorf: With the definite threat of 23.♖h4.

Tal: New reserves enter the attack. The king's flank is all the same under threat.

22...♔d5

Najdorf: 22...♖g7 would have been followed by 23.♖f7!

Tal: Clearly, the only move. Besides the 'brutal' 23.♖h4, the threat of ♜e1-e3-h3 is very unpleasant. Winning a tempo with the threat of mate, Black is in time to consolidate the position.

23.f3

Tal: In reply to 23.♗e4 there could follow 23...♖f5.

23...♖g7 24.♗e4


Najdorf: I was faced with a difficult decision. Why not 24.♜e5? This might have been followed by 24...♖d7 25.♖f2 ♜h8 26.♜ae1 ♗d5. As the king's side has been fortified, the pressure against the c3-pawn now represents a real threat. White could continue with 27.♜5e3, and after 27...♖c7 neither opponent would have a real advantage.

Tal: Before this move Najdorf, having thought for a long time, unexpectedly offered a draw. I was seized by the excitement of the struggle, and I decided to continue the fight. However, it seems to me that more dangerous was 24.♜e5 ♖d7 25.♜ae1, maintaining the tension. In a series of variations the elegant leap of the rook to h5 is threatened, as well as the eventual manoeuvre ♗g5-h3-f4.

24...♖f5

Najdorf: After 24...f6 25.♗d6? would not do because of 25...e5!. However, 25.♖f2 would have been very attractive for White. With the move in the text Black hopes to thwart his opponent's attack, for the last minor piece can thereby be exchanged. The position is equalised and I realised that I had not managed to take advantage of the first move. So I offered a draw, but Tal refused my offer.

25. ♖g3



Tal: Interestingly, the move after having offered a draw, White decides to sacrifice a pawn, but to retain the queens. The endgame is somewhat more pleasant for Black, but after 25. ♖f5 ef5 26. ♘d6 ♜c7 27. ♘b7 ♜b7 28. d5! White maintains the balance without any particular difficulty. The move played by Najdorf is significantly sharper, but perfectly possible. At any rate, neither at the board nor in subsequent analysis did I manage to find a path to victory. A draw - this is quite another matter...

25... ♙e4 26. fe4 ♚a5


Najdorf: Nor would 26... ♚h5 have been better. This could have been followed by 27. ♜e3 ♜h8 28. ♜f1 and the check at h2 would do no harm to White.

27. ♜e3 ♜fc8 28. ♜f1

Najdorf: Clearly, White cannot defend his c-pawn, but he can still attack his opponent's king, ensuring at least a draw.

Tal: The pawn at c3 is indefensible - on 28. ♜c1 there follows 28... ♜d4. White has strong trumps - the f-file (half-open), and also the h-file (open!).

28... ♜c3



Najdorf: Already while moving the knight to e4 I had in mind the saving manoeuvre that later occurred.

29.♖ef3

Najdorf: (!)

29...♗8c7

Tal: 29...♖f3 30.♗f3 ♖f8 is too passive.

RR: Indeed, after 31.♗f6 ♔g8 32.♖f3 White wins by force. - Griffin.

30.♗f4

Najdorf: (!)

30...♔g8

Najdorf: Black does not allow White to put him in check.


Tal: I had already decided to force a draw - 30...♖d7 31.♖c3 ♖c3 32.♗e5 ♔g8 33.♗b8 ♔h7 34.♗h2. Then, however, I decided to hold off for one more move. The move in the text reckons on the natural 31.♗f6 ♖d7.

31.♗d6

Najdorf: (!)

Tal: (!) This move is significantly stronger. Now it was already obligatory to force the draw, which was achieved with 31...♗g5 32.♖c3 ♖c3 33.♗b8 ♔g7 34.♗a7 ♗e3 35.♔h1! (weaker is 35.♔h2 ♗g3 36.♔h1 ♖c7!). Black had already intended to play 31...♗g5, but suddenly for a second there flashed the variation 31...♖f3 32.♖f3 ♖c1 33.♔h2 b5. Impulsively, there followed...

31...♖f3



Tal: ...and here already I noticed my mistake, which Najdorf exploited instantly.

Najdorf: (?) Black could have played 31...♞g5! and after 32.♞c3 ♞c3 33.♞b8 ♔g7 34.♞a7 the game would end in a draw.

32.♞d8!

Najdorf: (!) A really unpleasant intermediate move!

Tal: This is the whole point. White's queen bursts into the enemy camp. Already now there is no draw for Black.

32...♔g7 33.♞f3

Najdorf: Suddenly White begins an attack that cannot be repulsed. Together with 34.♞c7, White threatens 34.♞f6 and 35.♞h3.

33...♞e1 34.♔h2 ♞c3

Tal: The only possibility of preventing the transfer of the rook to h3, but now the f7-pawn proves to be defenceless. The final moves before the time control were made in circumstances of mutual time trouble, particularly acute for Black.

35.♞f6 ♔h6 36.♞f4 ♔h7

Tal: Black cannot continue 36...♔h5 37.g4 ♔h4 38.♞h6 ♔g4 39.♞f4#. Najdorf does not force events, reckoning (and not without justification) on finding a forcing path to victory in analysis.

37.♞f7 ♔h6 38.♞f4 ♔h7


Najdorf: It is clear that 38...♔h5 would lead to mate after 39.g4 ♔h4 40.♞h6.

39.♞f7

Najdorf: Of course I could have played 39.♞f1 right away but I was mainly worried about the time

control.

39...♔h6 40.♚f8 ♔h5



Najdorf: In this position the game was adjourned. White wins by force.

Tal: In this position the game was adjourned. That evening it was established that White wins, and that the path to victory lies through a two-fold (unfortunately not a three-fold) repetition of the position.

41.♚h8

Tal: The sealed move.

41...♔g5 42.♚e5 ♔h6 43.♚f4 ♔h7

Najdorf: See the note to move 39.

44.♖f1

Tal: In this lies White's idea. Having covered the g3-square, White with gain of tempo removes the rook from exchange.

44...♚e2

Najdorf/Tal: In reply to 44...♚e3 decisive is 45.♚h4 ♔g7 (45...♚h6 46.♖f7!) 46.♖f4!.


45.♚f7 ♔h6 46.♚f8 ♔h5

Najdorf: A similar finale would have resulted from 46...♔g5 47.♚f6 ♔h5 48.♚e5 ♔h6 49.♖f4 ♚e1 50.♖g4 ♔h7 51.♚f6 etc.

47.♖f4

Tal: Threatening mate in two moves 48.♚h8 ♔g5 49.♚h4#. The reply is forced.

47...♚e1 48.♚h8 ♔g5 49.♚e5 ♔h6 50.♖g4



Tal: Already, that's that. There is no saving Black from a quick mate.

Black resigned. 1 : 0

[*Najdorf/Tal*]

Board 10

Paul Keres – Borislav Ivkov [C 87]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.e4 e5 2.♘f3 ♘c6 3.♙b5 a6 4.♙a4 ♘f6 5.0-0 ♙e7 6.♖e1 d6

Keres: A continuation that normally leads to a variation of the Steinitz Defence Deferred.

7.♙c6 bc6 8.d4 ♘d7

Keres: Leading to a difficult defence therefore Black ought to try 8...ed4.


9.♘bd2 0-0

Ivkov: (!) I played the same way against Smejkal in the four-game playoff match at the Prague Zonal tournament.

RR: this had taken place earlier in 1970. - Griffin.

I was interested to know what might have been a better move for Smejkal. Now I think I know... Otherwise, another possibility in keeping with the position is 9...f6 10.♘c4 ♘b6 11.♘a5 ♙d7, as demonstrated in the game Keres - Reshevsky (Los Angeles, 1963).

10.♘c4



10...♙f6

Keres: A new idea of holding the e5-pawn, but, judging from everything, not the most successful. Evidently, better is the old continuation 10...f6.

RR: Many years previously, v. Boleslavsky in the 20th USSR Championship (Moscow, 1952) Keres himself had tried the continuation 10...ed4?! 11.♘d4 ♘b8 here. - Griffin.

11.♙e3

Ivkov: (!) The above-mentioned game against Smejkal continued instead 11.c3 a5! 12.♙a4 ed4 13.cd4 c5 14.e5 de5 15.de5 ♙e7 16.♞d1? ♙e8 17.♙c6 ♘b6 18.♙e4 f5!, with advantage for Black.

11...♙e8

Keres: Black has run into difficulties with the development of his pieces. He aims at all costs to avoid the illogical exchange at d4 and is thereby forced to reckon with the possibilities of ♘c4-a5 or d4xe5. White, by simple means, strengthens his position.

12.♙d2 ♙e6 13.♙c3

Ivkov: (!) The pressure on e5 is increased, and at the same time the weak point at c6 is sounded out.


13...♞b8 14.b3 ♞e8 15.♘a5

Keres: White recognises that after 15...ed4 he cannot take with the knight at d4 on account of the reply (16.♘xd4) 16...c5! (16...♙e4? 17.♙d2!), since Black then obtains good play.

With the move 15.♞ad1 White could have continued to keep the opponent in a passive position.

Ivkov: 15.♞ad1, maintaining the tension, would also be good.

15...ed4 16.♙d4



Ivkov: Fortunately, White could not play 16.♘d4 because of 16...c5 - the idea behind the move 13...♞b8.

16...c5 17.♙f6 ♖f6 18.♚f6 gf6

Keres: Also after 18...♗f6 19.e5 de5 20.♗e5 White retains the advantage.

Ivkov: 18...♗f6 does not promise much either, but the formation of four pawn ‘islands’, regardless of the closed character of the position, is no consolation.

19.♗d2 ♗e5 20.f4 ♗g6 21.g3 ♙d7

Ivkov: Even after 21...f5 22.e5 de5 23.♗c6 ♞b6 24.♗e5 ♗e5 25.♞e5 ♞e5 26.fe5 f6 Black’s situation is not hopeful, but in any case it was the only way to proceed.

22.♗ac4 ♙c6 23.♗e3


Ivkov: (!)

23...♙f8

Keres: Mistaken was 23...♙e4? since after 24.♗g4 ♙g7 25.♗e4 f5 26.♗gf6 Black loses the exchange, or, after 26...♞e6? 27.♗h5 followed by 28.♗ef6, a piece.

Ivkov: 23...♙h8 seems better.

24.♙f2 ♙e4



Keres: (?) Black falls into a trap, since he reckons only with 25. ♖e4 ♜e4 26. ♗d5, which gives White the possibility of going into a better endgame. However, a surprise follows.

Ivkov: (??) This is certainly a blunder, but Black's position is difficult in any case.

25.f5

Ivkov: This is the move which I unfortunately noticed too late, when I had already touched the e4-pawn. In my haste I forgot to say "J'adoube"...

25...♙c6

Keres: (!) Black has no other way out, since after 25... ♗h8 26. ♗e4 ♜e4 27. ♗c4! the knight at h8 is doomed to the role of an extra for the rest of the game. After the move in the text White, with a piece for two pawns, has an almost winning position.

Ivkov: (?) To retreat the knight was impossible, but instead he had to play 25... ♙b7.

26.fg6 fg6

Ivkov: At least Black has some compensation: the balance between his pawns has been re-established.

27.♗ec4

Keres: (?) White conducts the following part of the game most uncertainly. It was possible to consolidate White's advantage very simply with the move 27.c4 followed by ♗e3-d5.

Ivkov: (?) White's first mistake. 27.c4 followed by ♗e3-d5 should have been played.

27...♙f7 28.a3 ♜e1 29.♜e1 g5 30.♗e3 h5 31.♗f5


Ivkov: (?)

Keres: In the present case too 31.c4 followed by ♗e3-d5 was the simplest solution.

31...♜e8 32.♜e8

Ivkov: (?) To his other mistakes White adds one more and now seriously jeopardises his chances of victory. The rooks had to be retained, in view of the presence of two knights for White, and the reduced material.

32...♙e8



33.h4

Keres: (!) A good move, which fixes the h5-pawn on a square of the colour of the black bishop.

33...d5

Keres: A final attempt to render the situation of the f5-knight difficult, by means of ...d5-d4.

34.b4

Keres: The possibility of exchanging pawns significantly facilitates Black's defensive task. White achieves much more with the move 34.♘e3 ♙e6 35.♘f3 etc.


34...♙d7 35.♘e3 cb4 36.ab4 gh4

Ivkov: In time pressure I feared that 36...♙e6 might be followed by 37.g4, creating a passed pawn on the h-file. For example, 37...hg4 38.h5 c6 39.♘b3 ♙f7 40.♘d4 and ♘e3-f5.

37.gh4 ♙e6 38.♘f3

Keres: Under the pressure of time trouble White plays inaccurately. Necessary was 38.♘b3 ♙e5 39.c3 with complete control over the dark squares. Black now gains serious chances of saving the game.

38...♙d6 39.c3 c5 40.♙e2 ♙c6 41.♙d3



Keres: Here the game was adjourned and Black sealed his move. Thanks to the reduction in material and his strong bishops, Black has good prospects of saving the half-point. White's trumps in the continuation were the weak pawn at h5 and the circumstance that the dark squares are under his control. Nonetheless, for complete control White is forced to permit the creation of a dangerous passed pawn on the a-file. The following endgame was so complicated that even analysis could not establish with certainty the hopelessness or otherwise of Black's situation. At any rate, one way or another White retains good prospects of victory.

41...♙e8

Keres: The sealed move and the best one in the given position. Hopeless was 41...d4 on account of 42.cd4 cb4 43.♙c4 a5 44.d5 etc. or 41...♙d6 on account of 42.bc5 ♙c5 43.♘d4 and Black would have ended up in a difficult situation as a consequence of the threat of 44.♘b3 followed by 45.♙d4. Nothing is changed by the continuation 43...♙d6 44.♘ef5 ♙e5 45.♘g7 since after 45...♙g4 there follows 46.♙e3, while on 45...f5 there is 46.♘h5 f4 47.♘f3 etc.

Ivkov: This was the sealed move. With 41...d4 42.cd4 cb4 43.♙c4 a5 44.d5 Black would have been driven back, and the queen-side pawns blocked.

42.bc5 ♙c5 43.♘d4 ♙g6 44.♙d2 a5! 45.♘g2!

Ivkov: 45.♘b3 ♙b5 would not have worked: 46.♘d5 ♙c4 47.♘f4 ♙b3 48.♘g6 a4 49.♘f4! (or 49.♙c1? ♙c3 50.♘f4 ♙d4 51.♘h5 ♙e5) 49...a3 50.♘e2 f5! 51.♘c1 ♙c4 52.♙c2 f4, and White cannot win.

45...♙d6

Keres: After 45...a4 White achieves the good set-up 46.♘f4 ♙e8 47.♘f5.

46.♘f4 ♙e8 47.♘d3 ♙g6


Ivkov: (!)

48. ♖b5

Keres: With this move White begins the inaccurate implementation of the intended plan, in mutual time trouble.

He ought to continue 48. ♖f4 ♗e8 49. ♖c2, with which it was possible to achieve the position which appears in the further course of the game.

48... ♗c6 49. ♖f4



Keres: (?) On 49. ♖a3 there could follow 49... ♗d3 50. ♗d3 ♗c5 after which, most probably of all, White can no longer win the game. However, the move in the game is mistaken. White should have continued 49. ♖d4 ♗d6 50. ♖f4 etc.

Ivkov: White should have repeated the position with 49. ♖d4.

49... ♗e8


Keres: (?) Feeling the shortage of time, both opponents considered the endgame after 49... ♗b5! 50. ♖g6 ♗c4 51. ♖f4 d4 52. ♖h5 (but not 52. cd4 ♗d4 53. ♖h5 ♗e5 with a draw) 52...dc3 53. ♗c2 to be won for White. However, after 53...a4 54. ♖f4 a3 55. ♗b1 ♗b3 56. ♖e2 a2 57. ♗a1 f5 58. h5 (or 58. ♖d4 ♗c4 59. ♖f5 ♗d3!) 58...f4 59. ♖c3 ♗c3 60. h6 f3 61. h7 f2 62. h8=♚ ♗d2 Black would have just achieved the draw.

Ivkov: (?) Black lets slip a good chance to draw, by giving up his bishop for the knight. For example: 49... ♗b5! 50. ♖g6 ♗c4! 51. ♖f4 d4! 52. ♖h5! (or 52. cd4 ♗d4 53. ♖h5 ♗e5 with a draw) 52...dc3 53. ♗c2 a4 54. ♖f4 a3 55. ♗b1 ♗b3 56. ♖e2 c2 57. ♗a1 f5 58. h5 f4 59. h6 f3 60. ♖c1 ♗c4 and a draw. White can still try 57. ♗c1 a2 58. ♖d4 ♗c4! 59. ♖c2 ♗d5 60. ♗b2 ♗e5, but there is no win. It is difficult to explain why at that moment I did not consider these possibilities, while in analysis I saw them all.

50. ♖a3 ♗d6 51. ♗e3 ♗e5

♠f4 64.♗e3 would have been incorrect) 62.♗c2 and White retains very good winning prospects.

Ivkov: (??) The last, and most serious mistake. Black had almost secured a draw, but, pressed for time, he made this ill-considered move. There was a good chance with 56...♙a4!, after which White would have to play extremely carefully in order to realise his material advantage. The variations are as follows: 57.♗a1 ♖c5 58.♗a2 ♖c4 59.♠f4 d4! 60.cd4 ♖d4. In this position White cannot proceed with 61.♠f5 because of 61...♗e3 with a draw. Thus, there are only two possibilities for White to continue this endgame: 61.♗c1 ♖c3 62.♠f5 ♖b2 63.♗ab3 ♙e8 64.♠f6 ♖c2 65.♠g5 ♖b2, and White cannot untie his knights. But that would not be all! A draw is still a long way off 66.♗e2! ♖b3 67.♗f4 ♖c4 68.♗h5 ♖c5 69.♗f4 ♖d6 70.♠f6 and wins. Therefore: 65...♙f7 66.♗e2! ♖b3 67.♗f4 ♖c4 68.♗h5 ♖d5 69.♗f4 ♖e5! (69...♗d6? 70.♠f6 and wins) 70.♗g6 ♖e6 71.h5 ♙g8! and the king goes to f7. Besides this, there is a third continuation of this variation: 63...♙d7! 64.♠f6 ♙g4 65.♠g5 ♖c2 66.♗e2! ♖b3 67.♗f4 ♖c4 68.♗h5 ♙d1 69.♗f6 ♖c5! 70.♗g4 ♙g4 and the black king gets to f8. The last variation to be explored begins with 61.♗b4! and then 61...♖c3 62.♗d5 ♖b2 63.♗f6 ♖a1 64.♗h5 ♖b2 65.♗f6 ♖c3 66.h5 ♖d4 67.h6 ♙c2



68.♗g4! ♙b1 69.♠g5 ♖d5 70.♠f6 ♖d6 71.♗e5 ♙h7 72.♠g7 and White wins.

Unfortunately, it seems that Black is lost after 56...♙a4!. However, there can be no question about the difficulty of the tasks confronting White. Moreover, the above variations would be more appropriate to a theoretical study than to practical play, and therefore it is a pity that Black did not take advantage of 56...♙a4! The further resumption of the game was more or less forced and was not necessary at all.

57.♗a1 ♖c5

Keres: On 57...♙b1 there would have followed 58.♖d4 and the d5-pawn is in a hopeless situation, while the c3-pawn could, in case of necessity, advance. A good continuation for White was 57...♗e5 58.♗a2 f5 59.♗b3 f4 60.♠f2. The move in the text is no better than any other continuation.

58.♖b3

Ivkov: (!)

Keres: This is the point! Bad was 58.♖a2, since White's in this case after 58...♗c4 White's knight would have been stalemated.

58...♗c4 59.♘d2 ♗c3 60.♖a2 ♗b2 61.♘b4 ♙f7 62.♗d4

Keres: In the endgame White wins, since he is only faced with presenting the approach of the black king towards the h-pawn. Nonetheless, the path to victory does not lack interest.

62...♗c1 63.♘f3 ♗d1 64.♗e3

Keres: (!) Mistaken would have been 64.♘d5 on account of 64...♗e2! etc. White may take the d5-pawn only once the black king has been cut off.


64...♙g8 65.♘d3 ♗c2

Keres: 65...♙f7 66.♘f4 led to the same continuation as that which occurs in the game.

66.♘f4

Keres: White could also continue 66.♖c5 and 67.♘d7.

66...♙f7 67.♗d4 ♗d1



68.♗d3!

Keres: The decisive manoeuvre. Black finds himself in zugzwang.


68...♗c1 69.♘e2 ♗b2 70.♘c3 ♙g8

Keres: Also after 70...♗c1 71.♗d4 the black king cannot cross the d-file.

71.♗d4 ♗c2 72.♘d5 ♙d5

Keres: A final attempt. Otherwise, in the case of the advance of the f-pawn, the white king reaches g5 with an easy win.

73.♔d5 ♕d3 74.♘d4 ♕e3 75.♘f5 ♕f4 76.♕e6 Black resigned.



Keres: After 76...♕g4 77.♕f6 ♕f4 White wins with the move 78.♘h6. An interesting and substantive endgame.

1 : 0

[Ivkov/Keres]

(back to the text) *Larsen*: The position has now become Nimzowitsch's variation of the Sicilian Defence with colours reversed: 1.e4 c5 2.♘f3 ♘f6 3.e5 ♘d5 4.♘c3 ♘c3 5.dc3. In this position Nimzowitsch, in his time, played 5...b6?, which was later displaced by 6.e6!. White has an extra tempo in comparison with the above position, and besides it is not quite certain that the bishop's position at c5 is the best one.

ROUND 3

Thursday 2nd April, 1970

A dramatic day that saw the Rest of the World team reverse the result of Round 2, leaving the match wide open.

On top board, Spassky gained the better position against Larsen from a Queen's Indian Defence, and had a clear advantage in the queenless middlegame that resulted. However, after he missed a very strong continuation at the 25th move the position became double-edged. Despite being in serious time trouble, the Dane managed to stay in the game and keep the pressure on the Spassky. Possibly as a result of playing for the win when the position no longer merited it, the World Champion blundered shortly before the time control, and his position immediately collapsed.

On board 2, Petrosian employed an unusual line in the Caro-Kann Defence against Fischer that resulted in the sort of closed, strategic position in which the ex-World Champion excelled. Fischer was unable to make any headway and even stood slightly worse in the middlegame. However, he was never in any real danger of losing and a draw was agreed at the 32nd move.

Against Portisch on board 3, Korchnoi again opened with 1.e4. In a Spanish Game, he inexplicably

omitted to play the standard c2-c3 at the 9th move, and allowed Black to exchange White's important light-squared bishop for a knight. Black's opening difficulties were immediately solved, but he played the middlegame in unconvincing fashion and allowed Korchnoi to build up a strong king-side attack. The game was adjourned in a position that favoured the Soviet player. However, on the resumption Korchnoi ran short of time and after missing a clear win at the 48th move, the position became unclear. After further mistakes by White, it was Portisch who took the full point.

On board 4, Hort and Polugaevsky played the only 'grandmaster draw' out of the 40 games played in Belgrade.

On board 5, Geller and Gligorić continued their theoretical duel in the Smyslov System of the Spanish Game. This time the Yugoslav grandmaster improved on an earlier game from 1968 between the same players. White was unable to extract any advantage from the opening, and a draw was soon agreed.

On the next board Reshevsky opened with 1.e4, clearly wishing to test Smyslov in the Chigorin Variation of the Spanish Game that the ex-World Champion preferred in those years. Introducing a relatively new idea at the 19th move, he emerged from the opening with the advantage and subsequently gave a textbook example White's play in this structure. The game was adjourned in a winning position for White, and Smyslov's resignation followed at the 54th move.

Taimanov and Uhlmann continued their theoretical dispute in the Grünfeld Defence on board 7; the East German grandmaster introduced a prepared improvement but soon stood worse and by the 23rd move an endgame was reached with a clear extra pawn for White. However, Taimanov failed to play in the most convincing manner and Uhlmann, displaying resourcesful and inventive defence, managed to salvage a draw.

On board 8 against Matulović, Botvinnik again employed the Pirc Defence and solved all of his opening difficulties satisfactorily. After some inaccurate play by White in a simplified heavy-piece position, Black gained a clear positional advantage which by the adjournment had been transformed into an extra pawn in a queen endgame. However, for once Botvinnik's flawless technique deserted him, and the game eventually ended at the 93rd move when the Yugoslav forced a draw via a clever stalemating strategem.

On the ninth board Tal scored the Soviet team's only win in this round, defeating Najdorf in fine positional style. The Argentinian grandmaster was unable to recover from some poor opening play on the black side of a Sicilian Defence, as a result of which he was left with a compromised queen-side without any compensation for this static defect.

On the last board Ivkov and Keres shared the point. In a quiet position arising from the Tarrasch Defence, Ivkov launched an attack on the black king, but it was parried by Keres by means of a clever pawn sacrifice, as a result of which he gained a clear advantage. However, in the time scramble that followed he failed to make the most of his chances, and a draw was agreed in the first adjourned session.

Board 1

Boris Spassky – Bent Larsen [E 12]


chesstouring.com

1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 e6 3.♗f3 b6 4.♗c3 ♘b7 5.♙g5 ♙e7 6.e3 0-0

Spassky: Usually played here is 6...♗e4, aiming at the simplification of the position. However, a peaceful outcome to the encounter did not suit Larsen, and he prefers a more complicated struggle.

RR: After 6...♗e4 Spassky had previously tried 7.♙f4!? ♘b4 8.♚c2 v. Lutikov (27th USSR Championship, Leningrad 1960) and 7.♗e4 ♙e4 8.♙f4 0-0 9.♙d3 ♘b4 10.♗f1 v. Polugaevsky (28th USSR Championship, Moscow 1961). - Griffin.

7.♙d3 c5 8.0-0



8...♗c6

Spassky: (?) A mistake, which leads Black into a difficult position. He ought to play 8...cd4 9.ed4 d5, going over to standard positions of the Queen's Gambit.

Larsen: (?) I played this move in order to complicate the game. However, it was not correct. With 8...h6 9.♙h4 the move 9...♗c6 might have been a good one.


9.d5 ♗b4

Larsen: The sequel 9...ed5 10.cd5 ♗d5 11.♙h7 would give White a superior position.

10.d6 ♙d6 11.♙h7

Larsen: Another possibility was 11.♙f6 as Black cannot play 11...♚f6?? because of 12.♙e4! winning a piece (RR: in fact, Black can escape with 12...♙h2 - Griffin.), while the continuation 11...gf6 12.♙h7 ♗h7 13.♚d6 would lead to a sharp position with advantage for White because of the weakness of the d7-pawn.

11...♗h7 12.♚d6 ♙f3 13.gf3



13...♖e8

Spassky: (!) All of these moves are forced, while Black's last move is his best chance.

Larsen: What else? However, I had completely overlooked my opponent's simple and very strong answer. After 14.♙g3 f6 the position would not be clear, and after 14.♙f8 ♖g5 15.♔h1 ♙h5 16.♞g1 ♜f3 17.♞g2 g6 Black would retain good tactical chances.

14.♙e7

Larsen: (!)


Spassky: (!) This is stronger than 14.♙d8 ♖d6 15.♙e7 ♖c4 16.♙f8 ♞f8, and Black has sufficient compensation for the exchange.

14...♙e7 15.♙e7 ♞g8

Spassky: Better was 15...♞h8, aiming to bring the rook into play immediately after 16...♔g8.

Larsen: It is difficult to say whether 15...♞h8 would have been better. I thought that in one variation after ...♖f6, ♙f6, a tempo might be gained with ...gf6.

16.♞fd1 ♖c6 17.♞d7 ♖e5 18.♞b7 ♖c4



19. ♖e4

Spassky: (!) Black has a difficult position. Bad now is 19... ♖b2 on account of 20. ♗c5 with advantage for White.

Larsen: (!) A very strong move. Now 19... ♖b2 would be weak, since with 20. ♖g5 ♔g6 21. ♕h1 White would attack vigorously. In this variation Black's king would need the g8-square for retreat, so probably it would have been better to put the rook at h8 at the 15th move.

19... ♖a5 20. ♗d7 ♖c6 21. f4 ♗c8 22. ♗c1

Spassky: Also good was the simple 22. ♗ad1 ♗c7 23. ♕h4 and Black can hardly save the position.

Larsen: Probably the strongest. With the move in the game White prevents 22. ♗c1, which would have been followed by 22... ♗c7 23. ♗c7 ♖c7 24. ♗c5, as well as 22... ♖e7, as after 23. ♗e7 ♗c7 24. ♗c7 ♖c7 White would win a pawn by 25. b4.


22... a5

Spassky: 22... ♗c7 will not do in view of 23. ♗c7 ♖c7 24. ♗c5. In the case of 22... ♖e7 23. ♗e7 ♗c7 instead, White obtains an advantage by means of 24. ♗c7 ♖c7 25. b4.

23. a3 ♔g6

Larsen: (!?) This move and the next five left me pressed for time. When I decided on this move by the king, I in fact that that the continuation 23... ♖e7 24. ♗e7 ♗c7 was objectively the best one, after which Black would still have good drawing prospects.

24. ♕g2 ♗h8



Larsen: All things considered, 24...♖e7 was better here.

25.♕f3

Spassky: I rejected the variation 25.♖g1 ♜e7 26.♕f3 ♜h6 27.♞e7 ♞c7 28.♞c7 ♜c7 29.♜d6 ♞f8 30.♜c4 ♞b8 31.♞d1, considering it to be too prosaic. However, precisely this technical continuation gave White a clear advantage, sufficient for victory. Instead of this I decided to begin a combinational attack on the position of Larsen's king, at the same time presenting my opponent with good counter-chances.

25...♞h2

Larsen: It is better to have a worse position with an extra pawn, than a worse position without it.

26.♜g5

Spassky: The tempting 26.♙f8 does not bring success in view of 26...♜h7 27.♞f7 ♜g8 28.♜g5 ♜d8!.

26...e5

Spassky: (!)

Larsen: In this way Black makes room for his knight and maybe for his king too.

27.♞g1 ef4

Larsen: Is White threatening mate? No, so onward with courage! Actually, I was worried about the move that Spassky did play.


28.♙d6

Spassky: (!) In this lies the idea of the move 25.♕f3. Now Black has to solve the problem of his king, which, taking into consideration the approaching time trouble, is a far from simple matter.

28...♜d6

Larsen: Though I did not wish to exchange my knight for the bishop, whose passive position was my only consolation, there was no other choice. At this point I had only nine minutes left before the time control.

29.♖d6 f6 30.♗e6



30...♔f5

Spassky: Characteristic of Larsen. Possibly, the objectively strongest continuation was 30...♔h7. But Larsen boldly meets the complications head-on.

Larsen: At the edge of the board the king was in just as much danger as in the centre. With five minutes remaining I decided to attack. I did not see how my king could be mated, for example 31.♗g7 ♔e5, since 32.♖e6 (32.♖g6 ♗d4!) 32...♔d5 would be good for Black. Instead, Spassky played more strongly.

31.♗f4

Spassky: I spent a lot of time on the calculations of the variations associated with 31.♗g7 ♔e5 32.♖e6 ♔d5 33.♖d1 ♔c4 34.♗f5 ♔b3 and ultimately preferred a clear path, leading to White's advantage.

31...♗e5

Larsen/Spassky: Mate in 2 moves was threatened 32.e4 ♔e5 33.♖d5#.


32.♔e2 ♖e8

Spassky: (!) In serious time trouble Larsen conducts the defence with great skill. Bad was 32...g5 on account of 33.♗d5.

Larsen: (?) In time pressure one notices less. I saw that 32...g5?? would have been followed by 33.♗d5 with the advantage for White, so I decided on this 'clever' move when I had only two minutes left for eight moves. But I really felt that my position was not so weak; only the clock made

me nervous. The right continuation was 32...♖c4! and after 33.♞d5 ♔e4 34.♞g7 ♘e3 35.♞e7 White would have to hold the draw. Another good move was 34...♞e8.

33.♞b6



Spassky: Some commentators suggested here the move 33.♘e6, having in mind the variation 33...♞e6 34.e4 ♔e4 35.♞e6. However, White's position is hardly sufficient for a win. After the move in the game, White retains a slight advantage.

Larsen: (?) At this moment Spassky had eleven minutes! With 33.♘e6! White would still have some prospects, since Black must play 33...♖c4. In the ensuing rook endgame after 34.♘g7 ♔e5 35.♘e8 Black would have trouble ensuring a draw.

RR: In fact, 33.♘e6? is unsound. After 33...♞e6 34.e4 Black should continue, instead of 34...♔e4, 34...♔f4! when after 35.♞e6 ♘f3! both 36...♘g1 and 36...♘d4 are threatened. After 36.♞d1 (36.♔f1 ♘g1 37.♔g1 ♞h5) 36...♘d4 37.♞d4 cd4 38.♞b6 ♞h3 White's position is difficult. - Griffin.

33...♘c4 34.♞b3

Spassky: 34...♞e3 was also threatened.

34...g5 35.♘d5 ♞e5

Larsen: In answer to 36.♞c1 I intended to play 36...♘d6. My position was good, but the darned clock!

36.♞d1 g4

Larsen: Suddenly another attacker has appeared. If I only had as much time as Spassky, who still had five whole minutes...

37.♔f1

Spassky: (??) The natural move 37.♘b6 retained a slight advantage for White. The move in the game

is instead a catastrophic mistake, violating the normal course of the struggle in this dramatic and rather interesting game.

Larsen: I could not believe my eyes! Probably 37.♖b6 would secure a draw, although Black would have an interesting possibility in 37...a4!. After 38.♗c4 ab3 39.♗e5 fe5 the rook ending would perhaps be a win for Black, since the threat of a breakthrough with ...g4-g3 or ...c4-c3 would be very strong. However, after 38.♗a4 g3 White's position would be very difficult. For instance: 39.♕f3? g2 (RR: simply 39...gf2 followed by 40...♗e3 appears to win by force.- Griffin.)

40.♖bd3 ♖e4 with numerous threats, and 39.♖f1 would have been followed by 39...♗d6 40.♗c3 ♕g4 etc.

37...♖h1 38.♕e2 ♖d1

White resigned. **0 : 1**

Larsen: What really happened? I do not know how I won this game. Whenever reporters ask me who influenced me most I almost always mention Lasker and Nimzowitsch. This game would probably be closer to Lasker's style.

[Larsen/Spassky]

Board 2

Robert Fischer – Tigran Petrosian [B 15]

'Rest of the World' - USSR

1.e4 c6 2.d4 d5 3.♗c3

Fischer: I did not wish to repeat the variation I played in the first game. I have explained in my notes on that game where Black could have played better.

3...g6

Petrosian: A relatively little-studied continuation, perhaps no worse than the approved 3...de4.

4.e5

Fischer: I think that this is a bad move. 4.h3 is probably the strongest, but I thought that Black might have some improvement, so I chose the other sequel avoiding simplification.

4...♗g7 5.f4 h5

Fischer: The best move, otherwise Black is hemmed in on the king-side.

Petrosian: In this way Black secures for himself the possibility of exchanging the c8-bishop, after which the light-squared pawn formation in the presence of the dark-squared bishop allows him to believe in the durability of his position and in the hope of creating sufficient counter-play.


6.♗f3 ♗g4

Fischer: I expected 6...♗h6, but after 7.♗d3 ♗f5 I think that White has the better prospects.

7.h3 ♗f3 8.♖f3 e6

Petrosian: After 8...h4 there would naturally have followed 9.f5, after which the f-file would have been the cause of many worries for Black.

9.g3



Fischer: I did not wish to allow 9.♙e2 h4! and White comes to a standstill on the king-side.

9...♜b6!

Fischer: Black does not allow White a normal development with 10.♙e3 and 11.0-0-0.

10.♜f2 ♘e7 11.♙d3 ♘d7 12.♘e2

Fischer: (?) Passive. 12.♙d2 with the intention of 13.0-0-0 was better, and if 12...♘f5 13.♙f5 followed by 14.0-0-0 etc. with a slight advantage.

12...0-0-0

Petrosian: One must pay attention to the fact that White is slightly behind in development. Admittedly, while the play is of a closed character White is threatened with nothing, but after all, Black's position is sufficiently dynamic that he can try to open the game and thereby create the preconditions for the activation of his better-developed army.

13.c3 f6

Petrosian: (!)


14.b3

Fischer: White wishes to answer 14...♜df8 with 15.♙a3.

14...♘f5 15.♜g1

Fischer: 15.0-0 was simpler, since in any case White is going that way with his king

15...c5



Petrosian: (!) White must act cautiously, in order not to fall into trouble. Correctly assessing the situation, Fischer goes over to defence.

16.♘f5

Fischer: With 16.g4? hg4 17.hg4 ♖e7 I was afraid that Black would have too much initiative.

Petrosian: First and foremost White exchanges Black's currently most active piece - the knight at f5.

16...gxf5 17.♙e3 ♚a6

Petrosian: (!) It is now clear that the white king cannot castle.

18.♔f1


Fischer: After 18.♚f3! I feared 18...fe5 19.fe5 ♙e5(?) 20.de5 ♖e5 but after 21.♚f1 White could probably defend himself successfully.

18...cd4

Fischer: 18...♗b8! was better, as Petrosian suggested after the game, and White could answer 19.♚e1 with equal prospects.

Petrosian: A doubtful move. The correct plan of play consisted in the transfer of the bishop to e7, in order to maintain the threat of the exchange at d4. Simultaneously, at e7 the bishop supports the possible advance of the h-pawn.

19.cd4 ♖b8 20.♔g2 ♖c6



21. ♖c1

Fischer: (!) White intends to bring his knight to the ideal square d3.

Petrosian: (!) Once and for all preventing the invasion of the black queen at d3.

21... ♜d7

Petrosian: (?!) Still another artificial move. It was necessary to be consistent, and to play 21... ♔b8 followed by ... ♜c8.

22. ♕d2

Fischer: 22. ♜d1 with the intention of 23. ♖d3 was probably better.

Petrosian: (!) Now White threatens to establish the knight at d3, after which Black will have to reckon both with the threat of ♖c5 as well as with the possibility of the exchange at f6 followed by ♖d3-e5.

22... ♕a5

Fischer: Otherwise, Black might get into trouble on the queen-side.

23. ♕a5

Fischer: White cannot avoid an exchange of queens since on 23. ♕b2 Black can choose between 23... ♕a6 or 23... ♜f8 or something else, and after 23. ♕e2 there follows 23... ♜fe5! 24. de5 (or 24. ♜fe5 ♕c3 etc.) 24... d4! and ...d4-d3! etc.

23... ♖a5 24. ♖d3 ♖c6

Fischer: 24... b6 was simpler.

25. ♜ac1


Fischer: 25. ♖c5 ♜e7 26. ♜ac1 was better, with a certain initiative. The text move gives Black the

chance to use his rook for opposition on the c-file.

25...♖c7

Petrosian: The rook has found a way to remain in touch with the e-file. A draw is imminent.

26.♖c3 b6 27.♖gc1 ♔b7



28.♗b4

Fischer: I did not see how to make further progress after 28.b4 a6! 29.a4 ♖hc8 and now 30.b5? ab5 31.ab5 ♗a7 and the b-pawn is weakened, or 30.a5 ♗d8! and after the exchange of rooks Black's king threatens to invade at b5.

White cannot play 30.♔f3?? because of 30...♗e5, or if 30.♔f2, 30...♗f8 etc.

28...♖hc8 29.♖c6 ♖c6 30.♖c6 ♖c6 31.♗c6 ♔c6 32.♔f3

Agreed drawn. ½ : ½


[Fischer/Petrosian]

Board 3

Viktor Korchnoi – Lajos Portisch [C 90]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.e4 e5 2.♗f3 ♗c6 3.♗b5 a6 4.♗a4 ♗f6 5.0-0 ♗e7 6.♖e1 b5 7.♗b3 d6



8.h3

Kortschnoi: (?) Having been watching the game Geller - Gligorić, I forgot about my ‘Spanish’ bishop.

Portisch: (?) This move is a fingerfehler. Korchnoi, who was watching the opening of the other games, automatically moved the pawn, forgetting that he had not yet played c2-c3.

8...♞a5

Korchnoi: Now Black has easy play and every chance of achieving an advantage in the middlegame.

9.♞c3 0-0 10.d3

Portisch: In a closed position the lack of the ‘Spanish’ bishop is not so important, so it is easy to understand why Korchnoi chose this move.

10...♞e8 11.♙g5

Korchnoi: The only thing of which White can dream is to exchange as many pieces as possible, and in particular, one of the black bishops, for example 11...♙b7 12.♙f6! ♙f6 13.♞d5.


However, even after White having achieved this possibility, Black would have retained the advantage - he still has the strong light-squared bishop.

11...c6

Portisch: If 11...h6 then 12.♙f6 ♙f6 13.♞d5 with an approximately equal game.

12.♞e2 h6 13.♙d2 ♞b3 14.ab3 ♙f8 15.♞g3 c5

Korchnoi: Played in order not to permit d3-d4. Black ought not to have hurried with this move. More accurate is 15...g6. In the case of 16.d4, Black could reply 16...ed4 17.♞d4 ♙b7, threatening ...c6-c5 and creating serious pressure on White’s centre.



Korchnoi: For White it is in principle favourable to close the position; after all, the strength of bishops is in open situations.

Portisch: (!) Against the threat of ...d6-d5.

16...b4

Korchnoi: (?) For the above-mentioned reason, the move played by Black deserves serious censure. Correct was 16...♖b8, with a minimal advantage for Black. Instead now the advantage passes to White.

Portisch: (??) A serious positional mistake. Black blocks the queen-side and gives White a free hand on the king's wing, where all the action will take place. Instead of this mistake, Black could maintain the tension with 16...♖b8, having at least equal prospects. Thus, for White f2-f4 would be a more uncertain follow-up than in the game, since he would have to watch out for the weak pawn at b2.

17.♘h2

Portisch: (!)

17...♘h7 18.♘g4 ♖a7 19.f4 ef4

Korchnoi: Black had evidently intended, either now or at the following move, to play the queen to h4, but at the last moment refrained from it on account of 20.♘f5!.

20.♙f4 ♘f6


Portisch: After 20...♗h4 there would follow the very strong move 21.♘f5!.

21.♘h2 ♘d7 22.♗d2 ♘e5 23.♖f1 ♔h7 24.♖f2 g6 25.♖af1 ♙g7 26.♔h1

Portisch: Of course White does not take the pawn with 26.♙e5 since after 26...♙e5 27.♖f7 ♖f7 28.♖f7 ♔g8 followed by ...♗g5 Black would have excellent play for his pawn.

Korchnoi: To win a pawn by 26.♙e5 ♘e5 27.♖f7 ♖f7 28.♖f7 ♔g8 29.♖f3 is not good. After 29...♚g5! Black's game is better.

26...♖e7 27.♙e3



Portisch: (!)

27...♚h8

Korchnoi: Black seeks the possibility of activating his pieces, but he does not succeed in doing so.

Portisch: This manoeuvre appears to be out of place, but Black had to do something to counter the threat of d3-d4.

28.♖f4

Portisch: (!)

Korchnoi: The manoeuvre of the white rook has the aim of provoking a new weakening on the king's flank.

28...♔g8 29.♖h4 h5 30.♙g5 ♖eb7 31.♖hf4 ♘c6 32.♙f6

Portisch: (!) Black's most active piece is lost in an exchange, and now the square f6 will be very weak.

32...♚h6 33.♙g7 ♔g7 34.♘f3 ♔h8 35.h4

Korchnoi: Possible was 35.♖f7 ♚d2 36.♖f8, winning a pawn, but hardly the game, since for Black there appears strong pressure on the queen's flank. Most energetic of all was 35.d4, opening the centre to White's clear advantage (35...g5? 36.♖h4!).

With the move in the text White gives control of the square g4 to the black pieces makes the realisation of the advantage more complicated.


Portisch: (!) With 35.♖f7 ♔d2 36.♖f8 ♔g7 37.♗d2 White might have acquired a pawn, but Black would have some compensation in 37...♙e6, and what is more important, the pressure would have been released.

35...♙g4 36.♗g5 ♖g7 37.♖f6 ♖d7 38.♗f2 ♔g8 39.♗f4 ♗e5

Portisch: 39...♖ac7! would have been better, since the threat of 40.♖d6 was not a serious one because of 40...♗e5!, and Black naturally gains compensation for the pawn. Naturally, White need not necessarily have taken the pawn, but since Korchnoi was running short of time, it was a good moment to try to set a trap.

RR: Had Korchnoi fallen into this ‘trap’, the game could have come to an abrupt end. After 41.♖g6! White wins immediately. - Griffin.

40.♗d2 ♗c6



41.♖f2

Korchnoi: The sealed move. White’s position is better, but to win is not a simple matter. White now intends the transfer of the knight from g3 to d5. Were he to succeed in this, he would easily achieve victory. Deserving attention too is the pawn sacrifice 41.e5 ♗e5 42.d4, but it was difficult to decide on it as the sealed move, while I did not want to repeat the position, since on 41.♗f4 ♗e5 42.♗d2 Black could have given up a pawn with 42...♙e6!, and obtained counter-play.

Portisch: (!) I was worried about the possibility of 41.e5!?, which would best be answered by 41...♗e5 42.d4 cd4 43.♗d4 ♖ac7! 44.♗5e4 ♙e6 with complications. Likewise after 44.♗3e4 ♙f5 45.c5 ♗g4 46.cd6 ♖c8! the situation is not clear. Therefore, Korchnoi’s sealed move is better, since Black’s position remains difficult, while White can quietly prepare a decisive blow.

41...♖ac7 42.♔g1 a5 43.♗f1

Portisch: (!) White consistently carries out his plan, even at the cost of possible sacrifices. chessstouring.com


43...♙f5

Portisch: (!) Under the circumstances, Black had no other choice, for otherwise he would not have been able to prevent ♗f1-e3-d5.

44.♖6f5 g5 45.ef5 ♘e5 46.♗e3 ♜c8

Korchnoi: Or 46...f6 47.♗e6 ♚g3 48.♗d5 with a clear advantage.

47.f6 ♚h6



Portisch: Now 47...♚g6 would be followed by 48.♖f5, and Black is helpless!

48.♗f5

Korchnoi: (?) In time-trouble haste, White hurries to regain the sacrificed exchange and loses the advantage. Correct was 48.♖f5 ♜e8 49.♗e4 ♗g6 50.♖g5 ♜e5 51.♗f5 and Black is in difficulty.

Portisch: (?) Pressed for time White, forfeits his advantage with this move. After 48.♖f5! White could have won.


48...♚g6 49.♗e7 ♜e7 50.f6 ♜e8 51.♗e4

Korchnoi: (?) Better was 51.d4. Now however, the advantage is gained by Black.

51...♗g4 52.♖f3 ♜e7 53.♚f4 ♜e6 54.♖f1

Portisch: This move, too, is the result of the time scramble.

54...♗e5



Korchnoi: (!) Black threatens 55...♗d3, and no satisfactory defence to this is apparent.

55.♗d6

Portisch: (?) Now White obtains an unsatisfactory endgame.

In this position almost any other move would have been better.

55...♗d3 56.♙f7 ♚f7 57.♗f7 ♗b2 58.♗d8

Korchnoi: White's position is hopeless. The natural 58.♗g5 loses after 58...♙e3 59.♙f3 ♙f3 60.gf3 a4 61.ba4 ♗a4 62.♗e4 b3 63.♗d2 b2 64.♗b1 ♗b6 65.♙f2 ♗c4 66.♙e2 ♙f7 67.♙d3 ♗e5 68.♙c2 ♗f3 etc. or 59.♙a1 a4 60.ba4 ♙a3!.

Portisch: If 58.♗g5 then Black would win with 58...♙e3 59.♙f3 ♙f3 60.gf3 a4 61.ba4 ♗a4.

58...♙b6


Portisch: (!)

59.♙f5 ♗d3 60.♙d5 ♗c1 61.♙c5 ♗b3 62.♙b5

Korchnoi: More tenacious is 62.♙c6.

Portisch: The prospects are no better with 62.♙g5 since after 62...♙f8 63.c5 ♗c5! 64.♙c5 b3 Black's pawns would have the final say, and the result would be the same after 62.♙c8 ♙g7.

62...♙b5 63.cb5 ♗c5



Portisch: White has no defence, for 64. ♖c6 would be followed by 64...b3 65. ♗e7 ♔f7 66. ♗d5 a4 and Black's pawns advance.

White resigned. **0 : 1**

[Korchnoi/Portisch]

Board 4

Vlastimil Hort – Lev Polugaevsky [A 46]

'Rest of the World' - USSR

1.d4

Hort: In this game everything went the way I did not want it do. First of all, I began 10 minutes late as I had over-slept, and after that I could not make myself concentrate. My other problem during the game was how to proceed in our match with the score of 1½:½, playing White.

I chose a variation that Dr. Trifunović often played. To my regret, I must admit that I lacked courage in this game and preferred to wait for my opponent to take the initiative.

1... ♗f6 2. ♗f3 e6 3. ♕g5 h6 4. ♕h4

Polugaevsky: White is in a quiet mood. The principled continuation was 4. ♕f6 ♔f6 5.e4, with a complicated game. White has the centre, while Black has the two bishops.

The position is dynamic. Such a path has already been encountered in practice.

4...b6

Polugaevsky: Black did not want to risk too much with 4...g5 5. ♕g3 ♗h5.

5. ♗bd2 ♕b7 6.e3 ♕e7 7.h3

Hort: 7...g5 along with ...g5-g4 would have been rather uncomfortable.

Polugaevsky: White is attentive. If immediately 7.♘d3, then 7...g5 8.♘g3 g4.

7...♘e4


Hort: This move shows that Polugaevsky was not in a fighting move either. The text move indicates that Black intends to prevent 8.♘d3.

Polugaevsky: The simplest path to equality.

8.♘e7 ♔e7 9.♘e4

Polugaevsky: Equivalent to playing for a draw. White could obtain a more complicated position by means of 9.♘d3, but this, evidently, did not come into his plans.

9...♘e4 10.c3 0-0 11.♘d3 ♘d3



Hort: At this juncture Black offered a draw, saving his strength for the next game where he would have the white pieces.

Polugaevsky: The opponents agreed on a draw. The position has been so simplified that further attempts on one of their parts could hardly have changed anything.

Agreed drawn. ½ : ½

[Hort/Polugaevsky]

Board 5

Efim Geller – Svetozar Gligorić [C 93]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

Geller: In the present game Gligorić significantly strengthened the defence and found, in comparison with the previous games between us, perhaps the best disposition of his forces.

1.e4 e5 2.♘f3 ♘c6 3.♘b5 a6 4.♘a4 ♘f6 5.0-0 ♘e7 6.♔e1 b5 7.♘b3 d6 8.c3 0-0 9.h3 h6 10.d4 ♔e8


chesstouring.com

11.♖bd2 ♘f8 12.♗f1 ♘b7 13.♗g3 ♗a5 14.♙c2 ♗c4 15.b3 ♗b6 16.♙b2 c5

Geller: In this way Gligorić played against me in Sochi and this move, in my opinion, is the best in the given situation.

Gligorić: In the 1st round Black played 16...♗bd7 at this point, but with the immediate advance of the pawns Black will feel safer on the queen-side.

17.de5 de5 18.c4



18...♗bd7

Geller: But this move is already new. In the above-mentioned game 18...♙c7 occurred.

Gligorić: (!) An improvement in comparison with the game between the same players in Sochi (1968), where 18...♙c7 was played.

19.♙e2

Gligorić: After 19.cb5 ab5 20.♙d3 ♙b6 21.♙e2 ♙c6 Black easily protects the important squares.

19...b4 20.♖ad1 ♙a5

Gligorić: (!) Gaining a tempo to transfer both rooks to the e-file.

21.♙b1 ♖e6

Geller: (!)

Gligorić: (!) An excellent manoeuvre, protecting the king's side and at the same time lending support to the sensitive e5-pawn.

22.♗f5 ♖ae8 23.♗e3 ♗b8

Gligorić: It is now easy for Black to conduct the principal manoeuvre for consolidating this type of position.

24. ♖d5 ♗c6

Glorigić: With the pieces deployed in this manner, the position is absolutely equal.

25. ♜d2

Glorigić: Draw. After 25... ♗d4 White can adopt the same tactics with 26. ♖d1.

Agreed drawn. ½ : ½

[Geller/Glorigić]

Board 6

Samuel Reshevsky – Vasily Smyslov [C 98]

‘Rest of the World’ - USSR

1.e4

Reshevsky: Though I rarely begin a game with 1.e4, this time I chose this possibility for psychological reasons, believing that it would surprise Smyslov.

1...e5 2. ♗f3 ♗c6 3. ♘b5 a6 4. ♘a4 ♗f6 5. 0-0 ♙e7 6. ♜e1 b5 7. ♘b3 d6 8. c3 0-0 9. h3 ♗a5

Smyslov: I have had to test various systems of defence in the Spanish Game. In the present encounter I decided to refrain from the move 9...h6, since recently Reshevsky has often played this way with Black.

10. ♙c2 c5 11. d4 ♗c6 12. ♗bd2 ♜c7

Smyslov: An ancient treatment of the variation, having its roots in the creative legacy of Chigorin.

13. dc5 dc5 14. ♗f1 ♙e6 15. ♗e3 ♜ad8 16. ♜e2 c4


Smyslov: This continuation had been met with several times in my practice, and evidently it guarantees Black a level game.

17. ♗f5 ♜fe8 18. ♙g5 ♗d7 19. ♙e7

Reshevsky: (!) Usually 19. ♗e7 is played here, the idea being to keep the two bishops. The strategy begun with the text move, though perhaps not new, is in any case rarely used.

RR: The continuation 19. ♗e7 ♗e7 20. a4 had been seen in the game Vasiukov - Smyslov (37th USSR Championship, Moscow 1969). - Griffin.

19... ♗e7 20. ♗g5



Reshevsky: The intention, then, is to open an attack on Black's castled position. White's idea is to put Black on the defensive with ♖e2-h5, or ♖e2-g4 along with ♜e1-e3.

20...♘g6

Reshevsky: The purpose of this move is to get White to move his pawn to the g3-square. After that White's rook cannot reach the g-file! Otherwise after 20...h6 there would be some weaknesses on Black's king-side. For instance, 21.♘e6 fe6 22.♘e3 etc.

21.g3 h6 22.♘e6 fe6 23.♘e3 ♘c5

Smyslov: The doubled pawns on the e-file reliably cover the squares d4 and d5, while the slight weakening of the pawn chain can hardly be exploited by White.


24.♞ad1 ♞d1 25.♞d1 ♞d8 26.b4

Reshevsky: (!) White has the superior position. The point is that Black must take on b3 and thus allow White's bishop to become active. If Black avoids taking and plays, say, 26...♘b7, White will continue with 27.a4 and bring his bishop into play on the king's wing. Meanwhile Black's minor pieces will be poorly placed.

26...cb3

Smyslov: Also deserving attention is 26...♞d1 27.♞d1 ♘d7, not releasing White's bishop into freedom.

27.♞d8 ♞d8 28.ab3 ♞d6 29.b4 ♘d7 30.♞b3 ♘f6 31.♘g4



Smyslov: After lengthy consideration Reshevsky finds an interesting manoeuvre, the merits of which I did not appreciate during the game.

31...♘g4

Reshevsky: (?) A losing move. 31...♘d7 should be played. Even after that White would stand better, but also a long fight ahead to take advantage of his chance.

Smyslov: (?) This reckless exchange leads Black into great difficulties.

Correct was to reply 31...♘f8 32.♘f6 (or 32.♙f3 ♘g4 33.♙g4 ♔f7) 32...gxf6 33.♙e3 ♙c7! and Black's position is perfectly defensible.

32.♙g4 ♘f8 33.♙f5

Reshevsky: (!) The winning move. Black is in zugzwang.

Smyslov: (!) Here is the insidious move that places Black in a position of zugzwang. If now 33...♔h8 34.♙f7 and Black is left only with king moves. I preferred to give up a pawn and to go over to a difficult queen endgame.


33...♙c7

Reshevsky: If 33...♔h8 34.♙f7 and Black is left in zugzwang.

34.♙e6 ♘e6 35.♙e6 ♔f8

Smyslov: Somewhat better was 35...♔h7.

36.♙a6 ♙c3 37.♙b5 ♙e1 38.♔g2 ♙e4 39.♔h2 ♔e7 40.♙c5 ♔e6 41.♙c8



41...♔f7

Smyslov: The sealed move. If 41...♔e7, then 42.♕g4. The endgame is won for White, thanks to the strong passed pawn.

42.♕d7 ♔g8 43.b5

Reshevsky: The queen must be on d7 at the moment when White plays b4-b5 because if the queen had been at c8, Black's queen would have gone to d4.

43...♕c2 44.♕d5 ♔h7 45.♔g2 e4 46.♕d4

Reshevsky: The winning move!

46...♔g8 47.b6 ♕b3 48.♕c5

Reshevsky: The threat is 49.♕c8 ♔h7 50.b7 e3 51.♕f5 ♔g8! and Black can still hold on.

48...♕b2 49.♕c6

Smyslov: (!) Weaker is 49.♕c8 ♔h7 50.b7 e3 51.♕f5 ♔g8! and Black can still hold on.

49...♔f7 50.h4 g6 51.♕c7 ♔e6

Smyslov: Or 51...♔f6 52.b7 e3 53.♕f4 and 54.b8♕.

52.♕h7 ♕f6 53.♕h6 ♕f3 54.♔g1

Black resigned. **1 : 0**

[*Reshevsky/Smyslov*]

The 3rd round in progress.

Board 7

Mark Taimanov – Wolfgang Uhlmann [D 80]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 g6 3.♘c3 d5 4.♙g5 ♘e4 5.♙h4 c5 6.cd5 ♘c3 7.bc3 ♚d5 8.e3


Taimanov: Thus, the theoretical debate, begun in the duel of the first game, continues! Then, after 8...cd4 9.♚d4 ♚d4 10.cd4 there arose an endgame that is clearly favourable for White. It was obvious that if Uhlmann had again gone in for this variation, he must have prepared some sort of improvement. What, then, was it?

8...♙g7 9.♚f3 ♚d8

Uhlmann: (!)

Taimanov: Here is the answer to the question that was posed. Uhlmann avoids the exchange of queens, considering, probably, that in the middlegame Black has more active possibilities than in the endgame. I can frankly say that I expected just such a development of events and for my part had prepared a counter-surprise.

10.♙b5 ♘d7 11.♘e2



11...0-0

Taimanov: This natural move is, in my opinion, the principal cause of Black's later difficulties. In preparation for the game I considered the preliminary exchange 11...cd4 12.ed4 (12.cd4? ♖a5), and only now 12...0-0, to be obligatory.

Uhlmann: A serious possibility was 11...cd4 12.ed4 0-0 13.0-0 ♘f6, equalising.

12.0-0 a6 13.♙d3 ♜b8

Taimanov: Of course, not 13...♘e5 14.de5 ♚d3 in view of 15.♙e7.

14.a4 b6

Uhlmann: 14...♘f6 would have been better.

15.♞fd1 ♚e8

Taimanov: Too optimistically played. Uhlmann counts on preparing the undermining ...e7-e5, but clearly under-estimated White's reply. He ought to have more quickly completed development with 15...♙b7, although in this case too after 16.♙e4 ♙e4 17.♚e4 ♘f6 18.♚d3 ♚c8 19.♙g3 ♜a8 20.♞ab1 White's position is better.

16.♙e4

Taimanov: (!) A manoeuvre that is very unpleasant for Black. Now, in view of the threat of 17.♙c6, his development is difficult and he suddenly proves to be in a dangerous situation.


16...e5

Taimanov: (?) A consistent, but mistaken decision. He ought to have reconciled himself to a worse, but still sound position after 16...♘f6 17.♙f6 ef6 (17...♙f6 18.♙c6) 18.♙c6 ♚e7 19.♘f4.

Uhlmann: (?) The best defence was 16...♘f6 17.♙c6 ♙d7 18.♙d7 ♘d7 19.♚c6 with a better position for White. If White decides instead on 17.♙f6, then after 17...ef6 he again has slightly the better

prospects

17.♙c6 ♖e6 18.♙g3



Uhlmann: (!)

Taimanov: (!) A tragi-comic situation. With a full board, Black is virtually in zugzwang and does not have a satisfactory defence against the threat of 19.♙d7 ♙d7 20.♙e5 winning a pawn. Uhlmann thought for more than an hour in this critical situation, but he could not find a way to free himself.

18...♞d8

Uhlmann: After 18...♞e8 there follows 19.de5 and if 19...♙e5 then 20.♘f4 ♖e7 21.♙d7 ♙d7 22.♘d5 ♖e6 23.♙e5 ♖e5 24.♘f6 winning a piece. If Black after 20.♘f4 plays 20...♖f5 then there follows 21.e4, winning. Black is almost in zugzwang.


19.de5 ♙e5 20.♙d5 ♖e7 21.♖f7 ♖f7 22.♙f7 ♘f7 23.♙e5

Taimanov: Thus, with a little combination White has won a pawn, retaining the better position. For him to win the game should now have been a matter of uncomplicated technique. But in the further course of events, much that was unexpected was still to take place...

23...♞b7 24.♙f4

Taimanov: A logical manoeuvre. White prepares the strengthening of the centre with f2-f3 plus e3-e4.

24...♞e8 25.f3 c4



Taimanov: In the case of 25...♖e5 26.♙e5 ♜e5 27.e4 White's task would have been quite simple.

26.♞d4

Taimanov: (?) Retrospectively, this move merits censure. But during the game it was difficult to hold back from it. It was very tempting to provoke the move 26...b5, while a pawn sacrifice on the part of Black seemingly did not bring him any direct benefits. All the same, he should not have been greedy. Simply 26.e4 ♘c5 27.♙e3 ♘d3 28.♞db1 guaranteed a slow but sure victory.

Uhlmann: A much stronger move would have been 26.e4, possibly followed by 26...♘c5 27.♙e3!, and the sacrifice of the knight with 27...♖e4 would be misjudged because of 28.fe4 ♜e4 29.♞f1! ♔g8 (or 29...♔e8) 30.♙h6, winning.

26...♘c5

Taimanov: (!) This move does honour to my opponent's intuition. Uhlmann has subtly sensed the character of the position and takes the only correct decision - activation of his forces at any cost!

27.♞c4 ♙e6 28.♞b4 a5 29.♞b2 ♙d7 30.♞ba2

Taimanov: I had confidently gone in for this position when winning the second pawn. Black's initiative has seemingly reached a dead end and if White were to play e3-e4 and ♙f4-e3 the game would be decided. Alas, it turns out that Black's resources have still not been exhausted.

30...♘b3 31.♞d1 ♘c5 32.♞d4 ♘e6 33.♞c4 g5

Uhlmann: (!)

34.♙d6 ♘c5 35.♘d4

Taimanov: Having repulsed the threat of 35...♙e6, White has seemingly solved all of the problems. But all the same Uhlmann finds a possibility of counter-play!

Uhlmann: White should have played 35.♞d4, as after 35...♞e3 36.♔f2 ♜e8 37.♘g3 he would still have

a winning position.


35...♖a4

Uhlmann: (!)

36.♜ca4 ♘a4 37.♜a4 ♜e3

Taimanov: This position has arisen virtually by force after the win of a second pawn by White. It may be stated that the significant part of White's advantage has been lost. But was it really humanly possible to have predicted this? I think that neither Uhlmann, who played this part of the game in inspired fashion, nor I, who was 'sailing with the tide', knew what would come from the fascinating skirmish between the wooden pieces that seemed to have taken on a life of their own.

38.♗b5 ♜e1 39.♔f2 ♜b1 40.c4



Taimanov: (?) While this is already an obvious mistake. This is not accidental.

When the situation on the board has unexpectedly changed, a chessplayer often loses confidence. Chances of victory, although already problematic, were retained only by the move 40.♗d4.

40...♜d7

Taimanov: Now 41...♜b5 is threatened, and White is forced to open new highways for the black rooks.

41.♘e5 ♜d2 42.♔e3

Taimanov: 42.♔g3 will not do, in view of 42...♜g1 43.♔g4 ♔g6!.

Uhlmann: If 42.♔g3 then 42...♜g1 and White might have serious difficulties.

42...♜g2 43.♔e4 ♜b4

Uhlmann: (!)

Taimanov: (!) A correct decision. Although Uhlmann goes in for the exchange of an active rook for a passive one, he creates a dangerous passed pawn that restricts the activity of the white pieces.


44.♖b4 ab4 45.♗d4 ♔e7

Taimanov: Again an excellent plan. There is only one white enemy left, the c4-pawn which could gain in strength if its opponent, the pawn at b6, were to fall. Therefore Uhlmann brings up the king, preventing the manoeuvre ♔e4-d5-c6.

46.♗c7

Taimanov: It is clear that on 46.♔d5 there would have followed 46...♔d7, while on 46.♗c6 ♔e6 is sufficiently good.

46...♔d7 47.♗b6



47...b3

Taimanov: (!) Again, very resourcefully played! In the case of the automatic 47...♖h2, Black could still have experienced difficulties

48.♗b3 ♖b2

Taimanov: Now a slight material advantage passes to the side of Black. Admittedly, it proves insufficient.

49.♗e3

Uhlmann: After 49.♗c5 ♔c6 50.♗a7 ♖a2 White secures a draw with 51.♗e6.


49...♖b3 50.♗g5 ♖c3 51.♗h6 ♖c4 52.♔f5

Taimanov: White's king rushes towards the h7-pawn - Black's only reserve. It is difficult to hinder this.

52...♞c2 53.h4 ♜f2 54.f4 ♔e8 55.♔g5 ♞g2 56.♔h5 ♞g6 57.♙g5 ♔f7 58.f5 ♞c6 59.f6 ♔e6 60.♔h6

Taimanov: The aim is achieved and a draw is unavoidable.

60...♞c7 61.♙e3



Taimanov: This sealed move underlines most convincingly of all White's defensive possibilities. After 61...♔f6 62.♙d4 ♔f5 63.h5! the black rook is tied to the defence of the h7-pawn, while the king cannot take this function, since it cannot cross the 7th rank without loss. For example, with the position of the black rook at f7 and the king at e7, there follows the move ♙g7 and the h7-pawn cannot be defended. Therefore without resuming play the opponents agreed on a draw.

Uhlmann: After 61...♔f6 62.♙d4 ♔f5 63.h5 (not immediately 63.♙g7 because of 63...♞g7 64.♔g7 h5) there is no win for Black.

½ : ½

[*Taimanov/Uhlmann*]

Board 8

Milan Matulović – Mikhail Botvinnik [B 08]

'Rest of the World' - USSR

1.e4 g6 2.d4 ♙g7 3.♘f3 d6 4.♘c3 ♘f6 5.♙e2 0-0 6.0-0 ♙g4

Matulović: At this point in the Belgrade 'Liberation' tournament (1969) Botvinnik played 6...♘c6, hoping to complicate the situation. The text move is more usual and sounder.

Botvinnik: Here Black usually plays 6...c6 or 6...♘c6.

7.♙g5

Matulović: I had experience of this move, as Polugaevsky used it against me in the 1968 Olympiad in Lugano.

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7...♖c6 8.h3

Matulović: It seemed to me that this was a better follow-up than 8.♞e1, which Polugaevsky played, since he did not gain any advantage.

Botvinnik: During the game it seemed to me that 8.♞d2 is stronger, since after the move in the text Black manages to establish control over the centre.


8...♙f3 9.♙f3 ♘d7 10.♘e2 h6 11.♙e3

Matulović: 11.♙h4 gives White nothing as Black could, with 11...g5! 12.♙g3 e6 and the threat of ...f7-f5, gain an excellent game.

11...e5 12.c3 ♘b6 13.b3

Botvinnik: (?) After this, Black acquires a slight initiative. Stronger was 13.♞c1 ♔h7 14.d5 ♘e7 15.c4 and, in view of the fact that Black is without a light-squared bishop, his natural manoeuvre ...f7-f5 is insufficiently strong.

13...d5



Matulović: A brilliant thrust in the centre, made possible by White's passive opening play. Black has no problems, and he now takes over the initiative.

14.ed5 ♘d5 15.♙d5

Botvinnik: Convinced that the opening advantage has been lost, Matulović aims at simplification.

15...♞d5 16.de5

Matulović: 16.c4 ♞a5 17.d5 ♘e7 18.♞d2 would have left things equal.

16...♞e5 17.♘d4

Matulović: White misjudges, convinced that the position is balanced. A better line would have been

17.♙c2 ♖ad8 18.♗ad1, equalising.

17...♙d5

Botvinnik: The queen should defend the c6-knight.


18.♙c1 ♔h7 19.♗d1 ♖ad8 20.♙c2 ♗fe8

Matulović: Black develops steadily, but the position is too simplified for this to yield results.

21.♗d2

Botvinnik: Better was 21.♘c6 ♙c6 22.♗d8 ♗d8 23.♗c1 followed by c3-c4, and the position is level.

21...♘d4 22.♙d4 ♙d4 23.♗d4 ♙e5



24.♗ad1

Matulović: This careless move induces Botvinnik to play to win, and this game becomes the longest in the whole match. Now Black without difficulty creates an isolated pawn at d4, which will be the source of all White's troubles. After 24.♗d2!, threatening 25.♗ad1, the position would be equalised, with a draw the only possible result.

24...♗d4

Botvinnik: Black obtains a slight advantage, since for a weak white pawn appears on the d4-square.

25.cd4

Matulović: White had overlooked the fact that 25.♗d4 would be followed by 25...♙e1 26.♔h2 ♗e2, and White would have to resign.

Botvinnik: 25.♗d4 ♙e1 26.♔h2 ♗e2 will not do.

25...♙e2 26.♗d2

Matulović: There is a saying that all rook endgames end in a draw. I was afraid, however, that this

might be the exception. After 26.♚e2 ♞e2 27.♞c1 c6 28.d5! cd5 29.♞c7 White's active rook would most probably ensure a equal endgame.


26...♚e1 27.♠h2 c6 28.♚c4

Matulović: White tries a few tricks to activate his pieces, and is succesful for a while.

28...♞e7 29.♞d3 ♠g7

Botvinnik/Matulović: Bad was 29...♚f2 on account of 30.♞f3.

30.♞f3 ♞d7 31.♚c5 a6 32.♞f4 ♞d5 33.♚c2



Matulović: (?) A serious mistake which, owing to the opponent's time pressure, passed unpunished. White should have waited with 33.♚c4 to see what Black intended to do.

33...♚e6

Matulović: It is interesting that Botvinnik did not notice the possibility of 33...♞d4!, leading to the win of a pawn and obviously to a winning position. Now after 34.♞d4 there follows 34...♚e5, and after 34.♚b2 c5 35.♞d4 ♚e5 etc.

Botvinnik: Interestingly, neither Black nor White had seen that best of all now is 33...♞d4 34.♞d4 ♚e5.

34.g3 g5

Botvinnik: Black aims to secure for himself the f6-square.


35.♞e4 ♚f6 36.h4

Matulović: Now White definitively overlooks the loss of a pawn, and a difficult struggle lies ahead. After 36.♚b2 c5 (otherwise White plays 37.♞e5) 37.♞e5! ♞d4 38.♞c5 there would be a draw.

Botvinnik: White once again commits a mistake. Possible was 36.♚b2 c5 37.♞e5! and the pawn is

saved.

36...♞d4 37.hg5 hg5 38.♞d4 ♚d4 39.♞f5 ♚d5 40.♞c8 c5 41.a4



Matulović: In a difficult position White seizes a chance, blocking Black's pawn on the queen's side, and thereby considerably improving his position.

41...♞f6

Botvinnik: The sealed move. At the same time, it is a mistake, greatly complicating the path to victory. Simplest of all was 41...b6 followed by ...♞b3 and Black wins without difficulty.

42.a5 ♞f5

Matulović: The king's attempted break through with 42...♞e5 cannot succeed because of 43.♞e8 and the king has to withdraw, since 43...♞d4 leads to mate with 44.♞e3 and 43...♞e6 would be followed by 44.♞b8. The reduction in material favours Black.

Botvinnik: Nor is anything promised by 42...♞e5 43.♞e8 ♞d6 44.♞d8 ♞c6 45.♞e8 ♞d7 46.♞e4 with equality.

43.♞b7

Botvinnik: This and Black's reply opens the position of the defending king, which is always dangerous in queen endgames.

43...♞f2 44.♞h3 ♞f1 45.♞h2 ♞e2

Botvinnik: If 45...g4, then 46.♞c6 ♞g7 47.♞d6 with equality.

46.♞h3 ♞e6 47.♞h2 ♞e2 48.♞h3 ♞g6 49.♞b6

Matulović: White has moved his pawn to a5, and as a result there is some hope of salvation. For example, ...♞e6 is no longer a threat, as will be seen later in the course of this endgame.

49...♔h5 50.♚c5 ♚e6


Botvinnik: Stronger was 50...♚f1 51.♔h2 f5 with active play for Black. The exchange of pawns at the b3-square leads to an elementary draw.

51.♔g2 ♚b3 52.♚f5

Matulović: The position is objectively drawn. White has only one thing to worry about, namely, not to permit an unfavourable exchange of queens. And yet for another 40 moves Botvinnik tried to win the game.

Botvinnik: (!) Ultimately, Black will try to improve the position of his pieces, but this is not a simple matter, since his queen is forced to defend the pawns at a6 and f6, while in the case of the exchange of the pawn at f6 for the pawn at g4 a drawn position is obtained.

52...♚a2 53.♔f3 ♚a3 54.♔g2 ♚a2 55.♔f3 ♚b3 56.♔g2 ♚b7 57.♔h2 ♚b2 58.♔h3 ♚g7 59.♚c5 ♚f6
60.g4



Matulović: White has an ideal position. The king will defend the g4-pawn and the queen, which has an outpost at b6, the a5-one. To revive his chances Black must advance his king to the middle of the board, exposing it to checks.

60...♔h6 61.♚b6 ♔g7 62.♔g2 ♚e6 63.♚d4 f6 64.♚b4 ♚d5 65.♔f2 ♔f7 66.♚b6 ♚c4 67.♔g3 ♔e7
68.♔h3 ♚f1 69.♔g3 ♚d3

Botvinnik: After 69...♔f7, in view of the weak position of the black queen, White pursues the black king over the whole board.


70.♔g2 ♚e4

Botvinnik: Nothing is given by 70...♚d6 71.♚b7 ♔e6 72.♚e4 and the black king cannot pass.

71.♔g3 ♚f4 72.♔h3 ♚f1

Matulović: After 72...♖f3 73.♔h2 ♕g4 74.♗a6 White's a-pawn becomes more dangerous than both black ones.

73.♔g3 ♕e1 74.♔g2 ♕d2 75.♔h3 ♕d3 76.♔g2 ♕d5



77.♔h3

Botvinnik: A mistake, which almost costs White defeat. Better was 77.♔f1.

77...♗h1 78.♔g3 ♕h4 79.♔f3 ♕h3 80.♔f2 ♕h2 81.♔f1 ♕f4 82.♔e1 ♕g3 83.♔f1 ♕f4 84.♔e1 ♕d6

Botvinnik: Thanks to the position of the king at e1, this manoeuvre is now possible, since at the last moment the check at e3 would lead to the exchange of queens.

85.♕b7 ♔e6 86.♕b3 ♔e5 87.♕e3 ♔d5 88.♕d3 ♔c5 89.♕a3

Botvinnik: The only possible check. White's basic task is to prevent the black king from approaching the white a-pawn.

89...♔c6 90.♕a4 ♔d5 91.♕b3

Matulović: After this move Black cannot move to d4 because of 92.♕b6!.

Botvinnik: Most accurate of all was 91.♕a2 ♔d4 92.♕b2 (now on 92.♕d2 there is 92...♔c5) 92...♔c4 93.♕b6.


91...♔e4 92.♕c4

Botvinnik: Matulović finds an ingenious path to the draw.

92...♔f3

Matulović: If 92...♔e3 then 93.♕e2 ♔d4 94.♕b2 ♔c4 95.♕b6 etc. Also leading to a draw is 93.♕c3 ♕d3 (93...♔f4 94.♕c4 ♔g3 95.♕d3!) 94.♕e5 ♔f3 95.♕f6 ♔g4 96.♕e6.

93.♕d3



Agreed drawn. $\frac{1}{2} : \frac{1}{2}$

[Botvinnik/Matulović]

Board 9

Mikhail Tal – Miguel Najdorf [B 80]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'


1.e4 c5 2.♘f3 ♘c6 3.d4 cd4 4.♘d4 e6 5.♘c3 ♚c7 6.g3

Najdorf: There is a trap hidden in this move. If Black is not careful and plays 6.g3 ♘f6? it would be followed with 7.♙f4! and 8.♘db5.

6...a6

Tal: A quiet continuation, after which, however, it is not so simple for Black to obtain the active counter-play characteristic of the Sicilian Defence. Recently this variation has become more popular (in particular, it occurred many times in the most recent USSR Championship), and for White there have been found new possibilities of fighting for an advantage. As was shown as long ago as the game Fischer - Tal (Bled, 1961), a serious mistake here is 6...♘f6 7.♘db5 ♚b8 8.♙f4 with a clear advantage.

7.♙g2 ♘f6 8.0-0 d6



Tal: The most accurate. Weaker here is 8...♙e7 9.♙e1! d6 10.♘c6 bc6 11.e5! de5 12.♙e5 0-0 13.♙f4 and impossible is 13...♙d6 14.♙e6!.

9.♙e1 ♙d7


Tal: In this lies the point of the previous move. Now White does not break through immediately in the centre.

Najdorf: After 9...♙e7 I was afraid of 10.♘c6 bc6 11.e5 de5 12.♙e5. And after 9...♘d4 10.♚d4 ♙e7 11.e5 de5 12.♙e5 the position did not appeal to me (12...♙d6 13.♙f4! ♙e5 14.♙e5 ♚e7 15.♙d1 etc.).

10.♘c6

Tal: Initiating play on the queen's flank. In the case of 10...♔c6 the leap of the knight to d5 must be reckoned with, but the capture with the pawn creates some objects for attack.

10...bc6



Najdorf: It was hard to decide. If I had continued with 10...♔c6 by opponent would no doubt have answered with 11.♞d5.

What should one say about the position after 11...♔d5 12.ed5 e5 ? The follow-up 13.f4 ♔e7 14.♙e2 0-0 15.fe5 de5 16.♙e5 ♙e5 17.♙e5 ♔c5 18.♙h1 ♞g4 very likely would not be favourable for White, but simply 13.♔e3 followed by 14.♙c1 would give White a slight positional advantage. Accordingly, I decided on the text, despite its shortcomings.

11.♞a4

Tal: White's plan is simple - to try to open lines with the advance of the c-pawn. Unexpectedly for me the Argentinian grandmaster did not prevent this and soon ran into serious difficulties.


Najdorf: A thrust aimed at Black's c-pawn.

11...e5

Tal: Matulović plays 11...♙b8 here, on which I intended to play 12.f4. Clearly, 12.c4 does not then achieve its aim on account of the simple 12...c5.

Najdorf: It goes without saying that 11...c5 would not be good because of 12.e5, although Tal considers that 11...♙b8 was called for. (If 12.c4 then 12...c5.)

12.c4 ♔e7



Tal: Already here 12...c5 was necessary. In this case White's positional advantage (the square d5) would have been insignificant.

Najdorf: Actually I should not have permitted the c-pawn to advance. The right move was 12...c5 but even after that White is better off.

13.c5

Najdorf: (!)

13...0-0


Tal: The complications after 13...d5 14.ed5 cd5 (if 14...♘d5, then 15.♙d5 cd5 16.♘b6!) 15.♘b6 ♖d8 16.♘d5 are favourable for White. But now there is created a position with a rather large and stable advantage. There no compensation for the weaknesses on the queen's flank in Black's position. The next moves are readily understood.

Najdorf: If 13...d5 then 14.ed5 cd5 15.♘b6.

14.cd6 ♙d6 15.♙g5

Najdorf: Why didn't White play 15.♙e3? In any case I could have returned the bishop to e7. Thus, Black later gains a tempo with ...h7-h6. The freeing of the square h7 is important, because of the possibility of the manoeuvre ...♘f6-h7-g5.

15...♙e7 16.♙c2 h6 17.♙e3 ♖ab8 18.♖ac1 ♖fd8



19.h3

Tal: An unnecessary move, not only losing time but also presenting Black with an object for counter-play.

Its root cause was indecisiveness. I was completely unable to settle my choice on one of the two equally tempting plans - 19.♖c5 or 19.♙c5, and then decided to leave the square c5 for the knight, and preliminarily ‘insured myself’ against the possible ...♖g4.

Stronger, of course, was the immediate 19.♙c5, and it is very difficult for Black to defend. Najdorf immediately exploits the respite.

Najdorf: A completely useless move, and the pawn at h3 is exposed to danger in certain variations.

19...♖h7

Najdorf: A manoeuvre by which Black transfers the knight to e6, which is important for the defence of the vulnerable square at c5, and for possible activity at d4 on the part of the knight.


20.♙c5

Tal: The manoeuvre ...♖h7-f8-e6(-d4) would have permitted Black to consolidate. Already now White has no objection to simplification, but at some point the relatively undefended state of the h3-pawn can get in his way. Some clear moves follow.

20...♙e8 21.♖ed1 ♖d1

Najdorf: Otherwise White exchanges at d8 and Black cannot recapture with his rook on account of 23.♙b6.

22.♖d1 ♖g5 23.♙e7 ♗e7 24.♖c5



24...♗e6

Tal: For Black there was an interesting possibility - to first play 24...♖b5! and only after 25.♞c1 (25.♘a6 ♗e6 or 25...♞a5) 25...♗e6 26.♗e6 ♕e6 27.♙f1 ♞b4 and the black rook is very actively placed, since there is not the move 28.♙c4 on account of 28...♚h3. Evidently, in this way Black could have equalised the position and demonstrated that in chess, even the slightest mistake is punishable. Bypassing this possibility, Black is later forced to carry out a difficult, thankless defence.

Najdorf: (?) A much better move was 24...♖b5 and after 25.♞c1 ♗e6 26.♗e6 ♕e6 Black would have been in a much better position than in the game. Had White continued 25.♘a6, Black would have recovered the pawn with 25...♞a5.

25.♗e6 ♕e6 26.b3

Najdorf: The material on the battlefield has been somewhat reduced in the exchanges, but this does not do much for Black, who must still attend to his weak pawns on the queen's wing. Black's defence is extremely difficult.


26...♕e7

Najdorf: Thus Black takes c5 from his opponent's queen and at the same time prepares for the exchange of rooks at d8.

27.♕c3

Najdorf: (!) An exceptionally strong move. First of all, the exchange of rooks is prevented (27...♞d8 28.♞d8 ♕d8 29.♕e5 etc.), while at the same time there is the threat of 28.♕a5. If Black tries to re-organise his defence with 27...♕c7, this would be followed by 28.♙f1 a5 29.♞d5!

27...♞b4



Tal: An excellent resource. Black cannot permit the queen to a5, while in the case of 27...♙c7 possible is 28.♙f1 a5 29.♞d5! winning a pawn. It is unfavourable for White to now advance 28.a3 on account of 28...♞d4!. The immediate attempt to exploit the weakness on the 8th rank - 28.♞d3 a5 29.♙d2 (here on 29.a3 possible is 29...♞b5) did not give anything real after 29...a4. Having thought for around a half-hour, White found, as it seems to me, the most effective plan.

Najdorf: Probably best, since White's bishop is tied to the defence of the e4-pawn.

28.h4

Tal: Since Black is tied to the defence of the weak a- and c-pawns, White begins to harrass the king and, what is most important, includes his light-squared bishop in the game.

28...f6

Tal: Probably the most tenacious of all was the passive 28...h5.

Najdorf: With 28...a5 with the intention of 29...a4 Black would have had better chances. If White continued with 29.a3, the follow-up would be 29...♞b8 with an attack on the a3-pawn, while 30.♙a5 would be followed by 30...♞b3 31.♞d8 ♔f8 and Black is not exposed to any danger, although White would still have the better prospects with his passed a-pawn.

29.♞d3

Tal: Now, with a 'live' bishop, White's possible attack along the d-file is very dangerous.

29...♔h7

Tal: The Argentinian thought for a long time, and giving White the possibility to activate himself still further, also tried to give his pieces air to breathe.

It is clear that White's following move, based on a tactical finesse, was a 'rebuke' for him.

Najdorf: Now 29...a5 would no longer be feasible, because the position after 30.a3 ♞b5 31.♙f1 ♙a3

32.♖d8 ♜e7 33.♞a8 would not have been very comfortable.

30.♙h3

Najdorf: The e4-pawn is indirectly protected.

30...♙g6

Najdorf: Already tired from being continuously on the defensive, I chose a line which in fact precipitated a favourable outcome for White. Anyway, it would have been impossible to continue the game for long with passive defence.

31.♖d7 ♜f8 32.♞c6

Tal: Seemingly the most convincing. White wins a pawn, obtaining two connected passed pawns on the queen's flank, while his king feels sufficiently secure.

32...♞e4


Najdorf: Even 32...♙e4 would not offer counter-play after 33.♞a6.

33.♞a6 ♞e1 34.♙h2 f5

Tal: 34...♙e4 35.♙g2 is not dangerous for White. I think that 34...h5 gave Black greater chances.

Najdorf: 34...e4 would be followed by 35.h5! ♙h5 36.♞a5. 34...h5 would be slightly better, though after 35.♖d2 Black would have no counter-chances, and the two passed pawns on the queen's wing would decide the game in White's favour.

35.♖d6



Tal: Also good was the immediate 35.♞a5 ♞e2 36.♖d2. For the time being I set a little trap, into which Black falls. If Black had replied 35...♞f7, I would probably have returned to simplifying lines.

Najdorf: With a few powerful moves my opponent forces a decision.

This decision is quite understandable: 44.♖e8 ♔d7 45.♖e6 ♕f5 46.♖a6 etc.

1 : 0

[Najdorf/Tal]

Board 10

Borislav Ivkov – Paul Keres [D 34]

‘Rest of the World’ - USSR

1.♗f3 d5 2.c4 e6 3.d4 c5

Keres: The Tarrasch Defence once again came into fashion after the World Championship match Petrosian - Spassky (1969). It is perfectly correct, and fully merits having been saved from oblivion.

4.cd5 ed5 5.g3 ♗c6 6.♙g2 ♗f6 7.0-0 ♙e7 8.♗c3 0-0 9.dc5

Ivkov: The Petrosian - Spassky games have shown that the best move for White is 9.♙g5.

Keres: After this exchange White cannot count on any advantage. Undoubtedly, the continuation recommended by theory, 9.♙g5, is better.

9...♙c5 10.♙g5

Ivkov: (?) This move costs White his initial advantage. 10.♗a4 should have been played.

Keres: If White plays 10.♗a4 Black can, with the reply 10...♙b6 11.♙g5 d4, obtain a satisfactory game.


10...d4

Ivkov: (!) So, the square d4, which is usually in White's possession, has been lost to Black.

11.♙f6 ♖f6 12.♗e4

RR: Later, in the tournament at Geneva in 1977, the line 12.♗d5 ♖d8 13.♗d2 was introduced here by Jan Timman, against none other than Borislav Ivkov. It subsequently became one of the main battlegrounds in this opening. - Griffin.

12...♖e7 13.♗c5 ♖c5



14. ♖d2

Ivkov: 14. ♖c1 could have been played right away, but I thought during the game that the queen's move was better, since it prevents the move of the bishop to f5 or e6. After 14... ♗f5 15. ♖g5 would be uncomfortable, and 15. b4 might also follow. Therefore Black's bishop is best posted at g4.

14... ♗g4

Ivkov: (!)

Keres: On 14... ♗f5 the reply 15. ♖g5 could be unpleasant.


RR: - Nonetheless, a few weeks after the present game, against Bobotsov (match Bulgaria v. Estonian SSR, Tallinn 1970), Keres preferred this continuation. White continued instead 15. ♖ac1 ♖b6 16. ♖fd1 ♖ad8 17. ♖f4 ♗g6 18. ♖d2, etc. - Griffin.

15. ♖ac1 ♖b6 16. ♘g5

Ivkov: (!?) Risky, as it is quite clear that an attack on Black's king would not be very profitable. The move 16. ♘g5 can only be ascribed to an attempt to transfer the knight to c5.

Keres: An interesting idea with a double threat. White intends the transfer of the knight via e4 to c5 and simultaneously prepares operations on the king's flank.

16... ♖ad8



Ivkov: (!)

Keres: This move leads to great complications, which Black need not fear. However, continuing 16...h6 17.♘e4 ♜fe8 18.♞fe1 ♞ad8 19.♘c5 ♞d6, Black could retain a good game.

RR: In fact, the play so far had proceeded as in Ivkov's game v. Minev (14th Olympiad, Leipzig 1960). That encounter continued instead 16...h6 17.♘e4 ♞ad8(?)! 18.♘c5 ♞c8 19.♞c4 ♜fe8 20.♞fc1, etc. - Griffin.

17.♞f4


Ivkov: 17.♘e4 might have been followed by 17...d3 (as well as by 17...♞fe8). However, another interesting possibility was 17.♞d3 g6 18.♘e4 ♞f5 19.♞d2.

Keres: The continuation 17.♞d3 g6 18.♘e4 ♞f5 19.♞d2 promised less on account of 19...♞e4 20.♞e4 ♘e5 etc.

17...♞h5 18.♞h4

Keres: The sacrifice of the knight 18.♘h7 is not dangerous on account of the reply 18...♞fe8, although the acceptance of the sacrifice 18...♙h7 19.♞h4 g6 20.g4 ♔g7 21.gxh5 ♞h8 also secures a satisfactory game for Black.

18...♞g6 19.♞e4



19...♖e5

Ivkov: (!) I had in particular studied the moves of the knight to b4 and e7, as well as the rather dangerous move 19...h6, which lead White in all variations to the better position. However, with 19...♖e5! Black turns the whole situation to his advantage.

Keres: (!) Undoubtedly the best reply. Bad was 19...♙e4 on account of 20.♚e4 g6 21.♚h4, while the complications provoked by 19...h6 20.♙g6 fg6 21.♘e6 d3! 22.♗f8 ♘d4!, although at first sight leading to a more satisfactory game for Black, all the same do not give a completely clear picture, on account of the sudden reply 23.♗e6! g5 24.♚e4 etc. After the move in the text White, continuing 20.♙g6 ♚g6 21.♚f4 ♜fe8 22.♗f3, could achieve equality, but he was evidently not satisfied with this.

20.♗h7

Ivkov: (?!) I deliberately chose this line, with its difficult complications, instead of playing 20.♙g6 ♚g6 21.♚f4 ♘c6! with a somewhat inferior position.

20...♜fe8

Keres: On 20...♙e4 White replies with the simple 21.♚e4.

21.♗g5

Keres: White has no choice, since on 21.♙g6 ♚g6 22.♗g5 unpleasant is 22...d3!, and in general the loss of a piece is threatened. Black could now, continuing 21...♙e4 22.♚e4 ♘g6 23.♚f5 ♚f6!, transpose to a favourable endgame, but he hoped to extract more from this position.

21...d3 22.ed3 f5


Ivkov: 22...♗d3 was also quite good.

Keres: Also deserving attention is the simple move 22...♗d3, since after the exchange, the bishop would have proved to be stronger than the knight.

23. ♔g2

Ivkov: It was difficult to make up my mind between this move and 23. ♔h1, after which I would have had to watch my first rank very carefully. After the text move White's queen will be out of the game for quite some time.

23... ♖d4 24. ♙h3 ♘d3



25. ♘f3

Ivkov: (!?) 25. ♖c4 would not have worked because of 25... ♘f2.

Keres: (?) After this mistake, Black obtains a positional advantage. It was necessary to continue 25. ♖c2!, after which before Black there arose the difficult task of increasing his positional superiority. For example, after 25... ♘e1 26. ♖c1 ♖d2 White has the move 27. ♔d5! etc., whereas for the attempt 25... f4 White has an antidote: 26. ♖c8. The exchange of rooks (25. ♖c4) will not do, on account of the tactical possibility 25... ♘f2! etc.

25... ♘c1

Ivkov: This is the simplest, although in the time scramble I was more anxious about the retreat of the rook along the d-file.

26. ♘d4 ♙d4 27. ♖c1 ♖e2 28. ♖f1

Keres: After 28. ♖c8 ♔f7 29. ♖c7 ♔e6 White would have been unable to defend the f2-square.

28... ♖b2

Ivkov: Black has recovered the sacrifice material with a dividend and White's only hope lies in the slightly weakened position of Black's king.

29. ♔f3 ♖a2

Ivkov: On 29...b5 there is 30.♙h5!.


30.♙b7 a5 31.♚g2

Ivkov: White's queen finally has some breathing space. However, his position is still critical.

31...♙f7 32.♚f3 g6

Ivkov: This is perhaps Black's first slip in a chain of mistakes. *Keres:* Thanks to the strong passed pawn Black now has a clear advantage, and before White there arises the difficult task of neutralising this advantage, preventing the advance of the a-pawn.

33.h4



Ivkov: (!) At long last, White is threatening something.

33...♞a1

Ivkov: Too cautious. It might have been possible to try 33...♚e5 and the advance of the a-pawn.

34.♞a1 ♚a1 35.♙h2

Ivkov: 35.♙g2 ♚e5 36.♙c6? a4! was weak.

35...♚e5

Ivkov: Or 35...♚d4 36.h5 ♚h8 37.♙g2.

Keres: After the game, Ivkov suggested 35...♚d4, and on 36.h5 gh5 37.♚f5 a4, with the further advance of the pawn. In mutual time trouble, Black did not want to advance his king too much. Also deserving attention is the immediate 35...a4.

36.♙c6 ♙g7

Ivkov: (?) Unnecessary, to say the least. Black might have tried 36...♚c5.

37.♚a3 f4

Keres: (?) With the exchange of pawns Black loses his prospects of a win. Much better was 37...♙e6 with the idea of 38...♙a2. White would have had to avoid the exchange of queens, since in the bishop endgame he loses.

38.♙a4 fg3


Ivkov: On 38...♙c5 there is 39.♔g2.

Keres: 38...♙c5 did not promise much, on account of 39.♔g2!.

39.fg3 ♖b2 40.♙g2 ♗c3

Keres: This was the final move before the time control. Black could have retained some winning prospects, playing 40...♙a2 41.♙d4 ♔g8.

41.♙b5



Ivkov: (!)

41...♙c7

Ivkov: This was the sealed move, and I must admit that it was the only one that I did not pay attention to. However, Black can play whatever he wants in this position, since a win is no longer possible due to the open position on the king's side.

Keres: The sealed move, after which it becomes clear that a draw is inevitable. Greater prospects were promised by 41...♙d2 with the possible 42...♙a2.

42.h5

Ivkov: (!) The most important move for White's defence: by sacrificing a pawn he clears the way in front of Black's king, which has no shelter from the repeated checks.

Keres: (!) The most simple way of undermining all of Black's plans. However, perfectly sufficient was 42.♙b2 ♔h7 43.♙e4 ♔g8 44.♙d4!, or 42...♔g8 43.♙d4 etc.

42...gh5 43.♖g5 ♔f8 44.♗h6 ♔e8 45.♙c6 ♔e7 46.♗g5 ♔d6 47.♙g2

Ivkov/Keres: (!)

47...♔d7 48.♗f6

Ivkov: (!) It is not necessary for White to force a truce, i.e. to check repeatedly.

At this point, it would even be a mistake to play 48.♙h3 ♔e8 or 48.♗b5 ♔e7 49.♗g5 ♔e8 50.♗e3 ♗e7 51.♙c6 ♔f8 52.♗h6 ♔g8, and he would have been unable to check any more. After 48.♗f6 Keres saw that he could not improve his position and offered a draw.

Keres: (!) On account of the shaky situation of the black king, all further attempts by Black are in vain. This was the end of this fighting game, one that did not lack interest.

½ : ½

[Najdorf/Tal]

ROUND 4

Saturday 4th April, 1970

In an exceptionally tense final round, the USSR team managed to draw the match, to bring them victory in the overall contest by the narrowest of margins.

On top board Larsen faced Leonid Stein, who was standing in for Spassky on account of the latter's indisposition. The Soviet grandmaster at first equalised in a King's Indian Defence after some slightly inaccurate play by White, but then chose the wrong continuation at the 14th move. Larsen steered his way advantageously through the enormous complications that resulted, and emerged with the better endgame, which he duly converted to a win.

On second board, Petrosian gained a slight but persistent advantage with the white pieces against Fischer's Grünfeld Defence. However, his American opponent displayed perfect defensive technique, remaining well within the margin of safety throughout the game. A draw was eventually agreed after the 52nd move.

On board 3 Korchnoi again found himself in difficulties straight out of the opening – an English - against his Hungarian opponent. After missing a clear win at the 19th move, Portisch (White) agreed

to a draw via a repetition of moves in a position where he had the exchange for a pawn with questionable compensation for Black. He was short of time and later explained that he was content to win his ‘micro-match’ v. his opponent.

On the fourth board, in contrast to his play in the 2nd round, Hort chose a classical defence against Polugaevsky’s queen’s pawn opening. However, he again failed to equalise, and a draw was agreed at the 36th move only after the Soviet grandmaster had missed several promising continuations.

Gligorić v. Geller on board 5 was another King’s Indian Defence. On this occasion the Yugoslav grandmaster managed to achieve a significant advantage, and by move 30 it seemed that he was on course to record the win. However, he subsequently went wrong and by the time the game was adjourned, his winning chances had disappeared. A draw was agreed without resumption.

On board 6, Smyslov scored what was to prove a decisive victory against Friðrik Ólafsson, who was standing in for Reshevsky. He gained a clear advantage from the opening – a Catalan – and was a piece for a pawn up at the adjournment. After the resumption, despite the enormous pressure – this was the last game to finish – he confidently overcame the technical difficulties to win the game and secure victory in the match overall.

On the next board, Taimanov proved to be out of sorts against Uhlmann, and committed a series of oversights in the middlegame. By the time the game was adjourned, his position was hopeless and he resigned the game without resuming.

Botvinnik v. Matulović on Board 9 saw the Yugoslav grandmaster adopt the Leningrad variation of the Dutch Defence. Botvinnik gained a clear advantage but failed to capitalise on his chances and the game was ultimately drawn at the 63rd move.

On the 9th board, Najdorf v. Tal was a fairly uneventful King’s Indian Defence that saw a draw agreed at the 25th move.

The Keres v. Ivkov encounter on bottom board proved to be a very one-sided affair. Keres took full advantage of some anti-positional play by his opponent, and won convincingly.

Board 1

Bent Larsen – Leonid Stein [E 68]


‘Rest of the World’ - USSR

Note: Commentary to this game is provided by Rudolf Marić, in place of Stein.

1.♘f3 ♘f6 2.g3 g6 3.♙g2 ♙g7 4.c4 0-0 5.0-0 d6 6.d4 ♘bd7 7.♘c3 e5 8.e4 ed4 9.♘d4 ♖e8

Marić: The most accurate move at this point is 9...♘c5, since after the move in the text White can obtain the better game, continuing 10.♙e3 ♘c5 11.f3!.

10.♖e1



Larsen: Probably 10.h3, the main theoretical variation, was better, however, I wanted to avoid well-known variations.

Marić: A continuation that is encountered less often. Possible was 10.♔e3, and 10.h3 has been encountered innumerable times in practice.

10...♘g4

Marić: The undefended knight at d4 gives the possibility of undertaking this tactical thrust. Evidently, Larsen already intended the prepared reply and decided on this original move 11.f3 instead of 11.h3. The question, however, is whether it is possible to consider the move 11.f3 to be wholly correct.

11.f3

Larsen: (!?) A risky move, but in my opinion, a playable one.

11...♘ge5 12.b3 ♘c5 13.♔e3 f5

Larsen: (!) An energetic answer which prevents White from carrying out his plan: to build up a strong position with ♔d2 and then ♖ad1.

After the text move White must risk complications if he does not wish to be left with the e4-pawn isolated and the black knight occupying an ideal square at e5. It is clear that 14.ef5?? does not work because of 14...♘ed3, with a win for Black.


Marić: An excellent move, eloquently speaking of the fact that White has handled the opening inaccurately. Now the move 14.ef5 is a crude blunder, on account of the tactical possibility 14...♘ed3 15.♖e2 ♖e3! and White's rook perishes.

14.♔d2 fe4

Marić: A blunder. Black could decide the struggle in the centre in his favour with the intermediate tactical move 14...♘ed3!, since after the forced 15.♖e2 fe4 16.♘e4 (if 16.fe4 ♘e5 17.♔g5, then

17...♖c4! etc.) 16...♗e4 17.♚d3 ♘c5, securing a good game. After the move in the text, White, in his turn - also by means of accurate moves - can avoid the creation of an isolated pawn and retain a somewhat better game.

15.♙g5



15...♚d7

Larsen: Whereas Stein spent a long time considering his 13th move, he played this one a tempo, so the conclusion is that he had already planned it. 15...♙f6 would have been awkward for me, because it would lead to an equal position after 16.♙f6 ♚f6 17.♗e4 ♗e4 18.♞e4 c5 19.f4! cd4 20.♚d4 ♙f5 21.fe5 de5 22.♚d5 ♖h8 23.♞e2 ♞e7.

Instead 18...♙f5?! would be a doubtful move, because of the only good reply 19.♞f4! (after 19.♞e1 Black might continue 19...♗d3, or after 19.♞e3 ♗c6, in both cases with a better position for Black. 15...♗c4?! would be very dangerous for Black because of 16.bc4 ♙d4 17.♚d4 ♚g5 18.♗d5.

Marić: Still another mistake, which is the cause of the subsequent difficulties. In this case Black ought to play 15...♙f6!, and on 16.♙f6 ♚f6 17.♗e4 ♗e4 18.♞e4 Black, with the move 18...♙f5!, obtains a level game. For White the move 19.♞f4 would have been forced (if 19.♞e3 ♗d3 20.♗c2 ♞e3 21.♚e3 ♗b4! etc.), and after 19...♗c6 (but absolutely not 19...c5 20.♗f5 gf5 21.♚c3 ♞e6 22.♙h3 and White wins) 20.♞d1 ♗d4 21.♞d4 ♞e7, Black's chances are not bad.

16.♗e4 ♗e4 17.♞e4 ♗c6


Larsen: A critical position! Now after 18.♞e8 ♚e8 19.♙e3 ♚e3 White would lose a piece, while after 18.♙e3 ♞e4 Black would equalise. This means that White must sacrifice, and after 12 minutes' thought I decided to do so, though I could just as well have done so right away.

Marić: Here there was the interesting possibility 17...d5 18.cd5 ♚d5, and after 19.f4 ♗f3! 20.♙f3 ♞e4 White loses. Correct would have been 19.♞ae1! and Black has no reliable defence against the threat

of 20.f4.

RR: Interestingly, the later game Pr. Nikolić - Gulko (Hastings, 1989/90) continued instead 17...♘f7(!) 18.♖e8 ♔e8 19.♙e3 c5, etc. - Griffin.

18.♘c6!



Marić: For White there was no other continuation, since all of the remaining ones led to the better game for Black. For example, 18.♙e3 ♖e4 19.f4 ♔e8 or 18.♖e8 ♔e8 19.♙e3 ♔e3! etc.


18...♖e4

Larsen: 18...♙a1 would be followed by 19.♘e7 ♔h8 20.♔e1! with a double threat at a1 and g6. 19...♔g7 is not better because of 20.♙h6.

Marić: Had Black taken the exchange White could have gained an irresistible attack:

18...♙a1 19.♘e7 ♔h8 20.♔e1! ♙g7 21.♘g6 hg6 22.♖e8 ♔h7 23.♔e4 etc.

19.f4



19...♚c6

Larsen: After the game everybody wanted to know what would have happened if Stein had taken the rook. I find this a very dangerous move, since there is no way to protect the king after 19...♙a1 20.♘e7. After 20...♗g7 the continuation might be: 21.♚f4 ♚e8 22.♘d5 ♚f7 23.♘c7 ♚f4 24.♙f4 ♖b8 25.♙d6 ♗g8 26.e5 with a great advantage for White.

Another possibility was 20...♗f8. During the game my plan was to continue with 21.♚f2 and after 21...♗e8 22.e5 with the strong threat 23.♘d5, and probably after 22...de5 23.♘d5 ♙d4 24.♙e3 the position would have been very promising and, according to Janošević, even winning. However, after 20...♗f8, 21.♚f4 ♗e8 22.♚h4 would not be good for White because of 22...♚g4!, which permits Black to attack. Thus I think that after 20...♗f8 the best move was 21.e5! and after 21...♙e5 22.♚f2 ♗g7 (if 22...♗e8 23.♙d5) 23.♙h6! ♗h6 24.♚f8 White would have the better chances (24...♙g7 25.♘g8), whereas 21...de5 22.♚c1 would be threatening. For instance: 22...♚d4 23.♗h1 ♙f5 24.♘f5 gf5 25.♙b7, or 23...c6 24.♚f1 ♗e8 25.♘c6 etc. It is also possible that 19...bc6 was better than the text move. I think that this is very likely the case. During the game I had in mind, after 19...bc6, an interesting possibility 20.e5!?. However, after 20...♙e5 21.♖e1 the situation is not quite clear, while after 20.♖f1 Black would most probably equalise.

Marić: After this move, Black finds himself in the worse position until the end of the game. Larsen undoubtedly has something Lasker-like about him; he resorts to psychology much more often than any other modern grandmaster. The present game is the best example of this, since in general it rests on psychological nuances beginning with the first moves in the opening. Stein should not be criticised for the fact that he was not able to orient himself in the labyrinth of variations and to find in them the thread which led to salvation. He ought to have examined 19...♙a1 and tested the accuracy of the calculations of the Danish grandmaster (although I personally believe that Larsen undertook this manoeuvre in the main on intuition, and not on ‘mathematics’).

After 19...♔a1 20.♖e7 there arises the critical position and now Black has to decide where to put the king, with whom the white pieces are flirting. If 20...♔h8 then 21.♖f4 ♕g7 22.♖f7 and mate is unavoidable. Leading to the same outcome is 20...♔g7 21.♖f4! ♖e8 22.♖d5 ♖f7 23.♖c7 ♖f4 24.♕f4 ♖b8 25.♕d6 ♔g8 26.e5 and White has a decisive advantage. Citing these variations as an example, Larsen expressed the opinion that critical would have been the continuation 20...♔f8, after which the strongest, in his view, was the reply 21.e5. None the less this is questionable, since Black has significant possibilities of defending, although White has good compensation in the undeveloped state of Black's forces.

After 21.e5 obviously best was the continuation 21...de5 (if 21...♕e5, then 22.♖f2 ♔g7 23.♕h6!! ♔h6 24.♖f8 ♕g7 25.♖g8!, and mate). Now 22.♖f2 will not do, since after 22...♔e8 White does not have time to continue 23.♕d5 ♖e7! followed by ...♕d4. On 22.♖b4 there is the reply 22...c5, while on 22.♕d5 ♕d4 23.♔h1 c6 etc. In the opinion of Larsen, continuing 22.♖c1 White retains good attacking prospects. Nonetheless, after 22...♕d4 23.♔h1 c6! 24.♖f1 ♔e8 it is unclear what White can undertake, since on 25.♖f6 there follows 25...e4! and Black wins.

Is there another continuation for White besides 21.e5? Evidently, the most effective was 21.♖d1! ♕e5 22.♖f1 ♔e8 (22...♔g7 23.♕h6! etc.) 23.♖c8! ♖c8 24.♕h3 (in this lies the point of the manoeuvre ♖d1-f1 24...♖b8 25.♕e6 and mate. However, if the black king had found itself on the square f7 and not f8, this possibility would have been excluded. Thus, the exchange sacrifice from the practical viewpoint was undoubtedly correct.

20.e5!

Larsen: No more complications, and with this move White in all variations retains a slight positional advantage.


Marić: A passing pawn sacrifice of a pawn, which White soon regains, obtaining the better position. The critical moment in the game has passed, and Black is faced with a long and difficult defence.

20...♖c5 21.♔h1 ♕e6

Larsen: (!) This is the best answer. After 21...♖e5? Black would soon lose because of 22.♖e1, and 21...♕e5 would be followed by the very strong move 22.♕d5 ♔h8 23.♖e1, or 22...♔g7 23.♖f1 with advantage for White.

Marić: Black did not risk taking the pawn with the queen or with the bishop, since after 21...♕e5 22.♕d5 ♔h8 23.♖f1 the outcome of the game would have been decided.

22.♕b7 ♖f8 23.♕e3 ♖e5 24.♖e1



24...♚c3

Larsen: This move took Stein more than half an hour. In the ensuing endgame White's position is slightly better because of Black's weak pawns on the queen's wing. 24...♗h3 was an interesting possibility; however, after 25.♙a7 c5 26.♚d5 ♖h8 27.♚e5 ♙e5 28.♙g2 (if 28...♙g2 29.♔g2 ♞a8 30.♙c5) or after 26...♚d5 27.♙d5 ♖h8 28.a4 White would have good prospects of winning.

Marić: After thorough analysis, Black decides to transpose to an endgame, hoping to reduce White's advantage by means of simplification.

25.♔g2

Larsen: A useful move, and probably better than 25.♚c3 ♙c3 26.♞c1 ♙a5! since now 27.♙a7 would be followed by 27...c5, with an uncertain situation.

25...♚d2 26.♙d2 ♙d4 27.♙f4 ♖f7

Larsen: Another possibility was 27...g5, which would probably have been followed by 28.♞e6 gf4 29.♙d5 ♖h8 30.g4 and, in spite of the opposite-coloured bishops, White would have a clear advantage. After the move in the game Black is put onto the defensive.

Marić: Black obtained active play with the move 27...g5!?, since White after 28.♙g5 ♞f2 29.♖h1 ♙h3 would have ended up in a position of stalemate, whereas on 28.♞e6 gf4 29.♙d5 ♖h8 White's winning prospects are minimised. Letting slip this chance, in time trouble, Black can no longer hope for salvation.


28.♙h6 ♞b8 29.♙c6 ♙f6 30.♙e3 a6 31.♙d2 ♞b6 32.♙f3 ♞b8 33.♙a5 ♙d8

Larsen: Stein was already pressed for time, yet he did not fall into the trap 33...♞c8?!, which would have been followed by 34.♞e6!.

34.♞f1 ♖g8 35.♙c6 ♙f7 36.g4

Marić: Black's position is hopeless. White now quietly puts in place the final operation.

36...♙e7 37.♔g3 ♜d8 38.♞d1 ♙f6 39.h4 ♙e5 40.♔g2 ♞c8 41.g5 ♔g7



42.♙d7

Larsen: This was the sealed move. My analyses showed that I would win a pawn in any variation, and I was sure that this material advantage would be enough to win the game.

42...♞d8

Larsen: Not 42...♞b8 because of 43.♙c7 ♞b7 44.♙d6 etc.

43.♙g4 d5 44.♙f3 h6

Larsen: (!?) Black immediately surrenders a pawn to reduce the material. However, after 44...d4 45.♞e1 ♙d6 46.♞e4 Black loses either the d4- or the c7-pawn, and after 44...d4 45.♞e1 ♞e8 White plays 46.♙b4! (this is certainly stronger than 46.♙c6 ♞e6 47.♙d7 ♞e7 48.♙c7 ♞d7 with chances for Black to save himself) 46...♙d6 47.♞e8 ♙e8 48.♙d6 cd6 49.♔f2 White would win the bishop endgame without any difficulty.

Marić: A pawn is lost, since on 44...d4 there follows 45.♞e1 ♙d6 46.♞e4! etc. If instead Black replies 45...♞e8 there could follow 46.♙b4 with the threat of ♙c6 etc.

45.gh6 ♔h6 46.♙d2 ♔g7 47.♙g5 ♞d6 48.♙d5


Larsen: This move is of great importance. There were many fine players in the audience who believed this endgame would end in a draw, but I was quite sure of winning it. I am not positive, but it seems to me that somewhere I had already seen something like it.

Marić: White enters an endgame, having preliminarily studied it in all its finesses. The course of this part of this exciting and interesting struggle held the attention of more than 200 spectators. The endgame has undoubtedly important theoretical interest in its own right.

48...♙d5 49.♞d5 ♞d5 50.cd5 ♔f7 51.♔f3 ♕e8 52.♙f4 ♙f6 53.♙c7 ♙h4 54.b4 ♔d7 55.♙b6 ♙f6
 56.♙c5 ♙b2 57.a4 ♙a3 58.a5 ♙b2 59.♔f4 ♙f6 60.♔e4 ♙c3 61.b5


Larsen: (!) In this position White's passed pawns, supported by the bishop, now completely block Black's forces, so that White's king manages to remove from the board both of Black's pawns.

61...ab5 62.a6 ♔c8 63.d6 ♔b8 64.♔d5 ♙f6



Larsen: 64...b4 then 65.♔c4 etc.

65.♔c6 ♙g5 66.♔b5 ♙g4 67.♔c4 ♔a8 68.♔d3 ♙e5 69.d7 ♙c7 70.♔e4 ♙g3 71.♔f3 ♙d8



Larsen: 71...♔b8 would be followed by 72.♙d6!.

72.♖g3 ♘a5 73.♗g4 ♘d8 74.♗f5 ♘a5 75.♗e6 ♘c7 76.♗f7 ♘a5 77.♗e8 ♘c7 78.♘e7 ♘a5 79.♘d8
 ♘d2 80.♘b6 ♘g5 81.♘c5

Black resigned. 1 : 0

[Larsen/Marić]


Board 2

Tigran Petrosian – Robert Fischer [D 90]
 USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.c4 g6 2.d4

Fischer: 2.e4 is also possible so as to avoid Grünfeld's Defence

2...♗f6 3.♗c3 d5 4.♗f3 ♘g7 5.cd5 ♗d5 6.♘d2




Petrosian: This modest-looking continuation appeared in tournament practice after the victory that Smyslov gained over Hort in the tournament in Skopje, in 1969. As far as is known to me, this was also played by the Egyptian master Basjuni in a Zonal tournament in 1957. Perhaps, to the atlas of geographical chess names one may also add Egyptian to the already established English, French, Russian, Spanish, and so on, openings. It may also be noted that until the present game no-one had managed to demonstrate a clear path to equality.

Fischer: I do not think that this variation creates any problems for Black. The best variation is 6.♘d2 0-0 7.♞c1 and now 7...♗c3 8.♘c3 ♖d5 or 6.♘d2 0-0 7.♞c1 ♗b6 8.e3 ♗8d7 followed by ...e7-e5.

6...c5 7.♞c1

Fischer: (!) Black cannot proceed now with 7...cd4 because of 8.♗d5.

7...♗c3 8.♘c3 cd4 9.♗d4 0-0 10.e3



10...♚d5

Petrosian: (!) From here the queen dominates the whole board. If, for example, 11.♚b3, then after 11...♚e4! it is still not so simple for White to complete development.

Fischer: (!) Another possibility was 10...a6, as Larry Evans suggested after the game, but after 11.♙c4 b5 12.♚f3 White's position is slightly better. The text move equalises immediately.


11.♘b5

Fischer: Black can best answer 11.♚b3 with 11...♚e4!. After 11.a3 Black can continue 11...♖d8.

11...♚d1 12.♖d1 ♘c6 13.♙g7

Fischer: After 13.♙c4 Black answers 13...a6, since 14.♙g7 does not work because of 14...ab5! 15.♙f8 bc4 16.♙h6 ♖a2 with at least a draw, or simply 13...♙f5 which is similar to the moves in the game.

13...♙g7




Petrosian: (?) Significant simplification has taken place and one could expect a rapid conclusion of peace. I decided to continue the struggle.

Maybe I would manage to exploit the circumstance that the white king is a few centimetres nearer to the queen's flank, where some sort of developments could still occur.

14.♙e2 ♘f5 15.g4

Fischer: The only chance for some initiative before Black plays 15...♖ac8.

15...a6



Petrosian: (!) Simplest of all.

Fischer: Definitely not 15...♙e6 because of 16.♘c7.

16. ♖c3

Fischer: 16. ♖c7 ♜ac8 17. ♗a6 ♙e4 (17... ♙e6 18. ♖c5 ♙a2 was dubious) 18. f3 ♙f3 19. ♙f3 ba6 with the better chances for Black because of White's weaknesses on the king-side.

16... ♙e6 17. f4 ♜fd8 18. ♖f2 ♗b4 19. a3 ♗d5 20. ♗e4 ♗f6


Petrosian: Fischer is playing extremely cautiously, preventing the possible complications after 20... ♜ac8 21. ♗g5.

Fischer: 20... ♜ac8 was not good because of 21. ♗g5, and 21... ♜c2 is out of the question because of 22. ♗e6 fe6 23. e4.

21. ♗f6 ef6

Fischer: (!) It was not necessary to weaken the pawn-structure. After 21... ♖f6 22. g5 ♖g7 23. ♙f3 ♜ac8 24. ♙b7 ♜c2 25. ♖g3 ♜d1 26. ♜d1 ♜b2 27. ♙a6 ♜b3! Black regains a pawn 28. ♜d3?? ♜b6! gains a piece.

22. ♙f3 ♜ac8 23. ♜d8 ♜d8 24. ♜d1



24... ♜c8

Fischer: (?) 24... ♜d1 25. ♙d1 ♖f8 was simpler, and Black would have no problems.

Petrosian: The draw was more or less obvious after the exchange of rooks, followed by the march of the king to d6. But for some reason Fischer did not like this...


25. ♜d2

Petrosian: ...or he moved away with the rook, hoping for a cunning, but rather obvious trap: 25. ♙b7 ♜c2 26. ♖g3 ♜b2 27. ♙a6 ♜b3 28. ♜d3 White has an extra pawn, is it not so? - No. After 28... ♜b6 Black has an extra piece.

25...♖c7 26.h4 h6 27.♔g3 b5

Fischer: The threat was 28.♞d6 and 29.♞b6 with Black completely passive.

28.♞d6 ♞c2 29.b4 ♞c3 30.♞a6 ♕c4



Fischer: (!) This was the best. With 30...♞e3 31.♔f2 ♞c3 32.♕e2 White would have a few more chances.

31.f5

Fischer: 31.♔f2 would have been followed by 31...♞c2 32.♔e1 ♞c3 33.♔d2? ♞d3 etc.


31...g5

Fischer: 31...♞e3 32.♔f4 ♞e1 33.fg6 fg6 34.♞a7 ♔f8 35.♕e4 was another possibility but I did not like the passive position of Black's king.

32.hg5 hg5 33.♔f2 ♞c2 34.♔g1 ♞c1 35.♔g2 ♞c2 36.♔g3

Fischer: White tries to get the game adjourned without any change in the position on the board.


36...♞c3 37.♔f2 ♞c2 38.♔e1 ♞c3 39.♞a5 ♞e3 40.♔f2 ♞d3



Petrosian: In this position the game was adjourned. White's chances consist in winning the b5-pawn in exchange for the pawns at g4 and then f5, after which the pawn race decides.

The rook endgame after 41.♙c6 ♔f8 42.♙b5 ♙b5 43.♞b5 ♞a3 is seemingly dangerous for Black on account of 44.♞d5 followed by 45.♞d4 and the march of the white king towards the b-pawn. But in home analysis Fischer discovered an instructive draw.

41.♙c6




Fischer: This was the sealed move.

41...♔f8 42.♙b5 ♙b5 43.♞b5 ♞a3

Fischer: When analysing this, I came to the conclusion that this was a drawing end-game. besttouring.com

44.♞d5 ♜b3 45.♞d4 ♔e7 46.♔e2 ♞a3 47.♔d2 ♞b3 48.♔c2 ♞e3



Petrosian: It transpires that the white is not going anywhere, while at that moment when the white pawn gets to the 5th rank, there follows an attack on the pawn, after which either the black rook occupies a position behind it, or the black king is in time to blockade it.


Fischer: (!) The key move.

49.♞d3 does not work because of 49...♞e4, nor does 49.b5 ♞e5 50.♞b4 ♔d6 51.b6 ♞e8 52.b7 ♔c7 and the b-pawn is doomed.

49.♔b2 ♔e8

Fischer: The only move. Black cannot move his rook from the best square.

50.♔c1 ♞e2!




Fischer: White tries one more trick. With 50...♔e7? 51.♔c2! (51...♖a3? 52.♗d3! and wins easily) 51...♔e8 52.b5 ♖e5 53.b6 ♖b5 54.♗d6 ♔e7 55.♖c6 the approach of White's king would be decisive.

51.♔d1

Fischer: With 51.b5 ♖e5 52.b6 ♖b5 53.♗d6 ♔e7 54.♖c6 ♖b4! Black gains the g-pawn.

51...♖a2 52.♔e1 ♖b2



Agreed drawn. ½ : ½

[Fischer/Petrosian]

Group photo with all players

Board 3

Lajos Portisch – Viktor Korchnoi [A 33]

‘Rest of the World’ - USSR


1.♘f3 c5 2.c4 ♘f6 3.♘c3 ♘c6 4.d4 cd4 5.♘d4 e6 6.g3

Korchnoi: A fashionable continuation, according to contemporary theory, the most dangerous for Black.

6...♚b6 7.♘b3 ♘e5

Korchnoi: On 7...♘b4, unpleasant to me seemed 8.♙e3 ♚c7 9.♙g2 ♘e5 10.c5 ♘c4 11.♚c1 with advantage for White.

8.e4 ♙b4 9.♚e2



Korchnoi: All of this was encountered for the first time in the game Taimanov - Geller (22nd USSR Championship). There, if my memory does not betray me, 9...a5 was met with. This move seemed to me to be unconvincing. Also insufficient to me seemed 9...d6 in view of 10.♔d2! and White threatens to play f2-f4 and ♖c3-b5 with a clear advantage, and therefore I replied...

9...0-0

Portisch: In a game between Taimanov and Geller, Black played 9...a5 with complications.

Korchnoi: Threatening ...d7-d5. White must play energetically.

10.f4 ♖c6 11.e5 ♖e8 12.♔d2

Portisch: (!)

Korchnoi: Preventing the move 12...d6, on which there follows 13.ed6 ♖d6 14.c5! and White wins a piece. Instead of 13...♖d6 possible is 13...♖d4 14.♖d4 ♔d4 but after 15.0-0-0 White stands clearly better.

12...f6

Portisch: Black has no other move with which to obtain counter-play. 12...d6?? would be a great mistake because of 13.ed6 ♖d6 14.c5 with the win of a piece.

13.c5 ♔d8

RR: Later, 13...♔c7 was tried in a number of games here, beginning with Nei - Spassky (7th USSR People's Spartakiad, Moscow 1979). After 14.♖b5 ♔d2 15.♔d2 ♔d8 16.ef6 ♖f6 17.♔g2 b6 Black has fair counter-chances; interestingly, Korchnoi played both sides of this position in 1988, v. Gulko (Lugano Open) with White, and v. Morovic Fernández (4th match-game, Viña del Mar). - Griffin.

14.a3

Korchnoi: Instead of this whole operation to exchange the dark-squared bishop, deserving attention,

in my opinion, is the simple 14.♔g2 with superiority in position for White.

14...♔c3 15.♔c3 fe5 16.♔e5

Portisch: It would certainly have been risky to continue 16.fe5?! with the idea of later castling on the queen-side.


Korchnoi: On 16.fe5 Black intended to reply 16...♔g5, holding up the opponent's development. But still, this was possibly more consistent for White than the move in the text.

16...b6

Korchnoi: But now for Black there was a point in continuing 16...♘e5 in the case of 17.♔e5 it was possible to play, analogously to in the game, 17...b6 18.♔g2 ♔a6!. Also on 17.fe5, 17...b6 gave Black satisfactory play.

RR: Later, the game Dvoirys - Tal (USSR Team Championship, Voroshilovgrad 1985) continued instead 16...♘e5 17.♔e5 a5, etc.) - Griffin.

17.♔g2



17...♘e5

Portisch: (?) 17...bc5 would be followed by 18.♔c6, but a better move was 17...♔b7! 18.0-0 ♔c8! which, because of the threat of ...♔a6, would offer Black good prospects.

Korchnoi: (!) A strange move, the consequence of an absurd oversight! Continuing simply 17...♔b7 Black, having outstripped the opponent in development, would have presented him with the greatest problems. In this case it is not easy to demonstrate that White's position is better. For example, 18.0-0 ♔c8 (threatening ...♔a6) 19.♖fd1? ♘e5 20.♔e5 ♔g2 21.♔g2 ♔c6 22.♔g1 ♖f5 and Black has the better chances. Evidently correct is 19.♖f2!, and White retains the advantage.

18.♔a8 ♘f7

Portisch: After the game Korchnoi admitted that he had not noticed that after 18...♙a6 White could have taken the bishop, and that he was not obliged to play 19.♚e5, as he had thought.


Korchnoi: I had intended to play here 18...♙a6 19.♚e5 ♜a8 20.0-0-0 ♘c4 21.♚c3 ♙d5 22.♞he1 ♞f6 with excellent play, and suddenly saw that White replies 19.♚a6 ♜a8 20.0-0-0 and Black can resign. I had to play more modestly.

19.♙g2

Portisch: (?) White goes wrong. After 19.♙f3! bc5 20.♞c5 ♜b6 21.♚f2 ♜b5 22.♙e2 he would have a winning position.

Korchnoi: White has a winning position. It was possible to simply castle, since the variation (19.0-0) 19...bc5 20.♞c5 ♜b6 21.♚f2 d5 will not do, on account of 22.f5. However, the move in the text also does not spoil anything.

19...bc5 20.♞c5 ♜b6



Portisch: (!) I failed to notice now that after having won an exchange, the position isn't as simple as I thought.

21.♚f2

Korchnoi: Also not the best move. More energetic was 21.b4 a5 22.♞a4 ♜b8 23.b5 or 22...♚a7 23.♚f2 with a completely winning position.

21...♚b5

Portisch: (!)

22.♙f1

Portisch: (!) After the game I was asked why I had accepted a draw by repetition. During the game, and later on when analysing it, neither I nor my opponent could find a follow-up which would give


White the advantage. In view of my limited time, I did not wish to take any chances because I was hoping to win my four-game match against Korchnoi.

At first I thought 22.0-0 was a good move, but decided against it because of 22...♘fd6! with the threat of ...♘c4 together with ...♙a6, which gives Black attacking chances. 22.♙f3 would mean a loss of a tempo, and after 22...d6 23.♘e4 ♙a6 it is not clear how White's king can escape; therefore Black has compensation for the material loss.

Later that evening, after the game was over, I discovered the path that would have led to victory - 22.♖d1! with the direct threat of 23.♘d3 to consolidate the position with castling on the king-side.

Of course I would have played on had I noticed this possibility during the game, since I would not be risking anything then. Thus my only mistake was that I did not ask the captain of the team if he agreed with a draw. However, without 22.♖d1!, who knows what could have happened in the game, since both players were running short of time.

22...♙c6 23.♙g2 ♙b5 24.♙f1 ♙c6 25.♙g2



Korchnoi: Instead of this repetition of moves, White could with full justification play for a win: 25.♖g1 ♘e5 (here is what had scared by opponent - on 26.♙g2 there follows 26...♙c5) 26.♙e2 d6 27.♙e3! and Black stands badly! Admittedly, at this point Portisch had remaining only 25 minutes for 16 moves in a complicated position, and one can understand him...

Agreed drawn. ½ : ½

[Korchnoi/Portisch]

Board 4

Lev Polugaevsky – Vlastimil Hort [D 53]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.c4 ♘f6 2.♘c3 e6 3.d4 d5 4.♙g5 ♙e7 5.e3 h6 6.♙h4 b6

Hort: (!) Black experiments with an accelerated version of Tartakower's variation. This game is an interesting one from the theoretical point of view, though the queens were exchanged at an early stage of the game.

7.cd5 ♖d5 8.♙e7 ♚e7 9.♗d5 ed5 10.♞c1 ♙b7

Polugaevsky: The opponents are playing the Makogonov - Bondarevsky system in the Queen's Gambit. Black's last move is inaccurate. Most often of all Black's bishop goes to the square e6. Correct is 10...0-0. Now White could play simply 11.♗f3. But he prefers the manoeuvre ♗g1-e2-f4.

11.♗e2

Hort: This was the best move, since the knight moves to f4, where it can be more effective.

11...♚b4

Polugaevsky: Black aims at simplification. Also possible was 11...0-0.

12.♚d2

Polugaevsky: Deserving attention is the double-edged 12.♗c3.

12...♚d2 13.♙d2 ♙d7

Polugaevsky: (!) The best move in the given position. The king in the centre will defend the weaknesses on the queen's flank.

14.h4


Polugaevsky: (!) White aims, with the advance of the pawn, to blockade Black's king's flank, which will be useful to him in the future.

14...♗c6 15.♗f4 ♙d6 16.h5 ♗e7

Polugaevsky: If 16...♗d8, then 17.♞h3 ♗e6 18.♗e6 fe6 19.♞g3 with the advantage.

Hort: Another manoeuvre which presented itself was 16...♗d8, which would however not be good because of the counter-manoeuve ♞h1-h3-g3.

17.♙e2



Polugaevsky: Deserving attention is 17.♙d3, preparing the transfer of the rook 18.♖h3-g3. But Black could, in his turn, reply 17...♙c8 and then 18...♙d7.

17...c5

Polugaevsky: (?) A serious positional mistake, making Black's situation very serious. It was necessary to restrict himself to waiting tactics with 17...c6 and then 18...♙c8 and 19...♙d7.

Hort: (?) A positional mistake which exposes Black's king. Another possibility was 17...c6 followed by the manoeuvre ...♖a8-c8-c7 with a slight advantage for White.

18.dc5

Polugaevsky: (!)

18...bc5 19.♙f3 ♖ab8 20.♖hd1

Polugaevsky: Now it becomes clear that the black king feels very uncomfortable in the centre of the board. The whole time the break e3-e4 is threatened.

20...♖hd8 21.♙e1

Hort: White's position is much better; he is exerting pressure along the central files.


21...♙c6

Hort: Another error. 21...a5 would be better, in order to prevent, with 22.♘d3 ♖dc8 23.b3 a4, White's knight from reaching the b2-square.

22.b3 a5

Polugaevsky: Otherwise Black cannot create any counter-play at all.

23.♘d3 ♖b5



24. ♖b2!

Polugaevsky: With this manoeuvre of the knight White puts before Black the necessity to sacrifice a pawn. Black's following move is forced, since 25. ♖a4 and 26. ♕e2 is threatened.

Hort: (!) White has a great advantage. One could say that Black's prospects are very dim. This whole game shows that one must not play expressly to draw.

24... ♔c7

Hort: The best move and the only chance. Black surrenders a pawn in the hope of getting a draw.

25. ♖a4

Polugaevsky: White could have not hurried to win the pawn, but after the preparatory 25. ♖d2 there would all the same have followed 25...c4.

Hort: 25. ♖d2 was probably better.


25...c4

Polugaevsky: In a difficult situation Black does not lose spirit and, ridding himself of the weak pawns in the centre, obtains counter-chances.

26. bc4 dc4 27. ♖c4

Polugaevsky: It is difficult to say whether the variation 27. ♖d8 ♔d8 28. ♕c6 ♖c6 29. ♖c4 ♖e5 was stronger.

27... ♖d1



28.♔d1

Hort: A pleasant surprise for Black, who was sure that after 28.♔d1 ♕d6 29.♙c6 ♜c6 he was lost, although White would have to play very carefully.

28...♕d6 29.g3

Polugaevsky: Perhaps the only mistake by White in this game.

The more correct 29.♞d4 ♞d5 30.♞f4! and then 31.♙b3, or 29...♕c7 30.g3 ♜d5 31.♙b3, gave White definite chances of victory.

29...♜d5

Hort: Black's position has suddenly become very active.

30.♜c3 ♜c3

Hort: The simplest move. The reply 30...♞b2? is out of the question because of 31.♞d4! (definitely not 31.♞c6? because of 31...♕c6 32.♙f3 ♕d6 33.♙d5 ♞c2 and Black would be better off) 31...♕c5 32.♞d5 and White wins.

31.♞c3 ♙d5 32.a3 ♞b2 33.♞d3 ♕c5

Hort: White no longer has any winning chances, although he has an extra pawn. Polugaevsky now repeated the position three times, and a draw was agreed.

34.♞c3 ♕d6 35.♞d3 ♕c5 36.♞c3

Polugaevsky: White had not noticed that after 36...♕d6 the position is repeated for the third time, but in fairness we note that he does not have a win.

Drawn. ½ : ½

[*Hort/Polugaevsky*]

Board 5

Svetozar Gligorić – Efim Geller [E 92]

‘Rest of the World’ - USSR

1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 g6 3.♗c3 ♕g7 4.e4 d6 5.♗f3 0-0 6.♖e2 e5 7.d5 a5

Gligorić: The favourite method of Geller and Stein. Black posts the knight at a6 and then proceeds to develop the queen’s wing, preparing counter-action on the other side.

8.♖g5

Gligorić: In the 2nd round White tried to gain the advantage with 8.♖e3.


8...h6 9.♖h4 ♗a6

Gligorić: 9...g5 would weaken the light squares on the king’s wing, and accordingly Black avoids that move.

10.0-0

Gligorić: (!) In Bukić - Geller (Budva, 1967) the continuation was 10.♗d2 ♕d7 11.0-0 ♖e8 12.b3 ♗h7! 13.♞b1 h5! 14.h3 ♖h6 15.a3 ♗c5 16.b4 ab4 17.ab4 ♗a4 18.♗a4 ♞a4 with sufficient counter-play for Black. The move in the game plans a more active role for the white king’s knight.

10...♕d7



11.♗e1

Gligorić: (!)

Geller: In the year 1968, during the match USSR v. Yugoslavia, Gligorić twice played in this position 11.♗d2 against me. Also in our encounter in the international tournament at Belgrade (1969) he employed, admittedly in a slightly different position, this same ‘standardised’ move. It could be thought that on the basis of these encounters, and also as a result of the experience in the 2nd round,

that Gligorić had become convinced that in such positions the knight must stand at d3. Indeed, here White's knight supports in the best way White's offensive on the queen's flank.

11...♞c5 12.♞d3 b6

Gligorić: 12...♞d3 13.♞d3 b6 would give White the more agreeable position.

13.f3 ♔e8

Geller: A significant inaccuracy, which leads to a loss of time for Black. Better was 13...♞c8.

14.♞c5

Gligorić: Now is the moment for the exchange (when it is harder for Black's knight to reach d6), since the manoeuvre b2-b3, a2-a3 and b3-b4 is much too slow; in the end Black simply replies ...♞c5-a4 and exchanges his knight under more favourable conditions.

14...bc5

Gligorić: 14...dc5 is also possible, but the circumstances are no longer as good as in the previous encounter between the same opponents in the 2nd round.


15.a4

Gligorić: (!) Establishing the weakness of the pawn at a5 and providing a strong base for the knight at b5. White has some advantage.

15...♞h5 16.♞b5 ♔b8

Geller: This move too is a loss of time. Better was 16...♞c8.

17.♞d3



Gligorić: (!) Because of the need to defend the queen's wing the black pieces are not co-ordinating very well, so the most important thing now is to restrict Black's counter-action on the king's wing.

Geller: It is essential to preserve this bishop from exchange.

17...♞f4

Gligorić: This knight has no future here. Another possibility is 17...f5.

Geller: (?) This move is a serious mistake, which puts Black's game in a doubtful position. 17...f5 ought to be played, after which Black could have had counter-play in the centre and also on the king's flank.

18.♙c2 f5 19.♞a3


Gligorić: 19.♜h1 was perhaps better.

Geller: (!)

19...♞f7 20.♜h1

Gligorić: 20.♞b3 ♚c8 would be pointless.

20...♚c8 21.♙e1



Geller: Gligorić has conducted this part of the game very finely and has achieved a significant positional advantage.

21...♞h5

Geller: Alas! The mistake must be belatedly recognised.

22.ef5

Gligorić: 22...f4 would be unpleasant. But in this way White maintains pressure on both sides, and the bishop at c2 has an important task.

22...♙f5

Gligorić: Otherwise, it would be difficult for Black to mobilise his pieces on the queen's wing. chess-touring.com

23.♙f5

Glorigić: Maybe it would have been better not to make this exchange, but the text move is a good one.

23...♗f5 24.g3 ♘f6 25.♖e3

Glorigić: The battle now centres on the king's wing and White accordingly redeploys his pieces to better squares.


25...♚d7 26.♙c3 ♕h8 27.♖ee1 ♗a6

Glorigić: Black is blockaded on the queen's wing and is in a hurry to free himself. White could have organised an attack on a5 even earlier.

28.♚d2 c6

Geller: (!) Black is suffocating, and his last move, although not changing the assessment of the position, promises him some prospects of enlivening the play.

29.dxc6 ♗c6 30.♖d1 ♘e8



31.♚g2

Glorigić: (?) There was no time now for 31.♙a5 because of 31...f4 and perhaps ...e5-e4. A better move would have been 31.♚d5 or 31.♚e2 or 31.b3. The move in the game relieves Black of many difficulties.

Geller: (?) Up to this point Glorigić had played irreproachably and has achieved a winning position. The continuation 31.♚d5! put Black in an unenviable situation.

31...♗c8! 32.♖d5

Glorigić: (?) Another loss of tempo, but Black's position was so critical that even now White retains a slight advantage.

32...♙e6 33.b3


Glorigić: White can do nothing to prevent Black from achieving ...d6-d5.

Geller: With this move White perhaps lets slip all of his chances. Correct was 33.♖fd1.

33...♘f6 34.♗dd1 d5 35.cd5 ♘d5 36.♙d2

Geller/Glorigić: (!)

36...♘c3 37.♙c3 ♗d7



Glorigić: White was uncomfortably strong on the d-file, so Black offers a pawn, hoping for counter-play. A simple answer to 37...e4 would be 38.♙e3.

38.♙c2

Glorigić: (?) After 38.♙c5 ♗c6 39.♙e3 White would have an extra pawn and good winning chances with the manoeuvre ♘b5-a3-c4.

Geller: In the case of the acceptance of the pawn sacrifice, with 38.♙c5 ♗c6 39.♙e3 ♗c2 40.♘a3 ♗a2 41.♘c4 f4! Black obtains a dangerous attack.

38...♗c6 39.♗d7 ♙d7 40.♗d1 ♙e6 41.g4

Geller/Glorigić: (!)

41...c4

Glorigić: (!)

Geller: (!) Here the game was adjourned and a draw was agreed without resumption. Indeed, after the best moves for both sides 42.bc4 e4! 43.gf5 ♙f5 44.♙e4 ♙e4 45.fe4 ♗c4 a draw is inevitable.

42.bc4

Glorigić: A dubious line is 42.gf5 cb3!. After 42...e4! 43.gf5 ♙f5 44.♙e4 ♙e4 45.fe4 ♗c4 46.♘d6

♖a4 47.e5 ♖a2! 48.♗e1 ♕f8

White has nothing, while on 43.♘d4 there follows 43...♗c4 (43...♕d4 44.♗d4 ef3 45.♗c3!) 44.♖c1! ♗c2 45.♖c2 ♖c2 46.♘c2 with a draw.

Agreed drawn. ½ : ½

[Geller/Gligorić]

Board 6

Vasily Smyslov – Fridrik Ólafsson [E 05]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.c4 e6 2.g3 d5 3.♗g2 ♘f6 4.♘f3 ♗e7

Ólafsson: I had already made up my mind to open up the game with 4...dc4, but I was not quite sure how to cope with Smyslov's innovation 5.♘a3!. That is why I delayed this capture.

5.0-0 0-0 6.d4 dc4

Ólafsson: A solid line is 6...♘bd7 followed by 7...c6 and 8...b6 or 8...b5.


7.♗c2

Ólafsson: This cunning move invites Black to play 7...b5, which would be very bad because of 8.a4 and Black cannot play 8...c6 because of 9.ab5 cb5 10.♘g5!.

7...a6

Ólafsson: After the game it seemed to be doubtful judgement on my part to play this opening against a leading expert in it. Another day I might try 7...c5!.

8.♗c4 b5 9.♗c2 ♗b7 10.♗f4



Ólafsson: It is not clear to me what Smyslov intended to play after 10...♘d5 but it seems to me that

Ólafsson: (!) White would lose the exchange after 13.♙c7 ♜fd5, or at least Black would get a very satisfactory game. The question is now whether Black can play 13...c5.

13...♜bd5

Ólafsson: I played this move as a safety measure as I did not want to weaken my king's side after 13...c5 14.♙f6 gxf6. Black is in fact very badly off in this position. White simply plays 15.♞c3 followed by 16.♚h6 and the various threats to Black's king's position should prove decisive.

RR: In fact, subsequently this line was shown to be relatively harmless for Black; it occurred, for example, in the game G. Agzamov - Karpov (50th USSR Championship, Moscow 1983), where Black continued 15...♞d8. - Griffin.

After 14...♙f6 15.dc5 there seems to be no way to regain the pawn on c5.


14.♞bd2

Ólafsson: (!) Another strong move which I had overlooked. It does not directly prevent ...c7-c5, but the consequences of that move would be bad for Black: 14...c5 15.e4! ♜b4 16.e5 ♜fd5 17.♙e7 ♜e7 18.♚c5 ♚c5 19.dc5. The point is now that Black cannot regain the pawn by means of 19...♞d3 because of 20.♞b3. Black's position remains inferior. However, this may have been the best fighting chance for Black, as his next move leads to a strategically lost position.

14...h6

Smyslov: If 14...c5, then 15.e4 ♜b4 16.e5 ♜fd5 17.♙e7 ♜e7 18.♚c5 ♚c5 19.dc5 ♞d3 20.♞b3 ♞b2 21.♞d7 with advantage for White.

15.♙f6 ♜f6 16.♞b3



Smyslov: Now White prevents the move ...c7-c5 and achieves a noticeable supremacy.

Ólafsson: White has not gained command of the important c5-square, and it is no exaggeration to

state that the rest of the game is only a matter of technique for White.

16...♙d6 17.♘c5 ♙d5 18.♘e5

Ólafsson: (!)


18...♙g2

Ólafsson: The threat was 19.e4.

19.♔g2 a5 20.♚e3

Ólafsson: It is easy to see that Black's freedom of manoeuvre is hampered by the white knights and he will have to exchange one of them if he is going to have any fighting chance at all.

20...♙c5 21.dxc5 ♚a6 22.♚d3 ♘d5 23.e4



23...♘f6

Smyslov: (?) Better was 23...♘b4 24.♚d7 ♔f6, although after 25.a3 White retains the initiative.

24.f3 c6

Smyslov: Black has no counter-play, while White could continue 25.c6, preparing the invasion of the knight at d7.

Ólafsson: This of course leaves a terrible weakness at d6, but how was Black to continue?

25.♚e3 ♜ad8 26.♜d6 ♜d6 27.cd6 c5

Smyslov: Black gives up a pawn, in order to free himself somewhat.

28.♚c5 b4 29.♜e1 ♜d8

Smyslov: If 29...♜c8, then 30.♚d4 ♜c2 31.♔g1 ♜e2 32.♜d1 ♜c2 33.d7! and White wins.

Ólafsson: 29...♜c8 may have been slightly better.


30.♖c6 ♜a8 31.♗e7 ♘h7 32.e5 ♗d7 33.♞c2 g6 34.f4 ♗b6 35.♞e2 ♞b7 36.♞f3 ♞a6 37.♞c1 ♗c4
38.♞e2

Smyslov: The last moves took place in mutual time trouble. White avoids the trap 38.♞c4 ♞c4 39.♞a8 ♞e2 with perpetual check.

38...♞b7 39.♘g1 ♗d6

Smyslov: The battle is lost, and Black decides on extreme measures, giving up a piece for the dangerous passed pawn.

40.ed6 ♞b6 41.♞f2 ♞d6



Ólafsson: The rest of the game is of course without interest. White will win, provided he does not show undue carelessness.

42.♗c8

Smyslov: (!) The sealed move. In the case of 42...♞c8 43.♞c8 ♞d1 44.♘g2 ♞d5 45.♞f3 ♞d2 46.♘h3 the king escapes from pursuit.

42...♞d3 43.♗b6 ♞d8 44.b3 ♞f5 45.♗c4 ♞d3 46.♗e5 ♞c3 47.♞d2 ♞c1 48.♞c1

Smyslov: Black's position is lost. However, he continues to offer desperate resistance, sensing the important significance of this encounter, which decided the fate of the match.

48...g5 49.♞d2 ♘g7 50.♞d3 ♞f6 51.♞d4 ♞f5 52.♞d3 ♞f6 53.♞e4 ♞d8 54.♗f3 ♞d1 55.♘f2 ♞c1
56.♞e3

Smyslov: (?) This prolongs the struggle. Immediately decisive was 56.fg5 hg5 57.♞e3, forcing the exchange of queens.

56...♞b1

Smyslov: (!)

57.♖e2 g4 58.♗e5 h5 59.♔g2 f6 60.♗d3 ♕f7 61.♗f2 ♕e7 62.h3 f5 63.hg4 fg4 64.♗d3 ♕f7 65.♕h2

Smyslov: (!)

65...♖a1 66.♗e5 ♕f8 67.♖d2

Black resigned. 1 : 0

[Ólafsson/Smyslov]

Board 7

Wolfgang Uhlmann – Mark Taimanov [A 17]

‘Rest of the World’ - USSR

1.♗f3

Taimanov: My first little success. Uhlmann avoids a continuation of the theoretical debate over his variation in the Queen’s Indian Defence.

1...♗f6 2.c4 e6 3.♗c3 ♗b4

Taimanov: Knowing that Uhlmann does not like the Nimzo-Indian Defence, I decided to perplex him somewhat with this unusual move.

4.g3 0-0 5.♗g2 d5 6.a3 ♗e7

Uhlmann: After 6...♗c3 7.bc3 White has a slight advantage.

7.d4


Taimanov: Finally, after opening manoeuvring, the structure of the game has been determined. There has arisen a position characteristic of the Catalan Opening, wherein I considered that the tempo won by White (a2-a3) is less significant than the somewhat unusual (for this system) development of the knight at c3, which creates concerns over the defence of the c4-pawn.

7...c6 8.0-0 ♗bd7 9.♖d3

Uhlmann: 9.b3 is stronger, as the following variation shows: 9...b6 10.♗b2 ♗b7 11.♗e5! ♗e5 12.de5 ♗d7 13.cd5 cd5 14.f4 with an advantage for White. If after 11.♗e5! Black plays 11...♖c7, then 12.♖c1 follows, and White has the better prospects.

Taimanov: Already 9...dc4 was threatened and White has to bring the queen out to an ‘uncomfortable’ position.

9...a5



Taimanov: Black intends on 10...e4 d4 11...♖e4 to blockade the queen's flank with the move 11...a4. All the same, this was the best plan for White.

10.♙f4 b6 11.cd5 ♙a6

Taimanov: (!) Possibly, this intermediate move had been under-estimated by Uhlmann in his preliminary calculations?

It is clear that after 11...cd5 12.♘b5 White's position would have been better.

12.♚b1 cd5


Uhlmann: I planned to answer 12...♘d5 with 13.♞c1.

13.♞e1

Taimanov: (?)

Uhlmann: This loss of a tempo cedes the initiative to the opponent. The correct move was 13.♞c1 immediately.

13...♞c8 14.♞c1



Taimanov: After lengthy deliberation Uhlmann understood that his intended plan of advancing e2-e4 would have led only to a weakening of the central squares.

Therefore, he changed plans as he went along. However, marking time in this way obviously does not result in any improvement to White's position.

14...b5

Taimanov: Not waiting until White begins play on the queen's flank with the advance of the b-pawn, Black himself begins play there. This move, however, is associated with a tactical oversight, alas, not the only one in this game. Deserving attention is 14...♘h5 15.♙d2 f5 with an excellent game for Black.

15.b4 ♖b6

Taimanov: I had intended here the move 15...♘b6, with the idea after 16.ba5 ♘c4 17.♘b5 ♖a5 18.a4 ♘e4 to obtain an enterprising position at the cost of a pawn, but at the last moment I noticed the simple refutation 16.♘b5! ♙b5 17.ba5.

I will note further that I did not like the immediate 15...a4 on account of 16.♘e1 followed by the transfer of the knight to c5.


16.♙f1

Taimanov: This good idea 'takes aim' at the b5-pawn, but perhaps still better was 16.ba5 ♖a5 17.♙d2.

16...a4

Uhlmann: 16...ab4 17.ab4 ♖c4 18.♘a2 ♘e4 19.♙e3 would have been better, with a slight advantage for Black.

17.♖d3



17...♖c6

Taimanov: (?) While this move involves still another oversight. Correct was 17...♖c4 with a fully equal game for Black.

Uhlmann: Black throws caution to the winds. He should have played 17...♖c6 after the manoeuvre ♘d1-b2 the position would have been equalised.

18.♘e5 ♘e5

Uhlmann: 18...♖cc8 was necessary.

19.de5 ♘g4

Taimanov: Naturally, not 19...♘d7 on account of 20.e4 d4 21.♘a4! ba4 22.♖c6 ♙d3 23.♖b6 ♙f1 24.♖b7.

Uhlmann: 19...♘d7 would be followed by 20.e4 and now Black's answer 20...d4 is countered by 21.♘a4! ba4 22.♖c6 ♖c6 23.♗a6 with a great advantage for White.


20.♗f3 f5

Uhlmann: Probably 20...♘h6 would give the best chances for defence.

21.h3 g5

Taimanov: I frankly admit that this sharp thrust was no flash of temperament, but bitter necessity. Initially I had intended to play here 21...♘h6, since the exchange 22.♙h6 gh6 is not dangerous for Black. However, at the last moment I saw that on 21...♘h6 there is the strong reply 22.♙e3 followed by 23.♘d5! Thus, I began to play va banque.

22.hg4 gf4 23.♗f4



Uhlmann: Another possibility was 23.gf5 ♖f5 24.♙h3! with advantage.

23...d4

Uhlmann: Regardless of the consequences Black should have complicated the position with 23...♞c4. In that case White would have two possibilities: 24.♘d5 ed5 25.♞c4 dc4 26.gf5 ♙b7 with an uncertain outcome; 24.♚h6 (a better continuation) 24...♞g4? 25.♘d5 ♞g3 26.♙g2 ♞g2 27.♔g2 ♙b7 28.e4, winning. If after 24.♚h6 Black plays 24...fg4, then there follows 25.e3 with an extra exchange, as the rook at c4 cannot move on account of 26.♘d5.

Taimanov: I had believed in this position. It seemed to me that the threats along the f- and c-files could compensate for the sacrificed pawn. However, although I thought for around an hour here, I could find nothing good. Maybe there was nothing?

I also examined the following possibilities: 23...♞c4 24.♚h6 ♞g4 25.♘d5 ♞g3 26.♙g2 ♞g2 27.♔g2 ♙b7 28.e4! and White wins. 23...♞fc8 24.gf5 ♞c3 25.♞c3 ♞c3 26.f6! and Black stands badly. 23...fg4 24.♚g4 ♔h8 25.e3 ♚c7 26.♚d4 and Black has no compensation whatsoever for the pawn.

Therefore I decided to offer a sacrifice of another pawn, which seemed to me to be tempting.


24.♘d1 fg4 25.♞c6 ♚c6 26.♞c1

Taimanov: (!)

26...♚d7

Uhlmann: If 26...♚d5 then 27.♙g2!.

27.♚g4 ♔h8 28.♙g2



Taimanov: Now everything became obvious. White has not only an extra pawn, but also a dominating position. The remainder is clear without explanation.


28...♙c8

Uhlmann: Also after 28...d3 there is no hope for Black because of 29.ed3 ♔d3 30.♖e6 ♙g5 31.♖a1 ♙c8 32.♖d6, winning.

29.♘b2 ♖g8 30.♗h3 ♙g5 31.♖c2 ♗f7 32.♘d3 ♙d7 33.♖c7 ♖c8 34.♖c8 ♙c8 35.♗g4 ♙h6 36.♗d4 ♙d7 37.♘c5 ♙e8 38.♗d8

Uhlmann: 38.♙h3 would also ensure a rapid victory.

38...♙f8 39.♗c8 ♙c5 40.♗c5 ♔g7 41.♙c6 ♙c6 42.♗c6 ♗f5 43.♗b5 ♗b1 44.♔h2 ♗f5 45.♗d7 ♔h6 46.♗d4 ♔g7 47.♔g2



Taimanov: Here the game was adjourned and without resuming play I recognised my defeat.

1 : 0

[*Taimanov/Uhlmann*]

Board 8

Mikhail Botvinnik – Milan Matulović [A 89]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.♘f3 g6 2.c4 ♗g7 3.d4 f5

Botvinnik: A Russian adage says that one should play, and not be concerned with avenging a loss. Clearly, Matulović ought not to have played the Dutch Defence, knowing that I am an expert in it. If he wanted to avenge himself for the defeat in the first round he ought to have chosen another opening. The further course of events justifies this opinion.

Matulović: Interesting opening tactics. While in the 2nd round Botvinnik transposed the English Opening into the Sicilian Defence, now, by varying the move-order, Black takes the game into the Dutch Defence, Leningrad Variation.

4.g3 ♘f6 5.♗g2 0-0 6.0-0 d6 7.♘c3 ♘c6


Botvinnik: This leads to known schemes of the King's Indian Defence, with the difference that the black f-pawn finds itself not at f7, but at f5. The weakness of having the black pawn at f5 consists in the fact that if Black cannot successfully advance ...e7-e5, the square e6 in his position remains weak. This is the decisive strategic factor around which the further course of the struggle between White and Black takes place. White's reply is accordingly forced.

8.d5 ♘a5

Matulović: At this point, Larsen played 8...♘e5 against Gligorić. In my opinion, 8...♘a5 is better,

since here by playing simply 9.♘e5 de5 10.e4 White would gain some advantage.

9.♘d2



Matulović: Surely the best continuation. In the game Benkő - Tal (Candidates' Tournament, 1959), 9.♙d3 was tried, but that move has not stood the test of time.

9...c5 10.a3

Botvinnik: At first sight it could seem that this move lacks point and in essence represents a loss of time, since Black without difficulty prevents the intended move b2-b4. However, it is precisely with his 10th move that White confronts the opponent with difficulties, since he does not permit Black to play ...e7-e5! If, for example, 10...e5, there follows 11.b4.

Matulović: This is better than 10.♙c2, which is usually favoured here. Botvinnik takes advantage of the awkwardly-posted knight to prepare for action on the queen-side, and already threatens 11.b4.

10...♙d7

Botvinnik: Preventing 11.b4 cb4 12.ab4 ♘c4 13.♘c4 ♙c7, and Black regains the piece. But White does not intend to play b2-b4; he continues to follow the classical plan in this position, which appeared for the first time in the game Botvinnik - Geller (USSR Championship, 1952). The only difference is that now the black pawn is already at f5.

Matulović: The threat of clearing the c-file, by which the threat of 11.b4 is indirectly countered, comes from Tal.


11.♙c2

Matulović: 11.b4 does not work because of 11...cb4 12.ab4 ♘c4! 13.♘c4 ♙c7! and after 14.♙b3 ♜fc8 Black would regain the piece with an extra pawn.

11...♙c7

Botvinnik: Once again preventing b2-b4.

12.b3 a6 13.♙b2 b5



14.♞d1

Botvinnik: A typical manoeuvre in this position. The knight cedes the place to the bishop, which from c3 will attack the black knight at a5, while the knight itself is transferred via the square b2 to d3, i.e. to f4.

Matulović: The usual continuation is 14.♞ab1 and after 14...♞ab8 15.♞d1. With the text move Botvinnik keeps his rook on the a-file, threatening 15.cb5 ab5 16.b4, taking advantage of the fact that the queen at c7 is undefended.

14...bc4 15.bc4 ♞ab8 16.♙c3 ♞g4

Botvinnik: Black falls in with the plans of White, whose main task is to exchange the dark-squared bishops.

After this exchange Black's advantage on the b-file loses significance. Thus, Black is left without genuine counter-play and White quietly carries out his plan, associated with the advance of the e-pawn. Instead of the move in the text, Black ought to continue 16...♞b7.

Matulović: Probably Black's most active move, as the natural 16...e5 is not good because of 17.de6 ♙e6 18.♞a4!, and Black loses a pawn.

17.♙g7

Botvinnik: White immediately agrees to the exchange of bishops, in order that Black should not have time to pull himself together and to play ...♞g4-f6!


17...♞g7 18.♞c3 ♞g8 19.♞b2 ♞b7

Matulović: The position is now defined, and the plans of the opposite sides are evident. In an almost

balanced position, White's chances lie on the king-side, which has been weakened somewhat and where the square e6 should be the base for White's sorties against the opponent's king.

The following manoeuvres, after the exchange of the major pieces in order to neutralise Black's action on the other side, clearly show White's idea. Black's hopes lie on the queen-side and on the b-file. When the rooks are exchanged, Black must penetrate White's position with his queen, and compensate for the weakness of e6 by attacking the weak points at a3 and c4. However, the secure position of White's king allows him greater freedom of action, so that he has a slight advantage.

20. ♖d3 ♜fb8 21. ♝ab1



Botvinnik: Now, after the exchange of bishops, the knight has occupied the d3-square. There only remains to agree to the exchange of rooks!

21... ♜b1 22. ♝b1 ♜b1 23. ♖b1 ♚b6 24. ♗d2 ♘f6 25. h3

Botvinnik: (!) It is still necessary to find a shelter for the king, removing it from the 1st rank.

25... ♔f7

Matulović: Misjudged, since Black will not be able to protect e6. The right way was to move his awkwardly-placed knight at a5 by way of b7-d8 straight to f7, to protect the square g5.

26. ♔h2 ♗b7

Botvinnik: Black understands that the knight is doing nothing at a5 and he transfers it to the centre, into the very heat of the battle. Thus, it becomes clear why the move 25... ♔f7 was mistaken. Clearly, the square f7 is the most suitable from the knight, coming from a5.


27. e4

Botvinnik: Beginning decisive operations.

Matulović: White hastens to push through his plan of action on the king's wing before Black can

bring up reinforcements. Because of the threat of 28.e5 Black's reply is forced.

27...fe4 28.♖e4 ♗d8



Botvinnik: Nothing was given by 28...♗b1 29.♗d2 ♗a2 30.♗c1, while on 29...♗d1 there follows 30.♗f3.

29.♗g5

Botvinnik: With this move White loses the advantage(!) and gives Black the possibility of correcting his mistake at the 25th move. Since Black had not responded with the exchange of the knight at e4, it should not have been moved away from there. The black king is concerned with the defence of the square f6, and the pressure on this square ought not to have been alleviated. Better was 29.♗f4 threatening g5, ×h7 followed by ♗h8, and also g3-g4-g5.

Matulović: 29.♗f4 would have been better, along with g3-g4 and a further restriction of Black's mobility, although after the move in the text Black's position remains worse.

29...♗e8 30.♗f4 ♗f7 31.♗fe6

Botvinnik: No good is 31.♗h7 ♗h7 32.♗g7 ♗f8 33.♗e4 ♗e5.

31...♗g5 32.♗g5 ♗b1

Matulović: Black has improved his position by taking advantage of White's carelessness and exchanging a pair of knights. White's advantage has almost completely vanished.

33.♗e4


Botvinnik: A final attempt to strengthen the attack. On 33...♗f1 34.♗b2 Black would be left defenceless. However, he finds an ingenious saving resource.

33...♗a2

Botvinnik: (!) Black attacks the square f2 and gains a tempo for the move 34...♗f5. No good now is

34.♔c2 ♕f5 35.♕a4 ♖f8, and White's position has worsened.

34.♖g2



34...♕f5

Matulović: This mistake again puts Black in a weaker position. After 34...♕a4! Black, having cleared d7 for his king and threatening 35...♘e4, would have no more problems, since White has no threats and all of a sudden his pieces are 'hanging'.

35.♕f5 g5 36.♖d3

Botvinnik: Naturally, 36.♘e6 will not do on account of 36...♖f2.


36...h6 37.♘e6 ♘e4

Botvinnik: A time-trouble attempt. Better was 37...♖f7.

38.♖f3 ♖c4

Botvinnik: Better was 38...♘f6, since after the move in the text Black again ends up in a difficult situation. Judging from everything, Black had not appreciated the possibility of the opponent's reply.

39.♖h5 ♖d7 40.♖f5 ♘f6



Botvinnik: (!) Once again, Black has decent chances of a draw.

Matulović: Here the game was adjourned and White sealed his move. Though White wins a pawn with check, this is only temporary, since the d5-pawn is weak and cannot be defended for long.

When the game was resumed a very interesting and exciting endgame began. The position was drawn the whole time, but it required Black to play very cautiously and accurately.

41. ♖c5 ♔e8

Botvinnik: If 41... ♔d8 or 41... ♔c7 White replies 42. ♖e6 and 43. ♖f4.

42. ♗g6 ♔d8 43. ♖e6 ♔d7 44. ♖f4 ♖d5

Botvinnik: A happy confluence of circumstances for Black - after 45. ♗f5 ♔c6 46. ♗c8 he can reply 46... ♖c7. Otherwise, on 46... ♔b5 there is 47.a4.

45. ♗h6 ♗e4

Matulović: It seems that White has found a way to win - he has an extra pawn and his king has a safe position, while Black must be careful not to expose his king to attack. However, in analysing the game I found several defensive points, the first of which was seen at the 46th move.

46. ♔h2 ♗e1

Botvinnik: Bad is 46... ♗f3 47. ♗e6, as is 46... ♖f4 47. ♗f4 ♗f4 48.gf4 ♔e6 49. ♔g3 ♔f5 50. ♔f3 and White wins without difficulty.

Matulović: White must now move his knight to where it no longer threatens Black, but itself becomes an object of attack.

47. ♖d3 ♗c3 48. ♗g6 ♗a3

Matulović: An important moment. Later, Black gains time to consolidate, since White will be obliged to remove the passed a-pawn from the board. White's h-pawn is still far from promotion, and its

advance exposes the white king.

49.h4

Botvinnik: Greater chances were promised by the move 49.g4 and g4-g5, since it deprived Black of the square f6.


49...♙c3 50.h5 ♚f6

Matulović: The most important moment in the defence. White cannot permit the exchange of queens, which points to a draw. He must instead occupy himself with the a-pawn. Black uses the time for a final consolidation.

51.♙g4

Botvinnik: White takes the reasonable decision to eliminate the a6-pawn.

51...e6 52.♙a4 ♔e7 53.♙a6



53...♙f3

Botvinnik: A serious mistake. After 53...♙f5 Black takes the h-pawn and the position immediately becomes drawn.

Matulović: Black has activated his pieces. The following manoeuvre by White is appropriate only when playing to win.

54.♙a7 ♔d8

Matulović: An important move. The king cannot go to e8 because of a later check at g6, nor to f6 (54...♔f6) because of 55.♙h7 with many threats.

55.♙h7 ♘f6 56.♙h8 ♔d7 57.♙g7 ♔c6 58.h6

Matulović: A final attempt which does not succeed because of the manoeuvre of Black's king at the

54th move.

The game forcibly proceeds towards a draw.


58...♖g4 59.♔g1

Botvinnik: Now the h6-pawn is defended, since after 59...♖h6 60.♙h6 ♖d3 61.♙e6 White wins.

59...♙d1

Matulović: Not 59...♖h6 because of 60.♙h6 ♖d3 61.♙e6 etc.

60.♔g2 ♙e2



61.♔h3

Botvinnik: Necessary was 61.♙c3 ♔d7 62.♙d4 e5 63.♙a7 ♔e6 64.h7 ♙d3 65.♙a2.

Matulović: The h6-pawn lacks defence and Black draws immediately. Black threatened mate with 61...♖e3.

White had another possibility - 61.♙g5, which would have been followed by 61...e5! and now 62.h7 ♙e4! would be followed by 63.♔g1 ♙h7 64.♖b4 ♔b5 65.♙g4 ♙b1 66.♔g2 ♙b4 and in the event of a queen exchange Black's king is in the 'square' of the g-pawn.

61...♖h6 62.♙h6 ♖d3 63.♙e6 ♙f1

Drawn. ½ : ½

[Botvinnik/Matulović]

Board 9

Miguel Najdorf – Mikhail Tal [E 69]

'Rest of the World' - USSR


1.♖f3 ♖f6 2.c4 g6

Tal: The very tense sporting situation that had been created before the final round in the team competition dictated the choice of the King's Indian Defence by Black. On the one hand - a complicated position without an immediate crisis; on the other - a normal game, without anything perverse. The opponents rapidly played one of the fashionable variations.

3.g3 4.g7 4.g2 0-0 5.0-0 d6 6.d4 7.♘bd7 7.♘c3 e5

Najdorf: Once again in familiar waters - the King's Indian Defence.

8.e4 c6 9.h3 ♖b6 10.♞e1



Tal: Considered to be the strongest. White, not fearing the thrust 10...ed4 11.♘d4 ♘g4, for the time being does not determine the position in the centre.

10...♞e8

Tal: In the game Botvinnik - Geller (Belgrade, 1969) Black preliminarily exchanged at d4 and won quickly, but this was not at all because of the opening. After 10...ed4 11.♘d4 ♞e8 deserving attention is 12.♘c2.

Najdorf: 10...ed4 11.♘d4 ♘g4 seems good; however after 12.♘ce2! Black gains nothing from the whole operation.

11.d5

Tal: Now, with the position of the rook at e8, White closes the centre. The advance ...f7-f5 is not so favourable for Black.

Najdorf: The pawn's advance at this point earns several tempi, Black having already moves his rook to e8. Now ...f7-f5 would have to be prepared by ...♞e8-f8 and ...♘f6-e8.

11...♘c5 12.♞b1 a5 13.♞e3 ♖c7 14.♘d2

Tal: Up to the 14th move the game had developed identically to the Portisch - Fischer (Sousse, 1967).

Najdorf: With the idea, on 18...ab4, of taking with the rook, which would not have been possible if Black had posted his other rook on b8.

18...♖d3

Tal: The preliminary capture at b4 led met with the retort (18...ab4) 19.♖b4 ♖d3 20.♙d3 ♚c3 21.♖b3 followed by the capture of b5. White does not fear the loss of the pawn at h3 - it is difficult to create an attack on the king.


19.♙d3 ♚c3 20.♖b3

Tal: White continues along the same lines. Had Black managed to close the position on the queen's flank, his position would have deserved preference.

20...♚c7

Tal: Weaker is 20...♚c8 21.ba5 ♙h3 22.♙b5.

21.ba5



Tal: Thus, White has achieved his aim, creating in the opponent's camp a weak pawn at b5.

However, Black had played for this position well in advance, having in mind an idea (see the following note).

21...♚a5

Najdorf: 21...♙h3 would not be good, as after 22.♙b5 White's passed pawn would become very significant.

22.♙h2 ♖ec8 23.♚e2

Tal: Black's idea had been the interesting exchange sacrifice 23...♖c3. The main line is 24.♖c4! ♖c4! 25.♙c4 ♖e4. This creates a complicated position that is difficult to assess. Black's pieces have come to life, which, I think, gives him quite good chances. But... the final round gave rise to caution and,

having spent a lot of time, I preferred to play in a way that would worry the rest of the team as little as possible.

23...♖b7 24.♗eb1 ♗cb8

Tal: Here on Black's suggestion, a draw was agreed. His position is somewhat cramped, but very solid, while an attempt by White to become active could enliven Black's pieces.

Najdorf: Here Tal offered a draw. White's position is slightly better. Since in a few days' time I would celebrate my 60th birthday, I was content with the 2 : 2 result against my opponent, the brilliant former World Champion.

The other possibility was 25.♖f1 with the threat of 26.a4!. For instance:

25...♗e8 26.a4 b4 27.♗a1 ♕a4? 28.♗c4 ♖a8 29.♗bb1 followed by 30.♗b2;

25...♖a4 26.♗1b2 ♗h5 27.♗b1 f5 28.♗c3 ♖a5 29.♕b5 f4 30.♕d2;

25...♖a4 26.♗1b2 ♗e8 27.♗b1 ♗c7 28.♗c3 ♖a5 and Black holds the position.

Drawn. ½ : ½

[*Najdorf/Tal*]

Board 10

Paul Keres – Borislav Ivkov [B 50]

USSR - 'Rest of the World'

1.e4 c5 2.♗f3 d6 3.♗c3 ♕g4

Keres: (?) The idea of the early exchange of the light-squared bishop, as will be seen, is inexpedient, since Black will later find it difficult to control the light squares in his position.


Ivkov: (?) This is certainly weaker than any of the conventional moves in the Sicilian Defence:

3...♗f6, 3...♗c6 or 3...a6.

4.h3

Keres/Ivkov: (!)

4...♕f3 5.♖f3 ♗c6




6.g3

Keres: The fianchetto of the light-squared bishop, judging from everything, is a good decision, since later it guarantees continual pressure on the central squares.

Ivkov: (!!) This completely ruins Black's plan, begun with 3...♗g4. I expected 6.♗b5, which does not endanger Black.

RR: Curiously, 4 years later Ivkov repeated his play in the present encounter in a game v. Jansa (IBM Tournament, Amsterdam 1974). There White preferred this continuation. - Griffin.

6...g6 7.♗g2 ♗g7 8.0-0



8...h5

Keres: A violent attempt to seize the initiative, but in view of the fact that Black has still not completed development, he cannot count on success. On the contrary, the move in the text significantly weakens Black's king's flank, and he will have many concerns in securing a safe position for his king. The natural move was 8...♘f6.

Ivkov: (??) It is true that Black's position, without the light-squared bishop, is incomplete, but it is certainly not one that cannot be held. 8...♘f6 was a good move, or 8...e6, after which White would still have to prove the advantage of the pair of bishops, which his opponent had quite unnecessarily given him. The text move can hardly be justified as a desire for 'revenge', and hence it is scarcely appropriate to tournament play.

9.d3 h4 10.g4 e5


Keres: This continuation, still further weakening the light squares in the centre, is practically forced, since White, with the move 11.♙d1 followed by 12.f4, would have obtained a clear advantage.

Ivkov: (?) Had 10...e6 been played, and after 11.♙d1 g5!, the advance of the h-pawn would have been partly justified.

11.♘d5

Keres: (!) Calculated against 11...♘ge7. This is quite understandable, but 11.♙d1 followed by 12.f4 would also have been perfectly satisfactory.

11...♘ce7



Keres: A move that is confirmation of the fact that Black's development has not gone well. Had Black tried to play 11...♘d4 then White, after 12.♙d1 ♘e6 13.f4, would have achieved an advantage.

Ivkov: I did not care for 11...♘d4 12.♙d1 ♘e6 13.f4, but even that would have been better than the move in the game.

12.♙b1

Keres: (!) An excellent move. White threatens 13.b4 and forces the opponent to weaken the queen's flank.

White thereby rules out the possibility of queen-side castling by Black, while the possibility of the reply ...f7-f5 is prevented, since the black king would very soon prove to be under the attack of the white pieces.

Ivkov: (!) An excellent wait-and-see move, which contains the threat of b2-b4.

12...♖d5 13.ed5 a5

Keres: (?)

Ivkov: (?) Already in a very difficult position, Black could have better defended himself with 13...♖e7 14.b4 b6 15.bc5 bc5 16.♗g5 f6, and castling on the king's side.

14.c3 ♖e7 15.♙e2 f5

Ivkov: Too abrupt, but what else is there? On 15...0-0 there is 16.♗g5.

16.f4 fg4

Keres: Still another inaccuracy. Although Black's position even after the best move 16...♙d7 would have been difficult, on the other hand he would have avoided the very worst. After the move in the text, Black is left virtually defenceless.

17.♙g4 ♙d7 18.fe5

Keres: Stronger was 18.♙e6!, but the move in the text is also strong enough.

18...♗e5

Keres: More exact was 18...♙g4 19.hg4 ♗e5. After the move in the text White could once again play 19.♙e6.

Ivkov: If it makes any difference, 18...♙g4 is better here, since with (18...♗e5) 19.♙e6 White could have stalemated Black.

19.♗g5 ♙g4 20.hg4 ♖h7 21.♗e4


Keres: White has achieved complete supremacy.

Black's knight has not a single free square, the weakness of the pawns at g6 and d6 impedes Black, and catastrophe threatens along the f-file. From the strategic point of view, Black is already lost.

21...♔d7 22.♖f3 ♖g8

Keres: The advance of the h-pawn is not dangerous: 22...h3 23.♖bf1 h2 24.♔h1 etc.

23.♖bf1 ♔e8



24.♔h1

Keres: (!!) A good prophylactic move, preventing the possibility of ...♘f5 and at the same time removing the king from the diagonal g1-a7 and from a possible check after the intended d3-d4.

Ivkov: Black loses his only chance to put his weakest piece to some purpose after ...♘f5.

24...h3 25.♞d1

Keres: Black is faced with large, insolvable problems. Now there is threatened 25...-- 26.d4 and after 26...cd4 27.cd4 ♕h8 28.♕d3 etc.

Ivkov: 25.d4 cd4 26.cd4 ♕d4 27.♕d3 should have been played right away; White is threatening from all sides.

25...♔d7 26.d4 cd4 27.cd4 ♕h8 28.♔h2

Keres: In such a position there is no hurry. Continuing immediately 28.♞df1 ♕d4 29.♞f7 did not decide anything on account of the reply 29...♞gg7, and therefore White essentially waits for the reply ...♞c8.

Besides, the h3-pawn proves to be under attack and it has to be continually defended.

28...♞c8 29.♞df1 ♕d4

Keres: After this move Black loses a piece, but nor was there any salvation otherwise.

Ivkov: Black could have resigned, but knowing that the time control was close at hand, he continues...

30.♞f7 ♕e5 31.♔h1 ♞f7 32.♞f7 ♞c4

Keres: Also after 32...♞e8 33.♕d3 Black has no more possibilities of defending.


33.♕g6 ♞d4

Keres: Finally, Black threatens mate, but he does not have time to carry out the threat.

34.♖e7 ♜c8 35.♟f5 ♜b8 36.♖e8 ♜a7

Keres: Or 36...♜c7 37.♟d8 ♜b8 38.♟b6#.

37.♟e3



Black resigned. 1 : 0

[Ivkov/Keres]

REACTION TO THE MATCH

Thus, the USSR team had prevailed by the smallest of margins. The match had placed a considerable strain on the Soviet players. Smyslov was later to recall, regarding his final-round game v. Ólafsson:

As it turned out, everything was decided in my game with [Ólafsson]. I had the advantage in position. But psychologically I proved to be in a very difficult situation. All of the other games were finished, while we still had around an hour to play [in the first session]. The rest of the teams (both theirs and ours) crowded around and waited. The final result depended completely on us. To make a draw would mean a draw in the match as a whole. Were I to win, we would win. Were Ólafsson to win... Imagine the situation?! I would then be the sole culprit. Imagine how much nervous energy this game cost me! One mistake by me, and the World team would be the victors. Incidentally, Botvinnik later explained the poor result of our "first boards" by precisely psychological considerations.

This game, incidentally, our reviewers did not notice. They picked out others, but everything was decided by it. That's why I at once told everyone that this victory remains for me one of the most memorable; in terms of its intensity it can only be compared with the one that made me World Champion.⁶⁵

Reactions of some of the players appear in an article *Zapiski Zhurnalista*, written by the Yugoslav journalist Dimitrije Bjelica, which appears in *Shakhmaty* (Riga), № 11, 1970.

Boris Spassky:

If one speaks openly, I expected a more imposing victory by the Soviet team. However, we deservedly won the match. I am not happy with my play. In my third game against Larsen I committed an impermissible error. The match was full of fight, and was played at a high level.

Bent Larsen:

I expected a bigger victory by the USSR. However, the Rest of the World team surprised everyone. I am not happy with my play, except in the game against Stein.

I think that Spassky too was not in the best form. Now I will leave for a tournament of four in Holland with the participation of Spassky, Botvinnik and Donner. I am an optimist by nature and I hope to become World Champion.

Tigran Petrosian:

I am not happy with my play. It was a surprise for me to appear against Fischer; I had prepared to meet Larsen. The match resulted in a great battle, but we deservedly won. (Jokingly adds) I think that the Rest of the World select was glad that I was playing in the Soviet team.

Robert Fischer:

I am happy with the result. I did not expect to gain victory over Petrosian with the score of 3 : 1. I thought that it would be more difficult to play against Petrosian than against Spassky. Petrosian was not in good form, but it must be said that I was not in my best shape either. I felt the effect of my lengthy break from chess.

Viktor Korchnoi:

Had we played another four rounds, then probably we would have achieved a bigger victory. I am not happy with my play.

Lajos Portisch:

We achieved a very fine success – this is best of all seen from the result of the first four, ‘Olympic’, boards.

Interview with S. A. Furman, conducted by A. B. Roshal, which appears in Shakhmaty (Riga), № 11, 1970.

The journalist Aleksandr Roshal, at our request, met with the trainer of the Soviet team in the ‘Match of the Century’ in Belgrade, grandmaster S. FURMAN, and had a conversation with him. Thus...

The event was exceptionally interesting, although...

- After the failure of the third round the gap in the score had narrowed to one point. Although there was no general meeting, as such, before the decisive round, the trainers and directors of the Soviet team attentively analysed the situation and came to the conclusion that it was inexpedient to take risks for the sake of increasing the advantage – what was important was victory, even if it should be by the minimal score. The team members differed in this point of view.

Is the unpleasantness of the second half of the event not explained by the self-confidence after the results of the first two rounds?

- No, everyone played normally, dilligently, and in calculated fashion. Nor does the 11-move draw in the third-round game Hort - Polugaevsky refute my opinion. Playing with black, Polugaevsky was naturally forced to fight for equality. Hort took advantage of this and exchanged most of the pieces, after which to play for the win would have been a pointless risk on the part of our grandmaster. In general though the micro-match on the fourth board proceeded in a balanced struggle, but Hort proved to be more ‘technical’.

Perhaps, more practical?

- Precisely – more technical. In the first game the Czechoslovak grandmaster had less of an advantage than Polugaevsky had in the fourth, when a draw was agreed.

How was our team in the matter of the analysis of adjourned games?

- This matter occupied not only the trainers – there were more adjourned games than there were trainers. Help was also given by the reserves and by those team members who were free of

adjournments. Mistakes after the interval were not the result of unsatisfactory analysis. Polugaevsky, for example, when adjourning the first game, sealed a very bad move, while Korchnoi in the third game committed mistakes in the process of the resumption itself, which had nothing to do with analysis.

What happened with Korchnoi?

- He was in very indifferent sporting form. Not one of his games ended naturally. In the third, where Korchnoi stood to lose, a draw was ultimately agreed. He suffered defeat in the very game where he could have counted on victory...

I would not claim that the decline in Korchnoi's form is somehow a *fait accompli*, the action of which will extend beyond the match that has just finished. Rather, it seems to me the guilt lies in his general physical condition – it was noticeably worse than it was previously.

And how would you explain the failure of Petrosian?

- In the meeting of Petrosian with Fischer, a significant role was played by psychological factors. After all, Petrosian had prepared for a battle with Larsen, whereas Fischer had studied the games of the World Championship.

RR: Where, of course, his expected opponent, Spassky, had faced Petrosian. Thus, Fischer had studied, albeit indirectly, the play of his adversary in Belgrade. The same point was made by Aleksandr Roshal in the article *Against a Blue Background*.

Here the element of surprise had no little significance. Incidentally, this is not the first time that a chessplayer not expecting to play against Fischer has lost when he then proved to be face-to-face with him. (Recall that in the Interzonal tournament in Tunisia, Reshevsky thought that his game against his compatriot would not take place, and was unable to get in fighting mood at the last moment.)

RR: Fischer was in dispute with the organisers over the playing conditions, and having formally withdrawn from the tournament, he left the city of Sousse for the capital, Tunis, evidently with the intention of returning to the USA. Having failed to appear for his 10th-round game, he was naturally defaulted. However, he was subsequently persuaded to reconsider, and returned to Sousse just in time for the 11th-round game v. Reshevsky, arriving at the board after 50 minutes had elapsed on his clock. The disoriented Reshevsky lost without a struggle.⁶⁶

I must add that Petrosian's general condition was also worse than usual. He even referred himself to a doctor.

I would not like everything that I have said to somehow cast a shadow over the strength of play of Fischer, who is perhaps the West's strongest player. Although possibly he often does not make such clear and effective moves as some other grandmasters, his play is very logical. All of his moves are links in a single solid chain.

Does this mean that the match proved difficult for our chessplayers?

- The event was exceptionally interesting, although there were too many mistakes for games between outstanding grandmasters. However, as a chessplayer, I can understand and justify these mistakes: the tension of the struggle was too great. Our opponents were in fighting mood for this occasion, and this

is natural. The Rest of the World team performed as a friendly, close-knit outfit, who were ready to fight until only the kings remained.

Who in this team performed the function of trainer?

- For preparation and analysis of games, I think that the main link there was the captain, ex-World Champion Max Euwe. He proved himself to be very good in the role of captain, and managed to create a good playing ensemble. As for purely chess trainers such as Bondarevsky and I, I do not know. But the reserve grandmasters of the Rest of the World team also took part in analysis and preparation. Grandmaster Evans? He rather fulfilled the role of Fischer's helper.

What more can you say about the play of our chessplayers?

- Keres and Geller played strongly. Botvinnik made a good showing and, when one recalls his failure to make the most of his chances, one must not forget his age and the fatigue brought on by a lengthy and acute struggle. Tal is still not completely "recovered".

The opponents of the Soviet grandmasters that I have named were weaker than those of the leaders of the USSR team. Our team is more even in strength and therefore the lower the board, the greater the difference in class between the opponents. And here the first four boards in the Rest of the World Team noticeably stood out and indeed, were of the very highest standard.

Which games played in the 'Match of the Century' were the best?

- The prize for the best game played by a Soviet grandmaster was awarded to Geller, for his victory over Gligorić. An analogous award among the foreign players went to Larsen for beating Stein. At first the Dane made a series of inaccuracies, but then exploited well all of opportunities presented to him.

Personally, I would have said Spassky's victory from the second round. He brilliantly punished Larsen for his opening transgressions and concluded the struggle in exceptionally spectacular fashion.

But what then happened to Spassky in the third round?

- He committed a vexing and, at the same time very uncharacteristic for him, oversight.

His position at that moment was worse?

- If Spassky had wanted to make a draw, then at the previous move he would have gone ♠c1 and not ♠d1, and would have stood, in my opinion, even very slightly better. Here he too was let down by psychology. No, no, most likely of all he was not under the influence of his previous victory over Larsen; he was affected only by the advantage that had been let slip. I think that, as they say, the force of inertia was at work – in this game the World Champion had the whole time had the advantage, and failed to re-orient himself.

In the fourth round Spassky did not appear, since he had a cold, and his trainer Bondarevsky decided that he should not play.

So, are you satisfied with the victory that was gained by our team?

- Of course, the score could have been greater. However, I think that in chess, a win is always a win, whether it is gained with an extra queen or with the help of a single extra pawn. It is a team game, and

one should not pay too much attention to the success or failure of its individual members. The players are often looking at the other boards and it turns out that in order not to risk anything, they agree a draw, when they can see that their comrades have the advantage...

Yes, our team won, and we are proud of this victory!

Nonetheless, the narrowness of the victory – and in particular the fact that it was achieved on the bottom boards – caused considerable shock, and a good deal of soul-searching, in Soviet chess circles.

Extract from article by T. V. Petrosian: *Kakie Izmenenia, Shakhmaty v SSSR* (№ 6, 1970). It first appeared in the Belgrade newspaper *Politika*.

What has Changed?

I think that if the match ‘World – USSR’ had taken place 15 years ago, few would have doubted in the convincing victory of the Soviet team...

...in my view, a change in relative strength has occurred; has the mastery of foreign chess-players increased, or has the formerly so tangible superiority of the representatives of the Soviet chess school diminished?

It is no secret that in the post-war years the chess world got used to the hegemony of Soviet chess-players in the international arena. Not so long ago the international tournament at Warsaw 1946 - when the relatively unknown Yugoslav master S. Gligorić finished ahead of the young Soviet chess stars, I. Boleslavsky and V. Smyslov – was recalled as a curiosity.

But today to finish ahead of Soviet grandmasters has become a rather habitual matter for the strongest foreign grandmasters. One need only recall the end of the chess year 1969, and the international tournaments in Palma de Mallorca, Belgrade and Hastings.⁶⁷

The most astounding thing is that there is no apparent reason for the slight decline in the mastery of our chess-players.

The great popularity of chess in the most varied layers of the peoples of our country continues as previously. State and public organisations have not weakened their efforts at chess propaganda, at the organisation of various events, the preparation of training cadres or the publication of chess periodicals and literature. We have witnessed, in my opinion, a slight discrepancy between the efforts and the results achieved, first and foremost in the matter of the preparation of chess-players of higher class.

It seems to me that the root of the problem is that we have had a gradual unhealthy roll towards the side of the organisation of an enormous number of events, which should have led, and did lead, to a significant decrease in the requirements for obtaining various chess titles. Previously – and in particular before the war and in the first post-war years – the acquisition of titles was, for people captivated by chess, as a rule, not an end in itself, but the logical conclusion of the study of essence of the game, the comprehension of the secrets of mastery, the accumulation of a certain chess culture

and the natural appearance of great chess strength. However for many today, the pursuit of “commissioned titles” has become a fetish, requiring only a relatively short-term effort and, naturally, less knowledge and a lower class of play. “Freshly-baked” candidate masters, masters and grandmasters give birth to their own kind... This process continues, and the saddest thing is that no end is apparent.

It is my deepest conviction that a genuine hegemony of Soviet chess could return to the principle: “Better fewer, but better”.⁶⁸

What though has changed abroad? After all, the leading foreign grandmasters are competing with our grandmaster in what is the golden age of our chess.

What has changed is the attitude to chess as one of the elements of human culture. And this is the main thing. It is precisely this that has led the fact that in Europe and America, Asia and Australia, more and more people are becoming interested in chess, while a greater number of players should naturally lead to the appearance of new, talented, chess-players. The heightened interest in chess has led to the appearance of chess publications and the organisation of events for beginner amateurs and the strongest chess-players alike. And here I think that due recognition should be paid to the great efforts of FIDE in the matter of propagandising chess and the organisation of the World Championship.

If 15-20 years ago one could have counted on the fingers of one hand the number of foreign chess professionals, in the truest sense of the word, then today the majority of participants in significant chess tournaments are people for whom chess had become a matter of life, a genuine profession, and – something that is exceptionally important – one that is relatively well paid. If earlier it was considered that the life of these people was marked by the necessity to fight in every tournament game for their daily bread, then today one may speak of the fact that constant tournament practice and the continual interaction with one another has permitted them to maintain a high level of play.

One may draw the conclusion that a certain levelling in the playing strength of leading Soviet and foreign chess-players has taken place, and today it is rather difficult to speak of the serious supremacy of Soviet chessplayers. What will happen in the coming years? Will there appear in the chess world a new Larsen, Fischer, Portisch or Gligorić, or will there appear from the great group of talented young masters in our country a new Tal or Spassky? We will wait and see!

Six months or so after these words were written, the 20-year-old Anatoly Karpov shared 1st-2nd place with Leonid Stein in the great Alekhine Memorial tournament in Moscow, ahead of Spassky, Tal, Petrosian, Smyslov and a host of other famous grandmasters. Soviet chess had a new star...

POSTSCRIPT

The subsequent fates of the players in the ‘Match of the Century’ was varied, and in some cases inextricably linked. The story of the early years of the 1970s was the inexorable rise of Bobby Fischer towards the world chess throne. Shortly after the event in Belgrade, having evidently overcome all of the internal obstacles that had lately been preventing him from playing, he won a major international event at Rovinj/Zagreb and followed this success with another important victory in the tournament at Buenos Aires (in which he scored 15/17). Then, at the end of the year, he utterly dominated in the Interzonal tournament at Palma de Mallorca, taking clear 1st place by 3½ points – though his loss to Larsen in their individual encounter must have given the Dane particular satisfaction in the light of his insistence on leading the Rest of the World team in Belgrade.

If this was the case, the satisfaction would prove to be short-lived. In the Candidates matches held during the spring and summer of 1971, the American defeated both Taimanov and Larsen by the unprecedented scores of 6 : 0. Neither player’s reputation recovered from these results. The repercussions for Taimanov were especially severe – as far as the authorities were concerned, it was unthinkable that a Soviet grandmaster could lose in this fashion – above all to a player from the cold-war enemy, the USA. As a result, his state stipend was withdrawn and he was prohibited from travelling abroad. These were difficult years for the grandmaster from Leningrad; at around that time he also separated from his wife and partner on the piano, Lyubov Bruk. The restrictions on Taimanov were lifted only in 1973.⁶⁹ Larsen, though, would remain among the world’s elite for many years, and would divide his time between Las Palmas and Buenos Aires – where in 1972 he married his second wife, Laura Beatriz Benedini, a lawyer.⁷⁰

Fischer, of course, went on to take the World Championship title from Boris Spassky in Reykjavík in 1972 – in a contest that also became known in some circles as the ‘Match of the Century’ – only to retire from chess and forfeit the title three years later. Boris Spassky bounced back from defeat in Iceland to win the 43rd USSR Championship (Moscow, 1973) – widely considered to have been the strongest championship of them all. He would emigrate to France with his third wife in 1976, and became a French citizen in 1978.

Viktor Korchnoi, too, was destined to leave the USSR in 1976, though in considerably more controversial circumstances. After sharing 1st-2nd place in the IBM tournament at Amsterdam in July of that year, he applied for political asylum in the Netherlands. As a defector, he became a ‘non-person’ in the eyes of the USSR authorities; for many years his name disappeared from the Soviet press, while the authorities refused to send representatives to any competition in which he participated, with the exception of Olympiads and qualifying events for the World Championship. Despite the pressure applied to him off-the-board, he continued to improve in strength, and his best years – when he was still well into his forties - still lay ahead of him.

Tigran Petrosian remained at the very top of world chess for another decade. He was to win the last of his four USSR Championship titles in 1975, in the Armenian capital, Yerevan. He became a bitter rival of Korchnoi’s, with whom he contested no fewer than three Candidates’ matches – losing all of them. Lev Polugaevsky, too, became a constant adversary of Korchnoi’s in the cycle of matches for

the World Championship.

The form of Mikhail Tal continued fluctuate, more or less in parallel with his health. During the years 1972-1974 he embarked on unbeaten runs of 86 and 96 games. However, between them he suffered a collapse in form, in a period that crucially included the Interzonal Tournament held in Leningrad. Nonetheless, in the decade after the match in Belgrade he would add a further three USSR Championship titles to the three he had previously, while his superlative form in the final year of the decade (including a win in the 1979 Interzonal in his home city of Riga, and a shared 1st-2nd place with World Champion Anatoly Karpov in the 'Tournament of Stars' in Montreal) would see him rise to number two in the World rankings.

Efim Geller too would experience something of an Indian summer in his chess career, winning the 47th USSR Championship (Minsk, 1979) at the age of 54, nearly a quarter of a century after his only other Soviet title. Vasily Smyslov would go still further in this regard. Few would have predicted that he would progress to the final of the Candidates' matches when well into his seventh decade.

In contrast, following the Match of the Century, Mikhail Botvinnik would play only one more tournament - at Leiden, in the Netherlands, in May 1970. His efforts in chess would subsequently be directed towards the development of chess-playing computer programs, and in the direction of his famous chess school, in which there would soon appear a truly exceptional talent – the young Garry Kasparov.

Alas, not all of the players in the Soviet team were destined to live long lives. In early July 1973, on the eve of his departure for the European Team Championship in England, Leonid Stein suffered a heart attack and died. He was only 38 years old. Two years later, while returning from a tournament in Vancouver, Paul Keres would suffer a similar fate – he died of a heart attack in Helsinki at the age of 59. There were over 100,000 mourners at his funeral, which took place in Tallinn on 10th June 1975.

The remaining players in the Rest of the World team – Portisch, Hort, Gligorić, Reshevsky, Uhlmann, Matulović, Najdorf, Ivkov and Ólafsson – remained active for many years. Lajos Portisch and Vlastimil Hort appeared in the Candidates' matches for the World Championship, while Friðrik Ólafsson would succeed Max Euwe as President of FIDE. For some, if not all of them, however, their participation in the 'Match of the Century' would be one of the defining highlights of their chess careers.

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